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ABSTRACT

This dissertation asserts that Heschel’s work ought to be viewed as affective and
emotional. Understanding Heschel’s work as both creating and encouraging particular
affects enables a more robust and fuller understanding of American Jewish postwar life.
Specifically, American Jewish postwar life was animated by a nostalgia for the shtetl, a
desire to connect with the State of Israel, a longing to create meaningful Jewish ritual,
and uncertainty about the place of American Jews in broader social justice movements.
Heschel views humans as interconnected in a web of affects and emotions; through
affects, humans are connected to God, history and memory, and one another. The
Emotional Heschel isolates emotions in particular works as indicative of the changing
emotional and cultural landscape of postwar American Jews. The Emotional Heschel
examines four constellations of affects found in Heschel’s work and speaks of these
constellations’ relevance to the changing postwar American Jewish community. Firstly,
this dissertation examines the way Heschel writes of emotions surrounding the
Holocaust and lost Eastern European Jewish community coupled with the dread and
rage Heschel encompasses when discussing the Holocaust. Secondly, this dissertation
posits that The Sabbath can be read as a discussion about changing gender norms and
debates about the authenticity and/or inauthenticity of American Judaism. Thirdly, this
dissertation isolates feelings of joy, anxiety, and embarrassment surrounding the State
of Israel in Israel: An Echo of Eternity. In Israel: An Echo of Eternity, it is appropriate to
be concerned about Israel’s survival, joyous at Israel’s military victories, and

embarrassed at being a diaspora Jew throughout Israel’s wars. Lastly, this dissertation
examines the figure of the Hebrew prophet in The Prophets in conjunction with
Heschel’s own political activism as an example of the affects and emotions experienced
during social justice work upon the existing landscape of cultural and social change of
the Jewish community.

THE EMOTIONAL HESCHEL

By
Maria Carson

B.A., DePaul University, 2009
B.F.A., DePaul University, 2009
M.A., The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2012
M.Phil., Syracuse University, 2016

Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Religion

Syracuse University
July 2021

Copyright © Maria Carson 2021
All Rights Reserved

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation would not have been possible without various kinds of support. I would like
to thank, in no particular order, the following people. Firstly, to my advisor Zachary Braiterman,
thank you for your unending enthusiasm, support, and interest in this project. You always
encouraged me to think about things in a new, interesting, and generative way. Thank you for
always believing in me and in this project. Gail Hamner, thank you for encouraging me to take
myself seriously as a thinker and a scholar, and thank you for introducing me to affect theory as
a hermeneutic. Your thoughts on what it means to be a scholar and what a dissertation ought to
be had a profound impact on me. Jim Watts, thank you for taking my thoughts on ritual theory
seriously and for always being willing to support my academic pursuits. William Robert, thank
you for teaching me that the words I write and say have weight. Coran Klaver, and Shira
Schwartz: thank you for your labor on this committee. Coran Klaver, thank you for letting me
audit your classes about affect theory. Shira Schwartz, thank you for being willing to be on my
committee after only getting to know me over email and Zoom. Gareth Fisher, thank you for
taking my academic teaching seriously and encouraging me whenever I felt despondent. To the
Writing Table folks and the Affect Theory Reading Group – thank you.
I would also like to thank Chaplain Scott Kershner. Thank you for encouraging me to
write while working at Susquehanna University. Thank you for realizing early on that my
academic work and my work as a Director of Jewish Life were profoundly connected even when
I stubbornly maintained they were entirely separate from one another. You were right, of course.
Once after a hard day at work I came home, saw one of Heschel’s books and immediately burst
into tears. Heschel wouldn’t have approved of the way I handled that conflict on campus!, I
thought, sobbing, What kind of Director of Jewish Life am I?! Carla Krissinger, thank you for
being the best admin a Department of Religious and Spiritual Life could ever have. To my

v

students at Susquehanna University: Sami, Molly, Ellie, Lili, Noa, Emily, Naomi, Robert, Victoria,
Matt R., Matt W., Talia, Anna, Bri, Josh, and Sean, thank you. Your energy and commitment to
Jewish life and community has been incredibly rewarding for me.
To my PhD cohort: Lauren McCormick, Owais Khan, and Duygu Yeni -- thank you. You
were an amazing cohort to have, and I could not have asked for more supportive colleagues.
Other graduate students (who were not lucky enough to be in the best cohort ever) have helped
me tremendously: Adam DJ Brett, Courtney O’Dell Chaib, Rebecca Moody, John Borchert, Sara
Ann Swenson, Dai Newman, Mallory Hennigar, Seren Amador Gates, Wendy DeBoer, Jenny
Caplan, Patricia Giles, Jordan Brady Loewen, and Dana Lloyd: thank you. Emma Brodeur: you
were my first friend at Syracuse University, thank you for being there for me as I navigated
becoming a Jewish Studies scholar in an interdisciplinary Religion department. I do not think I
would have been able to finish this project if it had not been for the supportive and collaborative
culture in the Religion Department at Syracuse University. Deb and Jackie – that you for being
the best admins an academic Department of Religion could ever have!
My last thanks goes out to my family. Their emotional, mental, and financial support was
critical for me finishing this process. Thank you for everything. My sisters Catherine and Carolyn
gave me a sense of community, humor, and joy throughout this process. My mother Julie
endured nearly daily calls from me where I would just rattle off sentiments such as “I’m working
so hard,” “I’m tired all the time,” and “Does it sound like I know what I’m doing?” My father Chris
and my step-mother Dar-wen continuously inspired me with their strength, honesty, kindness,
and strong work ethic. To my husband Dan: thanks! You have helped me so much throughout
this process. You have not only been my constant companion; you are also are the one who
cracked the code of how to have both roman numerals and Arabic numeral page numbers in the
same word document. I love you.

vi

Table of Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
Heschel’s Life, Heschel’s Place in the Academy ...................................................................................................... 1
Overview of Thesis and Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................. 9
Defining Affect and Affect Theory......................................................................................................................... 17
Conclusion: A Return to the Universal?................................................................................................................. 27

Chapter One: Holocaust Affects ...................................................................................... 29
Introduction – Thesis and Relevance .................................................................................................................... 27
Nostalgia and Loss in The Earth is the Lord’s ....................................................................................................... 36
Elevating Eastern European Jewish Community ................................................................................................... 38
The Emotional Root of Eastern-European Jewish Culture .................................................................................... 45
Nostalgia, Melancholy, and American Jewish Reception of The Earth is the Lord’s ............................................ 49
Making the Unintelligible Intelligible .................................................................................................................... 56
Heschel’s Ambivalence About Anger and the Problem of Anger .......................................................................... 60
Universal Anger: Man is Not Alone ....................................................................................................................... 69
Dread and Death in Man is Not Alone .................................................................................................................. 75
A Particularistic Anger: Rage at the Nazis ............................................................................................................ 79

Chapter Two: The Sabbath and Sylvia Heschel’s Christmas Cards .................................... 84
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 81

vii

Authenticity and Inauthenticity in America: A Sticky Sign .................................................................................... 88
Overview of The Sabbath: What are the Realms of Space and Time?.................................................................. 91
Gender in the Realms of Space of Time .............................................................................................................. 101
Social and Cultural Backdrop to The Sabbath ..................................................................................................... 104
Interest in Shabbat “Things” ............................................................................................................................... 112
Materialism and Interrelationality...................................................................................................................... 114
Gender as an Orientation: Reading Gender in The Sabbath............................................................................... 121
The Jewish Home Beautiful: Another Orientation .............................................................................................. 135
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................... 140

Chapter Three: Emotional Zionism ................................................................................ 144
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 144
Overview and Backdrop of Heschel’s Israel: An Echo of Eternity ....................................................................... 145
The Fear of Another Jewish Catastrophe: The Relationship Between the State of Israel and the Holocaust .... 148
Joy at Israel’s Victory .......................................................................................................................................... 158
Embarrassment at Being a Diaspora Jew ........................................................................................................... 162
Affect Aliens: Those Oriented the Wrong Way Towards Israel........................................................................... 169

Chapter Four: The Radical, Traumatized Prophet .......................................................... 178
Introduction: Heschel as an Iconic Jewish Figure................................................................................................ 174
Overview and reception history of the Prophets ................................................................................................ 183

viii

Heschel’s Anthropopathism: God as Affected .................................................................................................... 191
The Holistic Nature of the Prophet: Subjectivity and Cultural Backdrop ............................................................ 196
The Reparative Reading of the Prophets ............................................................................................................ 206
The Trauma and Gravity of the Prophets: Becoming a Feminist Killjoy ............................................................. 213
Remembering Heschel ........................................................................................................................................ 221

Conclusion: The Heschel Sticker .................................................................................... 225
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 233

ix

Introduction
Abraham Joshua Heschel was born in Poland in 1907 to an important Hasidic
dynasty. Not satisfied with the kind of Torah-learning which he could achieve in a tightknit Hasidic community, he decided to pursue the academic study of Judaism at the
University of Berlin. With the rise of the Nazi party, Heschel fled first to London and then
the USA: he was recipient of a visa as part of a program organized by the president of
Reform rabbinical institution Hebrew Union College, Julian Morgenstern.1 Heschel was
largely uncomfortable at the Reform institution due to his more traditional and Hasidicinspired observances; he eventually moved to New York City to teach at the
Conservative institution, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America.2
Heschel wrote prolifically, and he wrote different kinds of books. Many of his
books are long treatises on aspects of Judaism or of religion in general, such as Man is
Not Alone, God in Search of Man, Maimonides, Who Is Man?, Israel: An Echo of
Eternity, and Heavenly Torah. Other works of Heschel’s are shorter and fall somewhere
between a short book and a long essay: The Sabbath and The Earth Is The Lord’s fall
into this category. And, of course, Heschel made several addresses and wrote many
essays: No Religion Is An Island, the collected essays found in Man’s Quest for God,
and The Moral Outrage of Vietnam are examples of these works. Heschel also wrote

1

Edward K. Kaplan, Spiritual Radical: Abraham Joshua Heschel in America (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007), 5.
2

Edward K. Kaplan, “Coming to America: Abraham Joshua Heschel, 1940-1941,” Modern
Judaism 27, no. 2 (May 2007): 129–45.
1

biographies and explications on the works of famous rabbinic figures, writing on
Maimonides, Abravanel, and the Kotzker Rebbe in this way. In addition to writing and
teaching, Heschel was an important political figure himself: Heschel was involved in the
civil rights movement in the 1960s, the anti-Vietnam war effort, a passionate Zionist,
and in many ways pioneered Jewish/Christian interreligious dialogue. He is frequently
remembered for his involvement in the march at Selma, where he was photographed in
a line marching with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
Heschel’s writings cover differing yet interrelated themes. Heschel was a
phenomenologist of religion, believing that all humans have an inherent ability to sense
and be touched by God.3 Wanting modern individuals to become more attuned to this
spiritual dimension of life, he was increasingly worried that life in modernity was shallow
and meaningless. Heschel’s demand that modern Americans ought to experience the
Divine affectively can, therefore, be seen as a critique of modernity. In particular,
Heschel was deeply ambivalent towards the political-cultural landscape in America
during the 1950s-1960s. Although he felt a great deal of respect for the country which
(eventually) granted him a visa and enabled him to escape the horrors of the Nazi party,
there is nevertheless a sense that the American landscape is overly-materialistic and
devoid of “true” or “authentic” religious feelings in his writings. Heschel was not alone in
this feeling either; Will Herberg’s classic Protestant — Catholic — Jew discusses while
more Americans were becoming affiliated with particular religious movements in the

3

Abraham Joshua Heschel, Man Is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion (New York: Farrar, Straus &
Giroux, 1951), chaps. 1–3; Abraham Joshua Heschel, God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1955), chaps. 2–4; Abraham Joshua Heschel, “Spontaneity Is the
Goal,” in Man’s Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism (Santa Fe: Aurora Press, 1954).

2

1950s, feelings of religiosity diminished.4 While I am not interested in deciding which
practices are “authentic” religious practices, or what “feelings” are appropriate for
religious people to have, I am interested in what Heschel says about this; Heschel
definitely believes that there are authentic and inauthentic religious experiences.
Heschel attempts to nudge his reader towards a more affective way of
understanding their relationship with the Divine, with Jewish tradition (if his reader is
Jewish), and their relationship with the world around them. Heschel does this in two
ways: descriptively and prescriptively. When writing descriptively, Heschel uses
evocative language, rich descriptions of beautiful scenes, and relates his own
experiences and biography to the reader. This descriptive method of affective nudging
attempts to allow the reader to understand (or begin to understand) that the primary way
one ought to understand their place in the world as affective. Heschel is prescriptive
when he makes claims that all humans do – or ought to – feel particular affects at
particular points in their life. At times, Heschel is quite explicit about this. For example,
the beginning of Man is Not Alone includes a statement which alleges that individuals
who do not feel a certain way when gazing at magnificent natural vistas are not truly
human.5
In attempting to describe these patterns of Heschel’s writings, I also suggest that
there is something inherently affective about religion, and especially something
inherently affective about the place of postwar American Jews. For my insistence that

4

Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in Religious Sociology (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1955); James Hudnut-Beumler, Looking for God in the Suburbs: The Religion of the
American Dream and Its Critics, 1945-1965 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994).
5

Heschel, Man Is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion, 3.
3

there is something inherently affective about religious experience, I draw on a variety of
sources. Obviously, phenomenologists of religion such as Rudolph Otto, Mircea Eliade,
and Heschel himself have argued and alleged that religious experience is profoundly
sensual and affective.6 For more recent scholarship I am indebted to, I follow Donovan
Schaefer’s discussion that all religious experience – and all experience – is affective.
Schaefer writes,
Religious Affects proposes that if we attempt to understand the chimpanzee
waterfall dance [a documented scene of chimpanzees dancing around a waterfall
in what appears to be a ‘religious’ activity], we must allow for the possibility that
what gets called religion may not be predicated on the uniquely human property
of language. This approach not only asks what is would mean for animals to
have religion; it explores the possibility that the turn to affect can help us
understand human religion as animal. […] What if religion is not only about
books, language, belief?7
Here, the turn to affect can both explain the ways that religion is felt and experienced by
humans, but also destabilize the assumption that only humans experience religion.
While this dissertation does not delve into the issue of animality and religion, what it
does do is suggest that there is something inherently, profoundly, affective about the
American Jewish postwar experience. Furthermore, by not looking at the erergent and
emerging affects of this time does a disservice to Jewish and Religious Stuides as a
field.

In my estimation, most secondary literature on Heschel can be separated into the
three following categories: (a) Heschel’s philosophy and theology, (b) Heschel and his

6

Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask
(Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W.
Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923).
7 Donovan Schaefer, Religious Affects: Animality, Evolution, and Power (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2015), loc. 135-145.
4

relationship to Hasidic Judaism and mysticism, and (c) biographical information about
Heschel’s life. Regardless of the category above, many scholars of Heschel seem
invested in defining Heschel as something: a philosopher, a theologian, etc. In perhaps
a smiling nod to this tendency, Michael Marmur’s article “In Search of Heschel” defines
no less than eight distinct types of Heschel: 1. Philosopher, 2. Theologian of the Deed,
3. Mystic and/or Hasid, 4. Scholar, 5. Prophet of Pathos, 6. Poet and Stylist, 7.
Twentieth-Century Symbol, and 8. Heschel qua Heschel.8 Although the prevalence of
the various “types” Heschel in this article is overwhelming, Marmur does articulate many
of the many ways Heschel is received in scholarship while simultaneously pointing out
the fact that Heschel can indeed fit into these different categories.
Complicating the way Heschel is categorized, compartmentalized, and
remembered is the way Heschel is remembered by the larger American Jewish
community. To the American Jewish community, Heschel is often seen as an iconic
figure. The memory of his political work combined with his near escape from the Shoah
and his theological work have resulted in Heschel being one of the more identifiable and
significant rabbis in the American Jewish community. Because of this investment in the
figure and the reputation of Heschel to American Jews, some academic scholarship on
Heschel also feels parochial and invested in reifying and maintaining Heschel’s position
in the thought of the American Jewish community. This discussion of the place of
Heschel in academic Jewish studies does, of course, speak to a larger conversation
about the place of fidelity towards Judaism and the Jewish community within the Jewish
Studies academy in general. Aaron Hughes’s The Study of Judaism: Authenticity,

8

Michael Marmur, “In Search of Heschel,” Shofar 26, no. 1 (2009): 9–40.
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Identity, Scholarship uses case studies to explore what he views as the problem of
Jewish studies departments in America being too politically, economically, and
structurally tied to the religious Jewish establishment.9
The place of Heschel as an iconic figure within the religious community becomes
a significant issue when looking at the scholarship of both Shai Held and Art Green. The
two are not only rabbis, but leaders of particular Jewish movements. Shai Held is the
head of a prominent egalitarian yeshivah in New York, Mechon Hadar. Art Green is the
head of the non-denominational rabbinical school, Hebrew College. While obviously
religiously motivated people can and do produce critical scholarship, it is nevertheless
important to mention because of the content of Held and Green’s scholarship. Green is
extremely invested in the idea of deploying liberal-leaning neo-Hasidic thought to
American Jews looking for something more meaningful than what they might find in
standard non-Orthodox synagogues, whereas Held is invested in traditional
(commandment-bound) egalitarian Judaism.10 The fact that for Green the core of
Heschelian thought can be located in Hasidism, and Held locates it in a form of ethics
that privileges both Jewish tradition and liberalism (suspiciously akin to the Judaism
Held himself envisions) suggests that Heschel is an authority figure worth fighting over.

9

Aaron Hughes, The Study of Judaism: Authenticity, Identity, Scholarship (Albany: SUNY University
Press, 2013). Of specific interest and concern to Hughes is the way some academic jobs in Jewish
Studies will “stitch together” two part-time jobs to create one full-time offering. However, these jobs
occasionally offer part-time employment as a Jewish chaplain or Hillel (international Jewish college
organization) and part-time employment as a professor of Jewish studies, causing a “blurring” of
academic Jewish studies and religious Jewish life on the university campus.
10 Arthur Green, Ehyeh: A Kabbalah for Tomorrow (Woodstock, Vermont: Jewish Lights Publishing,
2011); Arthur Green, Seek My Face: A Jewish Mystical Theology (Woodstock, Vermont: Jewish Lights
Publishing, 2011); Arthur Green and Evan Mayse, eds., A New Hasidism: Roots (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2019); Shira Hanau, “Proudly Observant, Egalitarian, Nondenomenational: Hadar
Opens New Kollel,” The Jewish Week, December 11, 2019, https://jewishweek.timesofisrael.com/proudlyobservant-egalitarian-and-nondenominational-hadar-opens-new-kollel/.
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There are other works which are clearly written for a rabbinic or religiously-oriented
audience. For example, Conservative Rabbi Gordon Tucker’s “A.J. Heschel and the
Problem of Religious Certainty,” while scholarly, certainly reads as a document written
by someone extremely invested in Judaism.11
The main biographical work on Heschel is a two-volume set, the first volume
written by Samuel Dresner and Edward K. Kaplan, Abraham Joshua Heschel: Prophetic
Witness.12 The second volume is written only by Edward K. Kaplan and is entitled
Spiritual Radical: Abraham Joshua Heschel in America, 1940-1972.13 These books
masterfully weave together accounts in Heschel’s life with first-person interviews as well
as discussing the major thrusts in his intellectual development. Additionally, Between
Berlin and Slobodka: Jewish Transition Figures from Eastern Europe situates Abraham
Joshua Heschel as a liminal figure between his Hasidic, Eastern European roots and
the American Jewish scene which he wrote about and lived in as an adult.14
Many commenters of Heschel do discuss the way in which Heschel’s project is
tied to emotions. The fact that Heschel’s worldview, philosophy, and theology highlight
the importance of particular sensations and emotions is obvious from most of Heschel’s
writings. However, the way these emotions are discussed is often flat and treated as an
afterthought for other, more privileged theoretical questions. Shai Held’s overall thesis in
Abraham Joshua Heschel: The Call of Transcendence is that the “transitive concern”

11

Gordon Tucker, “A.J. Heschel and the Problem of Religious Certainty,” Modern Judaism 29, no. 1
(May 13, 2009): 126–37.
12 Edward K. Kaplan and Samuel H. Dresner, Abraham Joshua Heschel: Prophetic Witness (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
13 Kaplan, Spiritual Radical: Abraham Joshua Heschel in America.
14 Hillel Goldberg, Between Berlin and Slobodka: Jewish Transition Figures from Eastern Europe
(Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, 1989).
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articulated by Heschel in Man is Not Alone is key to Heschel’s overall ethical project.15
Transitive concern, wherein humans are more concerned with the well-being and
continuation of lives other than one’s own, is the lynchpin that Held believes hold all of
Heschel’s work together. Realizing that one is in connection and with communion with
others, and with God, and then caring about this network-of-relations is, as Held says,
Heschel’s path to “authentic human personhood.”16 However, Held does not speak of
the affective possibilities of this lattice-like enmeshing that Heschel understands all
humans to exist in – connecting and living with other humans as well as the Divine.
Another thread in the scholarship of Heschel which begins to take emotions and
affects seriously are pieces of scholarship which focus on Heschel’s literary style.
Edward K. Kaplan’s Holiness in Words: Abraham Joshua Heschel’s Poetics of Piety
looks into Heschel’s theology with an eye towards literature. Kaplan wonders in the
introduction of his book why Heschel is so intriguing to him, quipping, “Why did Heschel
appeal so strongly to me, a seeker of faith attracted to mystical testimonies? … As a
student of literature, I was captivated by Heschel’s rhetoric.”17 Kaplan then goes on to
describe how it is Heschel’s literary style in particular which made his theological work
accessible for both Christians and Jews. Looking at the understudied volume of poems
that Heschel wrote originally in Yiddish, Alexander Even-Chen’s “On the Ineffable Name
of God and the Prophet Abraham: An Examination of the Existential-Hasidic Poetry of

15

Heschel, Man Is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion, 137–38.
Shai Held, Abraham Joshua Heschel: The Call of Transcendence (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2013), 4.
17 Edward K. Kaplan, Holiness in Words: Abraham Joshua Heschel’s Poetics of Piety (Albany: SUNY
University Press, 1996), 1–2.
16

8

Abraham Joshua Heschel” discusses how a critical examination of these poems can not
only yield insights into Heschel’s early theological development (Heschel published the
poems in Yiddish a year before defending his doctoral dissertation) but can also be read
as a kind of love-letter to, or wresting with his Hasidic background.18 Samuel Dresner’s
Heschel, Hasidism, and Halakhah contains the following anecdote about the oftendifficult style Heschel’s work presents to students of Heschel, “One reader,
overwhelmed … suggested studying Heschel [as one would study] a page of the
Talmud, that is, weighing with care each sentence, each phrase, each word.”19 While all
of these works do deal with the way the reader is affected by Heschel’s evocative
writing style, not as much time is spent analyzing the way the emotions within Heschel’s
text themselves are of philosophical or cultural interest.

Overview of Thesis and Chapter Summary
This dissertation asserts that Heschel’s primary project is affective and
emotional. Heschel views humans as interconnected in a web of affects and emotions;
through affects, humans are connected to God, history and memory, and one another.
Heschel’s preoccupation with affects and emotions is easy to see from a multitude of
vantage points; Heschel discusses emotions throughout several of his many texts in
differing ways. This dissertation does not attempt to be a comprehensive study of
emotions in Heschel’s overall oeuvre; in fact, I am skeptical that such an endeavor
would be particularly generative. Heschel’s oeuvre is so vast and rich that it would be

18

Alexander Even-Chen, “On the Ineffable Name of God and the Prophet Abraham: An Examination
of the Existential-Hasidic Poetry of Abraham Joshua Heschel,” Modern Judaism 31, no. 1 (May 2011):
23–58.
19 Samuel H. Dresner, Heschel, Hasidism, and Halakha (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002).
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exceptionally easy to fall “into the weeds” attempting to track through every particular
mood, emotion, or affect in Heschel’s work. Instead, this dissertation isolates emotions
in particular works as indicative of the changing emotional and cultural landscape of
postwar American Jews. By looking at the way Heschel writes of emotions surrounding
the Holocaust and lost Eastern European Jewish community; American Jewish practice,
gender and authenticity; the State of Israel and the diaspora; and the figure of the
Hebrew prophet and the possibility of political change, I aim to demonstrate how a
specific set of emotions were particularly resonate and emergent for much of the
American Jewish community.
Additionally, throughout the dissertation I take up a prevailing concern in the
study of American Judaism with the dichotomy between radicalism and traditionalism.
This concern with radicalism and traditionalism is significant primarily when thinking
about how Heschel is remembered today by the American Jewish community. Here, I
use the terms “radicalism” and “traditionalism” to mean more or less “change,” and a
sense of “going against the grain” vs. a sense of “tradition” and “going along with the
grain/fitting in.” Heschel is often remembered as a radical figure, but I will argue that he
is better seen as a hinge or pivot between radicalism and traditionalism. At points in his
life, he was radical: he was an agent of change, a kind of “feminist killjoy.”20 At other
points, he was profoundly and easily placed in the tradition in which he existed: a rabbi,
a father, a scholar. The concern with radicalism and traditionalism can, therefore, be
also seen as a discussion about the intersectional and interconnected ways in which
Heschel did and not have social power and capital in the broader community. He was,
20

I will discuss this at length in Chapter Four, “The Radical, Traumatized Prophet.”
10

at once: a refugee, a thickly-accented immigrant, a rabbi, a father, an activist who was
often maligned as “going too far” with his activism. On one hand, Heschel is deeply
radical: Heschel believes that mainstream American religion is lacking soul, American
culture is hopelessly materialistic and obsessed with money and status, and that racism
and needless wars are great horrors which needed to be virulently protested. On the
other hand, Heschel desired a return to tradition as a balm for these evils of modern
man. An element of Heschel’s radicalism, therefore, aligns with the plain dictionarydefinition of the word radical -- at the heart of, at the root of. Heschel believed that the
things which encouraged his radicalism to be found at the very core of the Jewish
tradition, stemming from the Bible itself.
I identify four constellations of affects and emotions which are present in
Heschel’s work. The first constellation, nostalgia-loss and dread-rage are ranges of
affect felt in response to the Holocaust and the destruction of East European Jewry.
Nostalgia and loss coalesce together to create an acknowledgement and awareness
that Eastern European Jewish culture has been destroyed; through this awareness
there remains a hope that some elements of Eastern European Jewish culture can live
on through American Jewish adoption and memory. Likewise, the Holocaust evokes
dread and horror at the potentiality for human evil, and rage at the execution of supreme
human evil as embodied by the Nazi party. These two ways of feeling the Holocaust –
rage/dread and nostalgia/loss – were an emergent form of Sara Ahmed’s concept of an
“affective economy.” The postwar American Jewish community was steadily coming to
grips with the reality and the horrors of the Holocaust. In particular, the nostalgic/
idealized image of the now-lost shtetl as a foundational image in the consciousness of

11

American Jewry, had not yet been fully developed when Heschel wrote of it in these
terms. To read Heschel, and especially to read Heschel for affect, is to watch the
emergence and crystallization of this and other “structures of feeling” of post-War
American Jewish community.
A concern about the authenticity of American Jewish practice comprises the next
constellation of affects discussed in this dissertation. Chapter Two, “Orientations and
Authenticity” offers a reading of 1951 The Sabbath with an eye towards gender and
materiality. Authenticity, and particularly the fear of the ‘inauthentic’ becomes a loaded
term, a sticky sign, associated with postwar American Judaism. Looking at Heschel’s
The Sabbath with an eye towards gender, my argument rests on two interconnected
points. First, the realms of space and time are best thought of as orientations toward the
material world. Additionally, while all humans have the ability to become oriented toward
the realm of space or the realm of time, the way these orientations look differ based on
one’s differing markers of identity and subjectivity: class, race, gender, and religious
identity. The chapter examines gender as a primary locus of difference between people:
traditionally, men and women have different roles to play during the celebration of the
Jewish sabbath, and Heschel’s The Sabbath reflects this. From there, the chapter
discusses how the discourse of “authentic” and “inauthentic” Jewish practice was
gendered: because traditional gender roles were less observed on the American Jewish
landscape than the Hasidic Eastern European communities in which Heschel was
raised, something feels “inauthentic” about American Jewish practice. The chapter also
teases out the way in which Heschel’s assumptions about gender are (today read as)
dated, sexist, and essentialist: by placing men and women as occupying opposing yet
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complementary orientations, Heschel reinforces sexist and heteronormative
imperatives.
The tension between radicalism and traditionalism as it is manifested in
Heschel’s own thought is most apparent in the chapter on The Sabbath. Throughout all
of his writing, Heschel uses “man” to refer to “human.” While common at the time when
Heschel was writing, this becomes distracting and distressing particularly when looking
at the gendered implications of his works! This sense of distress can be stronger when it
becomes apparent that Heschel speaks of women in The Sabbath in only very particular
ways. The brunt of the book does feel as though it was intended for men. Several
commentators on Heschel have argued that Heschel’s neo-Hasidic bent would have
eventually desired to see more halakhic rights for women in the Jewish community.
Susannah Heschel, Heschel’s daughter, even recounts that her father responded
positively when she challenged the chancellor of JTS regarding the ordination of
women. However, I do not see anything proto-feminist or proto-egalitarian in The
Sabbath. (It is possible that some of this is due to the time of publication of the work –
The Sabbath was written in 1951, well before Heschel would have been able to have
conversations with Susannah about the ordination of women!) Instead, The Sabbath
seems to extol traditional gender roles as a set of social and religious technologies to
achieve an orientation towards the realm of time. The work ultimately is, I suggest,
highly normative in regards to gender and to hetero-normative gender roles. While The
Sabbath makes this non-egalitarian and non-feminist claim, the result of this work is that
reaching towards those with differing orientations is a way that one can best appreciate
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the realm of time. Heschel can, therefore, be read against himself in a highly nontraditional and non-sexist and non-heteronormative grain.
Chapter Three, “Emotional Zionism” examines Heschel’s Israel: An Echo of
Eternity. Arguing that Heschel develops a form of “Emotional Zionism” in his writings
about the State of Israel and the diaspora, this chapter isolates three emotions to which
Heschel stands in relation. Because Israel: An Echo of Eternity was written shortly after
the 1967 War, the emotions which comprise Emotional Zionism are only intelligible
when viewed in their historical-cultural context. Because the 1967 War was perceived
as a watershed and surprising victory for the State of Israel, Heschel describes anxiety
leading up to and during the 1967 War and a profound sense of relief when Israel exited
the war victorious. Heschel also describes a bodily sense of joy at his ability to wander
the streets of Old Jerusalem and visit the Western Wall, areas which fell into Israeli
control after the 1967 War. Additionally, Heschel discusses a profound feeling of
embarrassment and non-masculineness at being a diaspora Jew during this time. It was
the Israelis who won this war while diaspora Jews looked on, seemingly more passive,
almost emasculated. These four emotions – anxiety, relief, joy, and embarrassment –
are the emotions that Heschel suggests one ought to have in relation to the State of
Israel. This chapter also argues that Heschel posits that Jews who do not have a strong
sense of these emotions towards the State of Israel are somehow strange or aberrant:
affect aliens. Furthermore, Heschel seems to almost suggest that non-Jews who view
the land of Israel as a homeland (Palestinians) are also akin to affect aliens. While this
was not unusual at the time, the way Heschel encourages one group of individuals to
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hold certain emotions towards a particular land and discourages others at the same
time is interesting.
“Emotional Zionism” also grapples with traditionalism and radicalism. For
Heschel, the ability to walk the streets of land won in the 1967 War was a blessing, a
kind of sign from God. This action in and of itself – visiting the Western Wall, walking in
Jerusalem – was felt as radical to Heschel. The way in which Heschel reframes existing
Zionist patterns of thought onto his covenantal and emotional framework – in which God
and the Jewish people are enmeshed together in a relationship shaped by affective and
emotional forces – is radical. However, reading Heschel today, Israel: An Echo of
Eternity feels (understandably) dated and naive. While the naivete Heschel brings to the
conversation about the State of Israel is indicative of the time – even progressive
Jewish communities were not having discussions about Palestinian sovereignty the way
many progressive Jewish communities do so today – Heschel’s naivete goes deeper.
The sense one gets when reading this book is that there is something ontologically
peace-oriented about the State of Israel. Because the State of Israel is associated with
peace, it is difficult for Heschel to imagine a scenario where Israel was the aggressor.
This was not uncommon for the time, due in part to the way Palestinian nationalism was
framed by the broader Western media, which the chapter will address.
Finally, Chapter Four, “Not A Microphone” discusses the ways in which Heschel
thought about prophecy in the Hebrew Bible and beyond. The title of the chapter, “Not A
Microphone” highlights and uplifts Heschel’s famous passage about prophets: “The
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prophet was a person, not a microphone.”21 The importance Heschel gives to the
individual subjectivity of the prophet cannot be overstated. What was of great
significance for Heschel was the subjectivity of the prophet; the prophet was formed by
their own cultural background. Much like the way Heschel discusses the way a person’s
identity orients them to the world around them in The Sabbath, Heschel discusses how
a prophet’s particular place in society and culture affects their prophetic message. The
prophet is not only a messenger of God, but a whole person whose background,
personal past experiences, and capacity for imagination impacted their prophetic
message. For Heschel, prophets were examples of the ways that contemporary people
could become enabled to enact social change in their own circumstances. Heschel’s
discussion of the prophets doubtlessly affected his own political action: he was active in
the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, the anti-Vietnam War effort, and a leader in
interfaith activism and interfaith engagement. Heschel is remembered by the American
Jewish community as a kind of modern-day prophet. The way in which he is
remembered for his activism, however, often white-washes or erases the deep
ambivalence that some mid-century American Jews had about Heschel’s activism.
Heschel is often remembered as a testament to the Black-Jewish coalitions of the
1960s. While these coalitions are important, they can be overstated.
Specifically, by overstating the support the American Jewish community had for
Heschel, it can be difficult to appreciate Heschel’s articulation of the prophet as
profoundly traumatized and isolated from their community. While I am not necessarily
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certain that Heschel viewed himself as akin to a Hebrew prophet, he is nevertheless
thought of in almost hagiographic ways by the American Jewish community. When
assumed that Heschel is a kind of prophet of which he spoke coupled with a
memorialization and valorization of Heschel that is rose-tinted, we miss the ways in
which Heschel himself felt isolated and alienated from the American Jewish community
as well as how foundational this feeling of alienation is for Heschel’s articulation of the
prophet. The prophetic message is usually not immediately taken seriously by the
community to which the prophet speaks, the prophet feels alienated and even
ostracized. Here, I use the concept of Sara Ahmed’s feminist killjoy to better explain this
feeling of isolation and alienation. The prophet, as a kind of killjoy, disrupts the normal
flow of emotions in their community. This disruption of emotions is not always taken
easily or happily by the community, instead causing the prophet to be labelled a killjoy.
The American Jewish community, and particularly those in the South, were often
ambivalent and concerned about the Civil Rights Movement, and Jews across America
were often deeply concerned with seeming “un-American” by being critical of the war in
Vietnam.

Defining Affect and Affect Theory
A way to begin conceptualizing affect is, strangely enough, with a series of bad
definitions. Affects are similar to moods, emotions, and feelings. The feeling one gets
when stepping into a room where people had just been arguing and now are
desperately, maniacally cheery in an attempt to save face can be described as a
sensation of affects circulating around and within the room: affects of anger,
embarrassment, unease. As Teresa Brennan puts it succinctly, “Is there anyone who
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has not, at least once, walked into the room and felt the atmosphere?”22 However, in
many ways simply saying that affects and moods are alike, and even the above
example of stepping into a room are woefully inadequate. Affects are not precisely or
only emotions, moods, sensations, or feelings. Complicated emotions, which are
comprised of mixed and discordant feelings such as embarrassment and unease, may
not be best described as affect. And, of course, different academics draw from different
theoretical genealogies which influence and change their understanding(s) and
definition(s) of affect.
The introduction to The Affect Theory Reader lays out many of the problems with
defining affect. “How to begin,” the first line of the introduction opens, “when, after all,
there is no pure or ordinary state of affect?”23 Seigworth and Gregg, the editors of The
Affect Theory Reader, continue that they understand affect as “force or force of
encounter” that nevertheless can feel little more than “the subtlest of shifting
intensities.”24 These shifting intensities work through forces accruing upon themselves
and others in a process of relational growth; “affect accumulates across both
relatedness and interruptions in relatedness.”25 Seigworth and Gregg’s definition – or
defining qualities – of affect can be described by the following qualities:
1. Affect is difficult to define because it always exists in relation to other entities
2. Affect is a kind of force of energy between entities (usually bodies) or,
potentially, inside a particular entity
3. Affect grows as it grows in relatedness and relationality.
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When Seigworth and Gregg say that there is nothing “ordinary” about affects, I do
not think they mean to imply that there is something unusual about affects. In fact,
affects surround and impact individuals quite frequently and commonly. However, what I
believe Seigworth and Gregg mean in this sentence is that there is nothing completely
undiluted about affects: an ordinary, non-specific affect does not exist. Affects that are
experienced are inescapably refracted through an individual’s particular subjectivity and
interrelated place with others in society.
Seigworth and Gregg’s discussion of affect here – which prioritizes the
understanding of affect as an interstitial force which flows between entities and bodies –
draws from a genealogy which begins with Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics and Gilles
Deleuze’s reading of the same in his work, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Spinoza’s
Ethics outlines Spinoza’s ontological and cosmological monism, wherein everything in
existence is made out of variations and variegations of a kind of vibrant life-force, the
Source of all things. Because of this, Spinoza rejected the Cartesian mind/body
dualism. For Spinoza, matter is comprised of one single, infinite substance. Therefore,
any substantial difference between mind and body is untenable within Spinoza’s
philosophy and ontology. This does not mean, however, that Spinoza would understand
no difference between mind and body: the two are attributes and modalities of one
infinite substance. Discussing the relationship between imagination and bodies, Moira
Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd state:
Imagination is for Spinoza a form of bodily awareness. That is not novel in the
history of philosophy. But bodily awareness here takes on a distinctive form and
status as a consequence of Spinoza’s treatment of mind and matter as equally
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attributes of the one Substance – different ways in which the one reality is
articulated or ‘expressed’.26
While here Gatens and Lloyd deal specifically with imagination as a kind of inaccurate
or fantastical thinking, this quote does nevertheless demonstrate that for Spinoza there
is something bodily and sensational about thought. Knowledge is a kind of bodily
awareness – having knowledge of the body is at the crux of knowledge itself.
This relationality between body and thought is picked up by Brian Massumi’s
understanding of affect in Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect,
Sensation. Massumi’s book has had an enormous influence within affect studies;
indeed, the Spinoza-Deleuzian stream of affect theory is often considered to be really a
Spinoza-Deleuze-Massumian thread. Instead of focusing on imagination, as Gatens and
Lloyd do above, Massumi here focuses on the relationship between a moving body and
a thinking body.
When I think of my body and ask what it does to earn that name, two things
stand out. It moves. It feels. In fact, it does both at the same time. It moves as it
feels, and it feels itself moving. Can we think a body without this: an intrinsic
connection between movement and sensation whereby each immediately
summons the other?27
Massumi’s emphasis on the moving and transforming body further destabilizes the
Cartesian mind/body dualism. Not only is there something bodily about thought, there is
something necessarily incorporeal about the body. As Massumi writes of the moving
body,

26

Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present (London:
Routledge, 1999), 12.
27 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2002), 1.

20

But the change is not itself corporeal. Far from regaining a concreteness, to think
the body in movement thus means accepting the paradox that there is an
incorporeal dimension of the body. Of it, but not it. Real, material, but
incorporeal.28
Not only is there something incorporeal about the body in Massumi’s work, there is also
something virtual about it. Massumi discusses an experiment wherein participants were
asked to move their finger in a particular way and record the time when they decided to
move their finger. Surprisingly, the participants all had heightened brain activity a halfsecond before they registered the time and made the decision to move their finger.
Massumi understands this perplexing study as being indicative of the virtual of the body,
the potentiality of the body: “the virtual, the pressing crowd of incipiencies and
tendencies, is a realm of potential.”29
Affect, then, in the Spinoza-Deleuze-Massumian understanding is necessarily
pre-cognitive. Cognition necessarily lags behind the vast pools of potentiality that are
generated and re-generated from bodies in Massumi’s framework. This never-ending
feedback loop between a moving body and a thinking body speaks to the inability to
truly verbalize or cognize affect in the Spinozist-Deleuzian articulation of affect. The
body moves too quickly and is in transition too continuously. This creates a problem, of
course, when hoping to explain or discuss affect. There is no way to discuss pure affect
in the Spinozist-Deleuzian tradition, because when people discuss affect, they are
decidedly thinking and cognizing about affect.
Because of the ever-changing and virtual nature of affect in this paradigm, affect
cannot be synonymous with emotions or moods. An emotion, in this understanding of
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affect, has the ability to be more self-sustained in a body than affects. Emotions are
somehow more private than affects, even while these theorists also admit that the body
is porous, leaky, and anything but hermetically sealed. “An emotion is a subjective
content,” Massumi writes, “the sociolinguistic fixing of an experience which is from that
point onward defined as personal.”30 Affect, for Massumi is intensity – but emotion is the
qualified intensity, refracted through one’s own subjectivity, making it intelligible through
language and cognition.31
Other affect theorists are less sure about the necessity of the difference between
affect and emotion. Affect theorists coming from the lineage of cultural theorist
Raymond Williams are generally more comfortable talking about affect and emotion as
largely the same – if not basically identical. This second lineage of affect theory tracks
its development from the cultural Marxist theorist Raymond Williams, particularly his
seminal article “Structures of Feeling” found in Marxism and Literature.32 This lineage
has been picked up by many contemporary affect theorists coming from a wide variety
of disciplinary traditions ranging from performance studies, gender studies, queer
theory, and cultural studies. In “Structures of Feelings,” Williams discusses the temporal
dimension of cultural forms, writing:
If the social is always past, in the sense that it is always formed, we have indeed
to find other terms for the undeniable experience of the present: not only the
temporal present, the realization of this and this instant, but the specificity of
present being, the inalienably physical, within which we may indeed discern and
acknowledge institutions, formations, positions, but not always as fixed products,
defining products.33
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Here, Williams discusses the emergence of structures on their way to becoming
hegemonic; they are not quite there yet. As time continues, various ideas and materials
become fashionable whereas others become dated. Williams discusses these
processes, and how these processes seem to happen large-scale: suddenly chokers
are fashionable again whereas in the past they were considered passé. Of course, as a
cultural Marxist, Williams would agree that these fashions are indeed manipulated by
capitalistic structures that create power, materials, and even feelings. Williams gives
more examples of how to read this process of the emergence of structures of feelings in
Cultural and Materialism: Selected Essays.34 These essays demonstrate how one can
carefully “read” for the emergence of structures of feeling in literature; so that one can
attempt to locate structures of feelings and their development in the past.
Important works in Williamsian Affect Theory include Sara Ahmed’s The Cultural
Politics of Emotion,35 Ann Cvetkovich’s Depression: A Public Feeling,36 and Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity.37 While these
books are disparate in their subject matter, they all touch on affect and the political while
not reducing affect to the pre-cognitive or pre-linguistic. Depression: A Public Feeling
and Touching Feeling both discuss ways of self-comportment and lived practices which
can make uncomfortable social and private affects more bearable. Sara Ahmed’s article
“Collective Feelings: Or, The Impressions Left By Others” describes how affective states
become manifest on the collective “skins” of groups of people, writing “how we feel
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about others is what aligns us with the collective.”38 Here, she notes how the collective
histories of groups of people in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, etc. change and shape
the way they interact with others and work to create these structures of feeling and
kinds of structures of power. Similarly, Ahmed’s work, “Affective Economies” thinks
through the ways affects stick to signs, ideas and bodies — and how these affective
economies work to cause society to devalue and fear particular bodies.39 Identities are
constructed and formed during these moments of fear, identities become sedimented
during these moments of sticky signs enabling and constructing fear and devaluation.40
Another work dealing specifically with racial forms of memory and affect is Loss: The
Politics of Mourning, edited by David Eng and David Kazanjian, which discusses how
traumatic events in history continue to shape and create pervasive affective moods.41
Power – and the linguistic and structural elements which construct, cement, and recement this power within culture and society – are central to analysis in this lineage of
affect theory. While power is certainly not absent in the Spinozist-Deleuzian model, I
often find that it is overshadowed by Massumi’s emphasis on ontology and ontogenesis.
Lastly, there is the psychological stream of affect theory. This stream, largely
exemplified by Silvan Tompkins, whose work was edited and analyzed by Adam Frank
and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, also distinguishes between affects and emotions.
Tompkins, through his work as a psychologist and analyst, determined that there were
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nine essential human affects.42 These nine affects are (1) distress-anguish, (2) interestexcitement, (3) enjoyment-joy, (4) surprise-startle, (5) anger-rage, (6) fear-terror, (7)
shame-humiliation, (8) disgust, and finally (9) dissmell (the desire to expel something
from one’s body or psyche, as in saying, “Yuck!”).43 In this paradigm, cognition,
recognition, and verbalization (even internally) of an affect are feelings– which ultimately
coalesce and build one another to create a personality.
How I approach affect theory is akin to one standing in front of a smorgasbord or
buffet: I take some elements of the various genealogies that I find most generative and
productive for my work. I find Massumi’s use of Spinoza and Deleuze’s emphasis on
ontogenesis and bodies in movement helpful, but only to a point. For what is the usevalue of affect theory which mandates a precognitive, pre-linguistic affect to what is
necessarily cognitive and linguistic scholarship? The laser-specific focus on
ontogenesis in Massumian affect theory causes me to wonder if bodies – even the
virtual, becoming bodies – have really fallen out of focus in Massumian analysis. I am
continually impressed by the work of those in the Williamsian model – most specifically
the work of Sara Ahmed and Kathleen Stewart – but I do think they are largely
discussing emotion and the movement of emotions – rather than affects.
Finally, I do agree with Massumi in principle that there is something pre-cognitive
and pre-linguistic about affects. Nevertheless, I think it possible to attempt to chart them
– similar to the way an asymptote becomes extremely close to touching a line but never
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completely reaches it. I find the way Tompkins discusses the nine primordial affects to
be the most helpful in this regard. Tompkins’s nine primordial affects immediately
coalesce around cognition, life experiences, and one’s place in the world to create
profound moods and emotions. Someone cries because of an increase in pain or a
decrease in pleasure. The Massumian bubbling-of-intensity affect would be what
happens before the infant cries, Tompkins is interested (as am I) in what happens
during and following the cry. Additionally, I find the way Tompkins clearly links the
affects with particular bodily movements and facial expressions extremely helpful when
trying to evoke a particular feeling through language. Encouraging the reader to think of
a baby laughing can be, in many cases, much more evocative than finding other means
of describing the word joy! For this reason, when I use the term “affect” in my
dissertation, I will be referring to the Tompkinsian-style affects and using the term
“emotion” for more sedimented emotions – even while recognizing that these emotions
share many of the same qualities as affects. Emotions circulate, are interstitial, and can
move between people.
M. Gail Hamner’s articulation of affecognitive is also helpful to me, and is helpful
when thinking through Heschel and affect, Heschel and emotions. “Put succinctly,”
Hamner writes, “affecognitive posits that all cognition embeds affect.”44 I agree with this
statement, so it is unsurprising that I do believe that Heschel is always thinking about
affects and emotions when he thinks. However, what is particular is not only that
Heschel’s thought and writings are affective and emotional. Rather, it is how these
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affects work together to create, maintain, and reinforce realities for the postwar
American Jewish landscape is what I hope to dwell on. These larger discussions about
the broader Jewish community as they relate to Heschel and Heschel’s work can be
aided by in-depth examinations of some of Heschel’s works, which is this dissertation
does dwell on particular texts and attempting to flesh out the emotions within them.

Conclusion: A Return to the Universal?
Shai Held, in Abraham Joshua Heschel: The Call of Transcendence, writes that
Heschel’s focus on the universality of the Divine-Human encounter makes the work
seem theoretically dated. Heschel, Held writes, “simply cannot survive the challenges
put to them by the post-modern realization of the linguistically and culturally conditioned
nature of experience.”45 However, what Held here does not realize is that the turn
towards affect and affect theory is a departure from thinking that reality is created and
constructed through words and linguistics. I also view affect theory as an attempt to reexamine the possibility of universality. The “hedging” words in the previous sentence
are intentional (“an attempt”, “the possibility”) for I view affect theory as an attempt to
begin to bring the universal back into the equation while simultaneously understanding
the potential pitfalls and dangers of such an approach. But I believe that this is worth
considering, as Elspeth Probyn writes, “At a fundamental level, one thing we all share is
a biological body.”46 However, not all affect theorists believe that affect theory is a
pathway (or proto-pathway) back towards the universal, focusing instead on the ways
affects support and bolster kinds of power.
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Heschel was affected by the American postwar Jewish experience, and he wrote
about the emotions and affects which influenced his life and thought. At the same time,
Heschel transmitted affects to the broader American Jewish community as well. As a
well-regarded teacher, rabbi, writer, and political activist, he was a creator of affects and
emotions as well. Because of this, his work is critically important to study for affect. By
understanding the affect of Heschel, we can better understand some of the emotional
structures through which the postwar American Jewish community continually grappled.
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Chapter One: Holocaust Affects
The Holocaust looms large in Heschel’s writing. This is unsurprising, given
Heschel’s personal history with the Holocaust and his audience of postwar American
Jewry. As a reminder, Abraham Joshua Heschel narrowly escaped death at the hands
of the Nazi regime. He had been working at the University of Berlin, but was arrested
and deported back to Poland (where he had been born and raised) in October 1938.47
While in Poland, Heschel secured a visa to seek refuge in the USA “thanks to Julian
Morgenstern, the president of Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, who had been trying
for several years to secure visas from the State Department to bring Jewish scholars
out of Europe.”48 Heschel worked at Hebrew Union College as a lecturer, ultimately
moving to New York City to work at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. While
working at HUC, Heschel attempted to secure visas for his family, but was
unsuccessful. Family that Heschel left behind in Poland or Germany all perished, as
Heschel’s daughter Susannah Heschel recounts:
When the Nazis invaded Poland, my father’s sister Esther was killed in a
bombing. His mother and sister Gittel had to abandon their apartment, and their
circumstances became very difficult. They sent postcards in which they worried
lovingly about [Heschel’s] well-being and begged for news of his safety. […] Both
were ultimately murdered, his mother in Warsaw, Gittel most probably in
Treblinka. Another sister, Devorah, who was married and living in Vienna, was
eventually deported to Theresinstadt on October 2, 1942 and from there sent to
Auschwitz, where she was murdered upon her arrival on May 16, 1944.49
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His father had already deceased; the only family members to survive the Holocaust
were those “who fled before the war began.”50 Heschel never returned to Germany,
Austria, or Poland, stating: “If I should go to Poland or Germany, every stone, every tree
would remind me of contempt, hatred, murder, of children killed, of mothers burned
alive, of human beings asphyxiated.”51
The way that Heschel addresses the Holocaust in his writings has been
frequently misunderstood. Most commentors on Heschel’s work in relation to the
Holocaust focus on issues of theodicy or suppose that Heschel does not address the
Holocaust much in his work.f This chapter asserts that the primary way in which
Heschel addresses the Holocaust is affective and emotional. Instead of a satisfyingly
coherent post-Holocaust theology or philosophy, Heschel talks about the Holocaust
through larger discussions of loss, nostalgia, rage, and dread. Loss and nostalgia are
found most clearly in The Earth is the Lord’s: The Inner World of the Jew in Eastern
Europe. This slim volume looks at Eastern European Jewish culture before the
Holocaust and, effectively, turns shtetl culture into a pathway through which American
Jews can remember and honor the decimated Eastern European Jewish community.
Additionally, the way in which images and scenes of the shtetl are deployed in The
Earth is the Lord’s cause the reader to feel as though they are “uncovering” a kind of
history that is now lost. Drawing on Ariella Azoulay’s discussion of uncovering
photography in Palestine, I argue that this process of looking at images of a past now
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destroyed and almost forgotten can be therapeutic, healing, and transgressive.52 Shtetl
culture is presented as something that American Jews could “tap into” while being
temporally and geographically removed from that culture. Loss and nostalgia work
together in this work to encourage American Jews to value shtetl culture, remember
shtetl culture and to possibly bring elements of shtetl culture into their own lives. It is
therefore through nostalgia that the American Jew can mourn – and remember – those
lost in the Holocaust.
Heschel’s two large philosophical works on religion and Judaism – Man is Not
Alone and God in Search of Man, respectively – forego nostalgia and loss for the
emotions of dread and anger. These two works, in addition to a speech Heschel gave,
entitled “The Meaning of this Hour,”53 are the closest Heschel came to an articulation of
a theology of the Holocaust. Man is Not Alone and God in Search of Man both elicit and
deploy dread in the face of death and rage in the face of state-sanctioned violence. Both
emotions seem difficult for Heschel articulate succinctly. When reading passages about
dread or rage in Man is Not Alone, God in Search of Man, or “The Meaning of this
Hour,” one gets the pervasive sense that Heschel is holding the emotions with kidgloves, or at arms-length. Heschel is rarely definitive or clear when discussing rage and
dread.
At times, Heschel speaks of dread occurring before death as if it were an almost
universal experience. At other times, Heschel seems to suggest that a truly pious
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person would not experience this dread at one’s own mortality. Rage is a difficult affect
for Heschel: while he understands that rage in the face of genocide is justified and
understandable, he nevertheless remains uneasy about the potentialities that too much
rage can provoke. This constellation of emotions (loss-nostalgia and dread-rage)
suggests that the major way he wrote about (and perhaps thought about) the Holocaust
was emotionally. Furthermore, I argue that Heschel intentionally deployed discussions
of rage differently depending on the perceived audience of his work.
This assertion, that the primary way in which Heschel wrote about the Holocaust,
runs counter to other readers of Heschel. Lawrence Perlman’s The Eclipse of Humanity
is written in response to several misreadings of Heschel, including the idea “that
Heschel ignored the issue of the Holocaust.”54 Zachary Braiterman, in (God) After
Auschwitz writes, “Modern Jewish religious thinkers like Buber, Heschel, Soloveitchik,
and Kaplan made only haphazard and oblique reference to the Holocaust immediately
after the war.”55 Braiterman continues by noting several places in Heschel’s later works
where he talks about the Holocaust, as well as noting several (“haphazard”) passages
in Man is Not Alone where Heschel discusses the larger problem of evil. Braiterman
writes, “For his part Heschel refused to blame the God of History when the immediate
responsibility for evil lay with human beings. In particular, ‘modern man’ assumed the
central focus of his rage.”56 Here, Braiterman does mention the emotions surrounding
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the Holocaust, but does so only in a larger argument about theodicy, the problem of evil,
and the question of the im/possibility of God after the Holocaust.
Lawrence Perlman’s attempt to uncover the Holocaust looming in Heschel’s
writing does so by looking at Heschel’s book on human ontology Who is Man?. Perlman
reads Who Is Man? as a response to Heidegger’s philosophy and Heidegger’s later
Nazi activity. Perlman states,
In the philosophical corpus of Heschel’s writing, Who Is Man? reflects a deep
crisis and break with past religious thought leading up to and following in the
wake of the Second World War. Who Is Man? is nothing less than a critique of
the entire philosophical tradition—a calling of it into account in a world that has
suffered the horrors of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.57
Perlman’s book also spends quite a bit of time discussing the importance of revelation
in Heschel’s post-Holocaust theology. While significant, Perlman’s account does not
discuss the emotional or affective weight the Holocaust has on Heschel’s writing, and is
largely concerned with Who is Man?.
Edward K. Kaplan reads Heschel as responding to the Holocaust theologically in
particular passages in Man is Not Alone. Kaplan remarks that the section entitled “The
Hiding God”58 is coherent enough to constitute a burgeoning post-Holocaust theology,
years before the term “post-Holocaust theology” became a commonplace phrase or
type of Jewish theology and philosophy.59 Kaplan is correct that “The Hiding God” does
include many passages which evoke the Holocaust (and the resulting possibility or
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impossibility of theology after the Holocaust!) but he does not discuss the emotions or
affects Heschel discusses in the section. Similarly, Michael Oppenheim attempts to
track out Heschel’s theological response to the Holocaust. Discussing Heschel’s
statements about the Holocaust in Man is Not Alone, Oppenheim writes, “[For Heschel,]
the Holocaust does not pose a problem for God, since it essentially concerns human
actions and human responsibility. It is they who have turned from and thus silenced
God.”60 God in Search of Man largely follows this same argument, according to
Oppenheim, with the added layer that God in Search of Man emphasizes the
importance of Jews performing the commandments, “[through the completion of]
commandments (mitzvoth) we can begin to redeem the world.”61 Here, the focus is
again on human actions instead of God’s culpability. As Braiterman states in (God) After
Auschwitz, Heschel consistently takes “the side of God.”62 Heschel never rages against
God, but humans.
What these accounts of Heschel miss is the supreme importance and concern
that the emotions of rage, dread, loss, and nostalgia are for Heschel. While Braiterman
is quite correct that Heschel rages only at humans (never God!), what he misses is the
importance and relevance of rage as a key point of Heschel’s philosophy. To
understand the Holocaust, Heschel suggests, one must understand and wrestle with
these emotions. Furthermore, Heschel ultimately suggests that Jews will and should
emotionally experience the Holocaust differently than the larger non-Jewish community.
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Wrestle with these affective forms the American Jewish community did; this chapter
asserts that these affects were emergent emotional structures. Raymond Williams, as
mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, articulated three stages of structures
of feelings through which knowledge became understandable, feelings sensible.
Discussing the ways in which feelings and attitudes change over time, Laurie
Cohen states “the construction of knowledge is thus a negotiated process in which
certain interpretations become dominant, while others are eclipsed or silenced.”63
Dominant structures of feelings are “hegemonic, working to sustain the interests of the
most powerful groupings in society.”64 Residual structures of feeling are “brought
forward form the past” and are remixed, reconstituted and remain relevant in the
present.65 Emergent structures of feeling are those structures still being created.
Williams states: “new meanings and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds
of relationship are continually being created.”66 Emergent structures of feeling are in the
process of being constituted. Because of their emanative status, they are difficult to pin
down. So difficult to pin down, in fact, that many people may not be comfortable
attempting to explain them – there is a sense that the vocabulary for these structures of
feelings is still in process.67 These structures of nostalgia and loss, and dread and rage
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were emergent in the decades following the Holocaust. Heschel at once felt them and
animated them in his work.

Nostalgia and Loss in The Earth is the Lord’s
The Earth is the Lord’s was originally delivered as a speech in Yiddish in 1945 at
the Yiddish Science Institute in New York City. The speech was entitled “Di mizrecheyropeishe tkufe in der yiddisher geshikhte,” translating to “The East European Era in
Jewish History.68 Heschel, after the positive reception of the speech, then proceeded to
expand upon the original speech in Yiddish, wrote a translation of that expansion into
English, and then expanded upon that translation – ultimately producing The Earth is
the Lord’s published in 1950.69 Edward K. Kaplan writes that by “transforming his
Yiddish speech into an English book, Heschel completed a metamorphosis from
European immigrant to American Jewish intellectual.”70 Indeed, while The Earth is the
Lord’s “looks backwards,” as it is a (glorified) description of the folkways of the
destroyed Jewish religious and Hasidic communities, it also “looks forward” as giving an
American audience that may never have experienced (or even been directly descended
from) shtetl community or culture a way to mourn these communities through a shared
sense of loss and nostalgia. While the Holocaust – or, as Kaplan notes, the
“Catastrophe” as it was more likely to have been called71 – was not mentioned in the
original speech and is barely mentioned in The Earth is the Lord’s, the work
nevertheless enables readers to mourn the Holocaust’s victims from a temporal and
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geographically removed vantage point. Melville Jacobs’s review of the book was explicit
in this respect, noting: “Many Jewish people will find deep comfort and support in
Heschel’s poetical phrasings regarding their ancestors’ ideological heritage.” 72
This loss and nostalgia in The Earth is the Lord’s are found in two interconnected
parts. First, Heschel spends quite a bit of time in The Earth is the Lord’s discussing the
ways in which Eastern European Jewish culture is impossibly authentically Jewish. By
doing so, Heschel elevates a form of Jewish culture that was often marginalized and
looked down upon in America – both by the generally higher-class German Jews and
the children of Eastern European immigrants themselves. Additionally, through this
process Heschel subsumes all the variations of Eastern European Jewish culture under
pietistic culture, specifically Hasidism. Through this process of elevating Hasidic and
pietistic Eastern European culture, Heschel articulates gravity, zeal, and seriousness as
the core element of Eastern European culture. It is not specific folkways, behaviors, or
other elements of a culture which is at the root of Ashkenazi culture. For Heschel, it is a
mood. The loss of this particular mood is devastating for Heschel, and while The Earth
is the Lord’s is a eulogy for the Jews of Eastern Europe (and the mood they cultivated) it
is also a suggestion for the postwar American Jewish reader of the text. One can honor
these dead, the text whispers, by attempting to create some of this mood of piety in
one’s own life.
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Elevating Eastern European Jewish Community
A major argument in The Earth is the Lord’s is that in spite of anti-Semitism (and
even perhaps aided by it, as I will outline) the Jews of Eastern Europe manifested an
impossibly ultra-authentic form of Judaism. Heschel calls this period “the golden
period”73 not only in “Jewish history” but also in “the Jewish soul.”74 This period was
golden not only from a historical perspective, but there was something inherently
authentic from a dynamic theological perspective: the soul of the Jew came into its own.
Heschel’s statement here is significant. The term “The Golden Age” of Jewish history or
philosophy usually refers to the Sephardic (Spanish) Jews in the early Middle Ages. The
term has been used since the nineteenth century, as Mark Cohen writes, “in the
nineteenth century there was nearly universal consensus that Jews in the Islamic
Middle Ages—taking al-Andalus, or Muslim Spain, as the model—lived in a ‘Golden
Age’ of Muslim-Jewish harmony.”75 Even now, the term is still widely used: budding
scholars might turn to a Wikipedia article about this time period and find an article
entitled “Golden Age of Jewish Culture in Spain,” to learn a brief overview of the
historical a philosophical trends of that time.76 Later in The Earth is the Lord’s, Heschel
compares the Sephardic Jewry of this time to the Eastern European Jewish community
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in which he grew up to further his assertion that the Jews of Ashkenaz were the real
progenitors of a golden era in Jewish history.
By elevating the Jews of Eastern Europe in this way, Heschel is not only turning
the understanding of the intellectual and philosophical primacy of Sepharad (and in
particulary, the primacy of Sepharad in 19th Century German-Jewish historiography) on
its head, he also is subverting the prejudice that educated, second-third-or-fourth
generation Jews had of the more recent Eastern European Jews who came from the
shtetl. Tova Cooper writes:
German Jewish educators were pursuing a[n] agenda for their eastern European
coreligionists in New York City. Their citizenship education programs provided
English-language education, as well as manual and industrial training, for the
eastern European Jewish immigrants—or Ostjuden—who were arriving to the
United States in large numbers at the turn of the twentieth century. German Jews
adopted an assimilationist educational agenda through which they could
encourage the Ostjuden to embrace capitalism without threatening the Germans
Jews’ status as owners of capital.77
At the turn of the twentieth-century, the Ostjuden were seen as in need of assimilation,
education, and jobs that would not threaten the more-established German Jews place
as owners of capital. The shtetl was seen as backwards, embarrassing. And here
Heschel states this time period was golden!
Disrupting the narrative that there was something “backwards” about Eastern
European Jews involved not only positioning Eastern European Jews in a positive light,
but also suggesting that assimilation/acculturation was a key reason that the Jews of

77

Tova Cooper, “Educating the Ostjuden: Abraham Cahan and Gestures of Resistance,” in The
Autobiography of Citizenship: Assimilation and Resistance in U.S. Education (New Brunswick: University
of Rutgers Press, 2015), 133.

39

Sepharad were not the owners of the ‘true’ golden era in Jewish history. “In the
Ashkenazi period,” Heschel writes, “the spiritual life of the Jews was lived in isolation.
Accordingly, it grew out of its own ancient roots and developed in an indigenous
environment, independent of the trends and conventions of the surrounding world.”78
The Jews of Sepharad, on the other hand, were “deeply influenced by the surrounding
world.”79 Because the Jews of Eastern Europe “borrowed from other cultures neither in
substance nor form;”80 Jewish culture and literature was “by Jews, about Jews, and for
Jews.”81 All of this, was done, according to Heschel, without “apologizing to [any]one”82
because of their religion, culture, or piety. In Eastern Europe, because Jews were
largely left alone and were unable to participate in the greater community in which they
lived. The anti-Semitism surrounding the shtetl, which left the shtetl alone, allowed this
form of Judaism and Jewish culture to flourish.
Eastern European Jews were encouraged to assimilate or acculturate to
American culture by Jews who had lived in America for a longer period in time.
Assimilation or acculturation to American folkways and mores was considered a way to
become a full-fledged American citizen. By suggesting that part of the reason for
Eastern European Jewry’s success was precisely their lack of assimilation or
acculturation, Heschel encourages a postwar American Jewish audience to think twice
about over-eager assimilation to American culture. The fact that Heschel emphasizes
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the apartness and isolation of Eastern European Jewry becomes even more
pronounced when one remembers that not all the Jews living in eastern Europe were,
indeed, isolated or cut off from the broader non-Jewish community. But here Heschel
claims they were, almost winking at the reader of the text to infer that too much
assimilation to broader American culture could be dangerous, a loss of something
incredible and golden.
Heschel continues to view the entirety of Eastern European Jewish society
through the lens of pietistic (largely Hasidic) communities. By doing this, Heschel is
obviously privileging these Hasidic communities, almost suggesting that other groups in
Eastern Europe were somehow “really also” pietistic and Hasidic. “The East European
Jews,” Heschel writes, “had a common will and a common destiny.”83 Heschel
continues,
They formed not merely a social group, but a community, full of color and
contrasts, uniform in its variety. The Jews were like a land with many provinces—
Litvaks, Bessarabians, Ukrainians, and Galicians, Hasidim, Mithnaggdim,
Maskilim, Habadnikes, Zionists, Agunists, and Socialists – one language with
many dialects. Social existence was complex, frequently dominated by
centrifugal forces, but there was a common center and for the most part a
common periphery.84
In this stunning passage, Heschel links together different kinds of Jewish communities:
some are geographic (Galician, Ukrainian, etc.), some are theological (Mithnaggim,
Hasidim, Habadnikes), and some are secular/political (Zionists, Socialists, Maskilim). All
of these disparate groups – and each are disparate for distinct reasons! -- are, for him,
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merely dialects of one unified language. This language was not about signifiers and
correlated meanings, but instead signaled the grammar of a particular culture and a
particular attitude of zealousness towards divinity and sacrality. “The zeal of the pious
Jews,” Heschel writes, “was transferred to their emancipated sons and grandsons.”85
The religiosity of Talmudists and Hasidim alike was “reincarnated in the supporters of
modern Jewish movements.”86 That which was reincarnated was the zeal, the spirit of
the religious ones. This zeal, for Heschel, was the all-important kernel of authentic
Jewishness in Eastern European Jewish culture.
Heschel’s statements about the world of the Eastern European Jewish
community are naïve – and I read him as being cognizant of this naiveté. “[Heschel’s]
statement that Ashkenazi Jewry ‘borrowed from other cultures neither substance nor
form’ is unjustified,” Kristol Irving wrote in his review of the work, “as is his delicate
disparagement of the Sephardim as, in some sense, not truly Jewish.”87 Byron Sherwin’s
review of The Earth is the Lord’s includes the following statement of the work’s origin,
“Heschel delivered a lecture in Yiddish at YIVO in which he offered his eulogy for the
now lost Atlantis of east European Jewry.”88 Here, Sherwin compares Eastern European
Jewish communities to the mythical lost city of Atlantis, something that Heschel did not
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do. Nevertheless, the feeling that East European Jewry was similar to a mythical city
was doubtlessly bolstered by the way Heschel portrayed it in The Earth is the Lord’s.
Such a fantastical comparison, even by a reviewer of the work, gestures to the
unbelievability of the way Eastern Europe Jewry is presented in the work. While shtetl
communities may have been more isolated than Jews living in urban centers in Eastern
Europe, to say that they were completely isolated from the outside world is fantasy. Ben
Cion Pinchuk describes the development of the shtetls that Heschel romanticizes as “a
product of the encounter between a Jewish community with a Slavic agrarian society
and culture,” which “carries the imprint of both.”89 Heschel’s romanticization of the shtetl
also bothered Irving, who felt compelled to quip in his review, “Poland was not, after all,
Paradise, and Eastern Europe cannot make the unconditional claim of the Garden of
Eden.”90
Heschel understood this. The point of The Earth is the Lord’s is not to present a
precise historical account of Eastern European Jewish culture. One reviewer, Sol
Liptzin, also understood this: “The essay is intentionally one-sided. It does not claim to
give an objective picture.”91 Irving Kristol ultimately synthesizes his knowledge that The
Earth is the Lord’s is not always historically accurate with his own enjoyment of the work
by calling the book a “sacred history,” mentioning that The Earth is the Lord’s makes “no
claim to be objective, complete, or disinterested--it claims simply to be true.”92 The Earth
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is the Lord’s is not a sacred history. There is very little historical about the work. Rather,
the work is closer to a sacred ethnography. Heschel is explicit that the goal of the work
is to not provide a history of Ashkenazi communities, but rather the way Jews in these
communities lived, including “their habits and customs, [their] attitudes toward the basic
things in life, [and] the scale of values which directed their aspirations.”93
The Earth is the Lord’s as a sacred ethnography can be seen in the way Heschel
describes the landscape of Eastern Europe. “Even the landscape,” Heschel writes,
“became Jewish.”94 Heschel continues: “In the month of Elul during the penitential
season, the fish in the streams trembled; on Lag ba-Omer, the scholar’s festival in the
spring, all the trees rejoiced. When a holiday came, even the horses and dogs felt it.” 95
So amazing was the culture that it permeated through the trees and animals of Eastern
Europe! The ambient emotions, the connection with the Divine, were all so strong that
no one could escape its pull. Even a “crow perched on a branch” is described as looking
and behaving Jewishly, as it appeared to wear a Jewish prayer shawl and bends its
head as if praying.96 After the Holocaust, however, one can assume that the landscape
did not retain its Jewish nature for Heschel. He never returned to the land in which he
was born; the only thing the landscape would retain is the horrific memory of the
Holocaust. The only way to remember the Jewishness of the land is through
descriptions like the one Heschel provides in The Earth is the Lord’s, through
photography, and through artwork. Jewishness is only available through the affective
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power of images. There is artwork of Eastern European Jewish culture presented
throughout The Earth is the Lord’s, which will be addressed later in this chapter.

The Emotional Root of Eastern-European Jewish Culture
After demonstrating how Heschel views all Eastern European Jewish
communities as branches off of a pietistic trunk and how Heschel elevates this
metaphorical tree-trunk as the most-authentic form of Jewish culture, I now turn to what
Heschel believes is at the root of this pietistic Jewish culture. The primary element of
shtetl culture that Heschel believes so authentic and indigenous to Judaism includes joy
mixed with sadness and a continual sense of gravity, solemnity, and sacrality
surrounding life. Heschel’s discussion of shtetl group identity as being cemented
primarily around emotions and affects suggests an overall understanding of (any) group
or national identity as being formed primarily around affects.97
At times, Heschel’s description of the emotional structures of Ashkenazi culture
can seem rather bleak: “To be gay, carefree, relaxed, was an art few of them ever
learned. A Jewish child would be taught that life was too earnest to be wasted on
play.”98 This bleakness, however, is cut through by discussions of the joy found by living
Jewishly: “Jewishness was not only truth; it was vitality, joy, to some, the only joy.” 99
When joy was felt, Heschel states, it was “always for a serious reason, the trimming for
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a happy occasion, justified like a logical conclusion.”100 Jews in Eastern Europe were
pious, they “lived more in time than in space, [as if] their soul was always on the way.”101
Every aspect of life was “keyed to a certain style,” even “the manner of putting on or
removing one’s shoes, the stance of one’s head when walking down the street.”102
Saintliness was the hoped-for outcome of this way of life: scholars of Torah were
revered and education prized. “Schoolboys were referred to as ‘the holy flock’,” 103
“women toiled day and night to enable their husbands to devote themselves to study,”104
and “the ambition of every Jew was to have a scholar as a son-in-law.”105 Study itself
was a way of connecting emotions and affects into thought: “Study was a technique of
sublimating feeling into thought, of transposing dreams into syllogisms, of expressing
grief in formulating keen theoretical difficulties and joy in finding a solution to a difficult
passage in Maimonides.”106 Saintliness was not, however, only synonymous with being
well-educated for Heschel. The mark of saintliness was “loving-kindness” towards all
creatures; “a saint was he who did not know how it is possible not to love [or] not to
help.”107
Silvan Tompkins’s discussions of joy and distress are here helpful. Tompkins,
importantly, believed that the nine primary affects could combine to create almost
infinite kinds of emotional structures and moods. Silvan Tompkins describes
100
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distress/anguish as “the first response a human makes upon being born,”108 and is often
accompanied by vocal outbursts or tears. The primary goal of such distress-provoked
outbursts is “to communicate to the organism itself and to others that all is not well.”109
After communicating that all is not well, the cry of distress hopes to motivate the self
and others to help alleviate that which is so disturbing and distressing to the
individual.110 After discussing the wailing baby, Tompkins turns to the ways in which
older children and adults may cry. Tompkins believes that humans experience distress
extremely frequently: daily, at least, if not more. “Trouble is ubiquitous and anticipation
is perennial,” Tompkins writes.111 But most adults do not cry daily. This is because “the
adult has learned to cry as an adult.”112
Crying is therefore expanded for Tompkins, and there are several ways of
“crying” which do not require wails or tears. A declaration of ouch!, a whining plea, and
a miniature whimper or cry are all kinds of cries usually enacted by adults.113 Even a
description of an outrage can be considered a cry: “There are individuals who cry to
each other in the complaint, ‘Did you hear the latest? I think it an outrage. I can’t
understand it—someone should do something.’”114 This “complaint” kind of cry is
particularly interesting, as Tompkins is clear that these exchanges both create and
cement community, “This type of shared crying in and through speech has
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powerful adhesive properties. The shared, verbalized cry complaint can weld dyads and
larger groups into very stable, cohesive alliances against common enemies. If you and I
cry about the same things or people we can enjoy each other.”115
Distress’s community-building is particularly significant here, as is the “adult way
of crying.” Heschel’s discussion of the way the exclamation “oy!” was used in Eastern
Europe is particularly relevant here: A gentle wail of ‘oy!’ was commonly uttered when
words were deemed insufficient to fully explain the weight of grief: “Sorrow was their
second soul, and the vocabulary of their heart consisted of one sound: ‘Oy!’”116 This
adult way of crying became a way to sediment the community to one another, to better
articulate this particular form of suffering.
Joy, for Tompkins, is largely about the reduction of a negative stimulus.117 The
“innate affect is triggered by a decreasing stimulus—perhaps a reduction in hunger or
loneliness, or relief of pain.”118 Joy is also “contagious”; the “mutually rewarding system
of shared joy makes humans want to be social.”119 The facial movement of the smile is
of particular importance to Tompkins: “We will seek to help and be helped by other
humans who smile at us.”120 Joy tempered with distress is presented in Heschel’s work
as being even more socially binding and community generating than ‘pure’ or unmixed
joy would have been. Furthermore, because Heschel links joy with Judaism the social
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power becomes even stronger: people are not only connected to one another through
their displays of joy and distress, but they are attached to Judaism. Joy and distress
cling to Judaism, cling to Jewish practices.
Hamner’s discussion of national identity and affect is here helpful. After seeing
an art piece (entitled Tacet) in which musical conductors were filmed while silently
reading the national anthems of the countries in which they held citizenship, Hamner
was struck by how emotional the practice of reading these scores were these
conductors. Hamner writes,
I walked away from “Tacet” convinced that an important dimension of nationality
is its feeling and that the valuations of patriotism have sensory modalities and
tonalities that escape rational capture. National belonging—and any sense of
social belonging—is primarily sustained not by the stated lineaments of ideology
but by the murky nodes and currents of affect.121
Not only do affects and emotions create community, they sustain them. Lineaments and
important structures, concepts and ideas are sustained through this emotional way of
being. After the Holocaust, Heschel asks in The Earth is the Lord’s, is there any way to
maintain and continue the emotions indigenous to the Eastern European Jewish
community?

Nostalgia, Melancholy, and American Jewish Reception of The Earth is the Lord’s
The loss of Eastern European community is heightened because it is the only
community able to mix these emotions and associate them with Judaism in this
particular way. A great loss. But, Heschel suggests through the pages of The Earth is
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the Lord’s, it is possible to rekindle some of the mood, emotions, and structures of
feeling ambient in Eastern European Jewish culture. Turning now to the way The Earth
is the Lord’s is suffused with nostalgia, I now turn to M. Gail Hamner’s articulation of
nostalgia. Nostalgia is that which “signals the felt tension between the irrevocable loss
and hope for a world that is different.”122 The communities of Eastern Europe were lost
forever; but would American Jews forget them? Or, would the uneasy acknowledgement
and memory of the lost communities of Eastern Europe encourage American Jews to
behave more like that which was lost? As Hamner continues, the tension of nostalgia
produces “a practical or lived gap into which flows at once the desire for and foreclosure
of a specific knowledge.”123 The tug of nostalgia is the tug to make the present at once
more-like the past yet better-than-the-past. The knowledge suggested as a salve for this
nostalgia presented The Earth is the Lord’s is not so much how to prevent another
Holocaust from occurring, but rather how American Jews could live better in the present
through a more thorough understanding of the lost Eastern European communities.
Nostalgia is inherently generative; it is creative as it looks backwards to the past.
Here, loss and distress work bidirectionally. Loss is found, as I have shown, in
the pages of The Earth is the Lord’s as a way to explain a particular pathway of emotion
in Eastern European Jewish culture. Additionally, loss can be sensed through the
document because of its status as a document describing a world no longer in existence
by a survivor of the Holocaust. Yiddish-speaking American Jews enjoyed this work in
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the original Yiddish so much that they asked the work to be translated into English.
American Jews, obviously, were not forced to respond so positively to the speech as to
encourage Heschel to translate and publish the book. Rather, there was something
pleasurable about experiencing this loss. The Earth is the Lord’s provided an outlet for a
still-sedimenting, emergent structure of feeling felt by American Jews after the
Holocaust. By experiencing loss together, those Jews who were largely not survivors of
the Holocaust themselves could cement themselves to their fellow Jews by feeling this
loss together.124
The feeling of loss and trauma post-Holocaust by the American Jewish
community is difficult to pin down. For decades, it was generally assumed that in the
two decades immediately following the Holocaust American Jews did not discuss the
Holocaust. The feeling that one ought to not talk about the Holocaust was common for
American Jews during this time. Ronald J. Berger recounts, “When my father first
arrived in the United States in 1946 after surviving Auschwitz and other concentration
camps, no one, not even Jewish relatives, was particularly interested in hearing about
his ordeal. People would say things like, ‘We suffered [during the war], too.’”125
Additionally, a common language by which to discuss the Holocaust was not yet
established. As Zachary Braiterman notes,
Discursive factors explain this relative silence [of Jewish theologians on the
Holocaust] better than psychologism. Buber, Heschel, Soloveitchik, and Kaplan
lacked a widespread discourse with which to discuss the Holocaust. A flurry of
memoirs, literature, film, and scholarship would begin to chronicle the Holocaust
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in graphic detail. Such texts disseminated a vocabulary, a body of knowledge
without which one could only have referred to the Holocaust in passing and
general terms.126
The Holocaust was not yet part of a vocabulary through which it could be clearly
articulated. Braiterman continues, “Without a sufficiently developed discourse, there
was simply no language with which to talk about the Holocaust, no pastiche of image,
figure, phrase, slogan, narrative, and reflection with which to rivet the religious
imagination.”127
However, this does not mean that Holocaust survivors themselves universally did
not talk about their experiences in the Holocaust. David Slucki’s analysis of the
Holocaust survivor network Katsetler Farband demonstrates this: “survivors talked and
debated rigorously about the Holocaust and its meaning almost from their arrival in the
United States.”128 Hasia Diner’s groundbreaking work on the ways in which American
Jews did indeed talk about the Holocaust summarizes the previous view as such,
That the Holocaust meant little to postwar American Jews has become an
accepted truth, one holding that, until the 1960s — as a result of either the
Eichmann trial early in the decade or the June 1967 Six-Day War in Israel — the
story of Europe’s destroyed Jews lay hidden through deliberate forgetting.
American Jews could not, would not, and did not engage in acts of public
mourning. This paradigm of American Jewish history postulates that, in the
affluence of the postwar period, with the 1950s its epicenter, American Jews had
nothing to gain from invoking the Holocaust. As most scholars and Jewish
communal commentators see it, American Jewry suffered from an almost twodecade-long, self-imposed collective amnesia.129
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Diner departs from a previous understanding that Jews almost never discussed the
Holocaust,130 instead noting that there was, in fact, robust Holocaust memorialization in
the early postwar period: “Holocaust commemorations of the postwar era reenacted a
set of on-the-ground realities that deeply influenced how American Jews constructed
their commemorative culture.”131 Specifically, Diner notes that there are “three
interconnected levels”132 through which postwar American Jews memorialized and
navigated the memory of the Holocaust. First, “they fashioned memorials of words,
images, and music to keep alive the Jews who had perished;” secondly, they set aside
“time to recall the massive number who had endured such brutal deaths;” and finally,
they “invoked those deaths and the destruction of European Jewish communal life as a
rhetorical weapon in a series of campaigns to affect American politics.”133 Through this
three-pronged approach, American Jews linked the past, present, and future together
through their understanding of the Holocaust.
However, the lack of a fully-developed vocabulary surrounding the Holocaust
nevertheless remained. Several scholars remarked that Diner’s thesis might have been
overstated in We Remember with Reverence and Love. Stephen Whitfield points out
that Diner does not explore why American scholarly books lagged behind those
published in France and England,134 and stresses that Diner does “not argue that the
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intensity and breadth of Holocaust consciousness were symmetrical in the eras before
and after 1962.”135 One reviewer of the work, Leonard Dinnerstein, went so far as to
flatly state,
While it is true that the Holocaust was not completely ignored by American Jews
after World War II ended, we can say that during the 1950s very few Jews
thought much about it. During the five-year period following the murder of the six
million, most American Jews, and Jews throughout the world, rallied to establish
a Jewish state in Palestine and, to a much lesser extent, to find homes for the
displaced persons who survived the war.136
Dinnerstein continues by asserting that while all American Jews had heard of Hitler and
“his determination in killing so many millions of people, but there is little evidence that
Jewish communities internalized the memories of the Holocaust to the extent that Diner
suggests in her book.137 What Dinnerstein hints at (likely without realizing!) is the
emergent nature of the emotional structure of profound loss in the wake of the
Holocaust: while very few Jews “thought about” the Holocaust intently, or truly
“internalized” the sense of the Holocaust, it nevertheless remained an ambient force.
Diner herself is quite clear in the lack of a coherent vocabulary through which
American Jews thought about, wrote about, and memorialized the Holocaust. Diner
herself acknowledges this, writing:
That word “memorial” need not have been present in every text, on every page,
in every pageant, concert, speech, or artifact, for them to have created a
memorial repertoire that put in the foreground the six million murdered Jews of
Europe. They justified their political, communal, and philanthropic works as a way
to recall the six million, and they fashioned their memorials in light of their
concerns for contemporary realities and for the future. This organic blending of
135
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pure and simple memorializing and acting in the present in light of the memory of
the catastrophe constituted a deep and powerful element in postwar American
Jewish public life.138
Memorials to the Holocaust were not always explicit, therefore; occasionally they were
the result of “organic blending” of memorializing the past while existing in the present.
Diner continues that it was not until the mid-1960s until a clearer vocabulary of
Holocaust memorialization was created:
In the years from the cessation of World War II until the middle of the 1960s,
these Jewish and American conditions influenced the ways in which American
Jews played with words, phrases, genre, themes, and practices to contemplate
the Holocaust and to discuss it among themselves and with their American
neighbors.139
This plasticity of language points to the uncertainty of postwar Jews as to how to
correctly memorialize the Holocaust linguistically.
Heschel himself was doubtlessly still in a state of acute mourning for the
Holocaust. Most of his family had died at the hands of the Nazis, his home was forever
gone. The pain is acute, throbbing. There was trauma, it lingered, and of course it did.
The American Jewish community was grappling with how to continue to go on in the
wake of the loss of the six million. In this way, the loss felt and experienced by the
American community reading The Earth is the Lord’s is a reaction not only to a lost
community and a lost affective and emotional culture, but also a reckoning with the
realities of postwar Jewish life. In the world where Treblinka and Auschwitz existed, how
can one continue to be a Jew? How can one not continue to be a Jew? Here, Heschel’s
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texts do not necessarily provide a vocabulary through which to understand the
Holocaust, but rather a means through which American Jews could feel themselves
more profoundly involved and in community with those that lost their lives in the
Holocaust. The pain and the loss, the affective structures of the Holocaust, are shared
through Heschel’s writing.

Making the Unintelligible Intelligible
Ariella Azoulay’s work on photographs in Palestine works to uncover truths of the
past that have been erased or forgotten due to violence, regimes of the state, and
continued conflict and strife. Discussing a photo and film installation which documented
pre-1948 alliances between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, she recounts a particularly
illuminating encounter with a respondent who was aghast that these grassroots
alliances happened before the foundation of the state,
Anonymous: Did these people [who achieved these civil alliances] represent
anyone?
Ariella Azoulay: Yes, themselves, their community.
Anon.: Okay... were these agreements about the purchase of land?
AA: No, these were civil alliances about their lives.
Anon.: What?! Probably about who is allowed to live where, that here Jews
may live and there they may not?
AA: No, they often lived as close neighbors. That was not the point.
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Anon.: So what was their interest?
AA: To preserve their life.
[…]
Anon.: How many such agreements were there?
AA: The film reports about one hundred, but I chose them out of many more.
Anonymous: [Amazed] What?!?140
The shock felt at these photographs describes how there was a presupposed
assumption that Jews and Arabs had always been enemies, the photographs uncover a
new way of looking at the past which can disrupt the present.
Photography, according to Azoulay, can do more than simply disrupting the
present with differing encounters of the past. Discussing another photograph, Azoulay
writes,
Thus, for example, an image from Lubya—showing Palestinians carrying a white
flag, a clear sign of nonviolence, and heading toward Israeli soldiers, the stillstanding houses in the background—shows an option that we know was rejected
because we know that the entire village was destroyed and its residents were not
allowed to return.141
What this photo demonstrates is a possibility of a past which was not allowed to
continue, a pathway not taken. I argue that the woodcuts interspersed in The Earth is
the Lord’s function in a similar way. While they do not suggest the possibility of co-
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existence with the Nazi party (such a concept would be insulting, laughable) but rather
show a snapshot of Eastern European Jewish life in Europe. The possibility of this life
was snuffed out with the Holocaust, but had history been radically different, perhaps it
could have continued.
The images in The Earth is the Lord’s feature images of religious Jews in the
shtetl along with images of ritual objects. In one image, a tichel-wearing woman relaxes
while reading in a chair, a son and a cat curled up at her feet. In the background, her
religiously attired husband is about the leave the home, his hand on the doorknob.142 In
another, a strained-looking man makes a supplication to his Rebbe, the Rebbe looking
kind and thoughtful. Unlit candles sit on the table next to the Rebbe, indicating that
perhaps Shabbat or a holiday is about to come in.143 Schor was a silversmith and
engraver who worked on Jewish ritual objects and scenes of Jewish community; his
works were described as “bright and lyrical in color and designed with a certain wooden
explicitness that gives them an affinity with primitive work.”144
Ilya Schor’s daughter, Mira Schor, described her father as “a master of ornamental
detail, a Renaissance artist in the age of high modernism and minimalism.”145 Schor
was, therefore, pulled by the past, stylistically uneasy in the present. “My father’s work,”
Mira Schor continues,
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taught us lessons about this world of his [Ilya’s] father; messages from a lost
paradigm were both evident in the images yet also absorbed at deeper unknown
level because they were so deeply embedded into the work and so foreign from
the world we lived in. A world view in which the deity was present in what was the
most humble, most minute, was transmitted to us through visual pleasure without
our knowing that it was a lesson.146
Ilya Schor’s work in The Earth is the Lord’s accomplishes the above as well. The
woodcuts teach lessons about a lost world, messages from a lost paradigm.
The loss of Eastern European Jewish culture and community is unthinkable,
unintelligible. But by understanding more about the culture and the emotional structures
suffused within it, it becomes possible to think of the ways that American Jews could
bring in elements of Eastern European culture into their own lives. The concluding
chapter of The Earth is the Lord’s is an open acknowledgement of this aim of Heschel’s.
In it, Heschel openly states that is book ought not to be read as history or as a factual
ethnography. Instead, the book serves as a way to sacralize the memory of the Jews of
Eastern Europe by behaving more like them in America.
“To be sure,” Heschel opens chapter fifteen, “in the life of the East European
Jews there was not only light but also shadow – one-sidedness of learning, neglect of
manners, provincialism.”147 Heschel continues, noting that communities were “tormented
by ruthless laws”, “intimidated by drunken landowners”, and full of “naked misery and
frightful poverty.”148 These situations, Heschel concedes, occasionally made piety and
religiosity too difficult: “The regions of piety were at times too lofty for plain mortals. Not
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all Jews could devote themselves to Torah and service of God.” 149 But still, Heschel
maintains that Eastern European Jews still had this spirit of piety within them: “There
was hardly a Jew in whom respect of the spirit had died out completely.” 150 What
Heschel accomplished in The Earth is the Lord’s was a process of turning the shtetl into
the sign it is today, a kind of “symbol and a myth.”151
This symbolic memory of the shtetl, can, Heschel understands, aid American
Jews struggling with the reality of the Holocaust. He writes,
Our life is beset with difficulties, yet it is never devoid of meaning. The feeling
futility is absent from our souls. Our existence is not in vain. There is a Divine
earnestness about our life. There is dignity. To be invested with dignity means to
represent something more than oneself. The gravest sin for a Jew is to forget
what he represents. We are God’s stake in human history.152
This change to present tense language makes it crystal-clear that Heschel is now
talking to the American Jew reading his work. Forgetting what the Jew “represents” is
the “gravest sin.” And while what the Jew represents is being “God’s stake in history,”
The Earth is the Lord’s suggests that Eastern European Jewish culture was the most
authentic way to be a Jew, the most authentic way to live as “God’s stake in history.”
Remembering the shtetl, being nostalgic for an over-idealized version of the shtetl, can
enable American Jews to reorient their lives towards spirituality, memory, and hope.
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Heschel’s Ambivalence About Anger and the Problem of Anger
Man is Not Alone and God in Search of Man are both extremely different works
than The Earth is the Lord’s. The Earth is the Lord’s is short, based on a speech, and
highly evocative. Man is Not Alone and God in Search of Man, however, are both
extremely dense and long works, much more philosophical in style than The Earth is the
Lord’s. Both books were also published after The Earth is the Lord’s. The New York
Times obituary of Abraham Heschel reads, “the writings that may be considered his
magnum opus was published in two parts: Man Is not Alone; A Philosophy of Religion in
1951, and God in Search of Man; A Philosophy of Judaism, in 1955.”153 The “magnum
opus” of Man is Not Alone and God in Search of Man consists primarily of Heschel’s
explanation of religion as an inherent human experience, the need of humans to stand
in awe and radical amazement at God, and the need of God of humans (particularly,
those in which God is in a covenantal relationship with, the Jewish people). While the
main thrust of both books is therefore about the relationship between God and humanity
more broadly, Heschel does speak of anger and dread in these works, specifically
linking dread and anger to death and the Holocaust.
Heschel is ambivalent about anger. While Heschel speaks largely positively
about God’s anger, Heschel is largely negative about human anger. For Heschel, God’s
anger demonstrates God’s love for humanity and God’s involvement in the created
world. Human anger, on the other hand, is a cause for alarm: human anger can lead
towards violence, death, and suffering. Anger, rage, and dread are also emotions that
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are dependent one one’s subjectivity and place in history: Jews and non-Jews will
experience anger in the face of the Holocaust differently from one another. To a thinker
so usually invested in the universal possibilities of religion as Heschel, this is a startling
argument.
Silvan Tompkins describes anger as the most “problematic” of all the affects
precisely because of anger's ability to wreak havoc on society.154 He states that anger
produces a "swollen, reddened face,”155 “deep and rapid breathing, a loud, sustained
cry, the mouth opened, the jaw clenched, [and] the eyes narrowed.”156 The face
expresses the affect of anger but can also serve as a transmitter of affect. Tompkins
writes that there are “universal taboos on looking too directly into the eyes of the other
because of the likelihood of affect contagion, as well as escalation, because of the
unwillingness to express affect promiscuously and because of concern lest others
achieve control through knowledge of one’s otherwise private feelings.”157 Here, we see
the importance of the face at transmitting affects, and more importantly, the anxiety and
fear at anger spreading throughout society. Even for Tompkins, fear is dangerous!
Tompkins dryly notes, “the primary function of anger is to make bad matters
worse.”158 Because of the its “contagious” nature, anger tends to provoke angry
reactions in others.159 More specifically, Tompkins is clear that "anger cannot be

154

Tompkins, Affect Imagery Consciousness: The Complete Edition, I–III:687.
Ibid., I–III:vol 3, xvi.
156 Ibid., I–III:688.
157 Ibid., I–III:621.
158 Ibid., I–III:689.
159 Ibid., I–III:687.
155

62

'satisfied' in isolation."160 It is impossible to truly satisfy the angry impulse alone. Anger
always moves. This does not mean, however, that anger cannot be sublimated by other
emotions, cultural structures, or combine with other affects. As a reminder, Tompkins's
understanding of affects are pre-emotional structures that — once felt — are
experienced in combination with other affects, creating and reaffirming emotional scripts
that rely on patterns. “The pure affect,” Tompkins writes, “has no necessary aims.”161
But, once we begin to talk about the effects of anger — including its problematic nature
on society — we talk about the way anger exists in combination with other affects and
within scripts.
The movement of the affect of anger can be misplaced and felt along temporal
and geographic lines: Tompkins uses this “free-moving” quality of anger to describe how
children who were once beaten are more likely to beat their own children.162 The anger
becomes attached to an emotional script involving anger and violence, and a particular
anger can manifest in an entirely different (yet similar) situation.163 It is possible to feel
anger at nearly any object, or person. Elspeth Probyn writes one "can feel anger at an
object that normally causes joy; you can be startled by any number of objects; you can
feel shame in the strangest of circumstances."164
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Anger's ability to move coupled with its predilection towards spurring on violence
makes it potentially dangerous to society. Significantly, Tompkins is clear that anger
always moves somewhere, whether it be within the original ‘subject’ of the anger or to a
different person. “My terror, my distress, and my shame,” Tompkins writes, “are first of
all my problems. They need never become your problems, though they may. But my
anger, and especially my rage, threaten violence for you, your family, your friends, and
above all for our society.”165 Here, Tompkins makes a clear distinction between anger
and the other affects of distress, terror, and shame. Although he here states that terror,
distress, and shame do not necessarily bleed out to the community at large, they still
may. It is not that rage is more slippery or transferable than the other affects, but that it
can lead towards violence and instability of order than the other affects. Specifically,
Tompkins states that unchecked anger and rage can lead to “murder, assassination,
rioting, rebellion, revolution, and war may result in the loss of life, the destruction of
property, and the destruction of crops and stores of food.”166 This is not always the case,
of course, Tompkins is clear that anger arising from a small irritant or infraction may be
stopped by a simple apology.167
While violence may be an effect of anger, Tompkins is clear that is not the only
conclusion. As seen above, anger can be turned inward to oneself, causing depression
and feelings of self-hatred and self-worthlessness. Anger may be sublimated by other
emotional and theoretical structures, such as Christianity or the idea of karmic
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retribution.168 While “the sex drive ceases once orgasm has taken place and the hunger
drive ceases once we have eaten our fill,”169 anger does not create a drive that needs to
be fulfilled in the same way.170 Although violence and aggression are not necessary
outcomes of anger, Tompkins is clear that most violent/aggressive actions do come
about because of anger. He writes,
But if one may be angry and not violent, and violent and not angry, the majority of
intended violence nonetheless is a mixed compound of anger and other affects
and other scripts. The ratio of anger to other affects in violence may vary from
zero anger to all anger, and that ratio itself may vary before, during, and after
violence and between scenes of violence for the same individual. Thus, the hot
moral outrage which first attracts the radical to a revolutionary movement may
become much cooler when commitment has been transformed into strategy and
when strategy has settled into long-term and shifting tactics.171
Here, we see that anger usually accompanies violence in some way, whether it be hot
and immediately present or cooler and in the background.
Tompkins is clear that violence is a threat to the establishment of a pre-existing
social order; Tompkins is here not making claims about the ability of violence to change
unethical or unjust social systems. He writes:
If I had been a black American slave on a southern plantation feeling the pain of
the lash of the whip, I might have wanted to express my anger in kind to repay
the debt in full and then some, or beyond and to kill the oppressor for all past
suffering and to ensure freedom for the future. This would have entailed my own
death, but I could have responded with an imagined scene in which vengeance is
fully and richly taken and celebrated. And such fantasies could have let to
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sharing such possibilities through knowing glances with fellow victims who had
also suffered the lash of the whip.172
While obviously it would be morally or ethically justified for slaves to revolt, it would
nevertheless disrupt the existing social order. Here, we see that for Tompkins anger as
a disrupting force is divorced from other, preconceived ideas of morality or ethics. For
Tompkins, it is possible for anger to destroy social order and yet do something morally
good.
Unlike Tompkins, Heschel’s ambivalence towards anger is not because of a
desire to maintain the social order. Rather, it is because it could disrupt humans as a
moral and ethical entity. Heschel is only concerned with violence and anger making
people less moral, more abhorrent. The very idea that anger could be disruptive for
moral reasons would be a non-starter for Heschel; Heschel is only concerned with
violence and anger enabling horrors, abhorrence, (and ultimately) another Holocaust, or
perhaps a new kind of Holocaust.
The Holocaust is mentioned only indirectly in Man is Not Alone, and Heschel’s
discussion of the Holocaust constantly seem to hold the topic at arm’s length. Edward
K. Kaplan, who (as mentioned previously) believes that Heschel’s section “The Hiding
God” in Man is Not Alone comes close to constituting a post-Holocaust theology, even
acknowledges Heschel’s relative silence on the Holocaust in Man is Not Alone. Kaplan
notes that in Man is Not Alone Heschel talked about the Holocaust “with discretion.”173
Michael Oppenheim’s understanding of how Heschel understood the Holocaust centers
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the problem of human evil as opposed to Divine culpability or the question of Divine
agency.”174 Oppenheim continues that the Holocaust is presented similarly in Man is Not
Alone and God in Search of Man, except that God in Search of Man includes the
importance of Jewish participation in mitzvot.”175 While of course God in Search of Man
does discuss the importance of the Jewish tradition in light of the horror of the
Holocaust, Oppenheim here misses something significant. Jews, for Heschel, obviously
have a special relationship to the Holocaust, and this relationship to the Holocaust
(along with the resources of their Jewish tradition and their covenant with God) gives
them an understanding of the necessity and the responsibility of human anger.
Heschel is beginning to structure an understanding that emotional responses to
the Holocaust are dependent on one’s place and situation in the world. Tompkins’s
example of the anger of the slave on the plantation indicates a similar concern.
Tompkins even remarks that slave owners in the South were aware of the
transformational and spurring on to action that anger can entail. “Slave owners,”
Tompkins writes, “knew all of this, and were constantly vigilant about the possibility and
potentiality of uprising” and attempted to regulate the emotions of their slaves.176
Furthermore, Tompkins suggests that Christianity was promoted to the enslaved
population — and then embraced by the enslaved population — because it enabled
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slaves to sublimate their anger for the possibility of a better life in heaven: "sensible"
alternative to revolution, with its promises of a happy afterlife."177
Here, Tompkins creeps closer to understanding how power affects affects: the
enslaved have different affective landscapes than their abusers. While this is an
extreme example, it points to what Probyn states in Blush “our early experiences,
framed by class, race, and gender are reproduced in how we understand possibility and
limitation.”178 Not only do our affects and resulting emotions depend on the way power
intersects with one's body; the way one understands limitations and possibilities of
existence also greatly depend on and alter our affects and emotions. Probyn remarks
on an experiment where women and men were shown pictures of women being
subjected to rape and other gender-based violence. Women felt a strong shameresponse from looking at the photos, whereas men did not.179 “If individual women,”
Probyn writes, “have experienced early in their lives primal scenes of shame and
humiliation, seeing other women shamed will tend to reactivate the feeling.”180
Heschel, too, understands that Jews and non-Jews have differing emotional
responses to the Holocaust. Jews, even Jews who were not survivors of the Holocaust
themselves, react to the Holocaust differently than gentiles. They are akin to the women
in the experiment Probyn discussed above. This can be seen in the way Heschel
addresses both Nazism and the Holocaust in God in Search of Man versus Man is Not
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Alone. Significantly, Heschel is blunter about Nazism and the Holocaust in God in
Search of Man than he is in Man is Not Alone. This is a significant distinction, as Man is
Not Alone is subtitled A Philosophy of Religion, whereas God in Search of Man is
subtitled A Philosophy of Judaism. Man is Not Alone has a wider intended audience and
more universalistic tone; God in Search of Man a narrower presumed audience and a
more particularistic tone. As I will demonstrate below, Heschel does not explicitly
mention Nazism or the Holocaust at all in Man is Not Alone. He is much clearer and
more specific in God in Search of Man, suggesting that perhaps he felt the intended
audience for God in Search of Man would be better able to understand particularistic
rage post-Holocaust than a wider audience.

Universal Anger: Man is Not Alone
In the section Oppenheim highlighted as being a response to the Holocaust, “The
Hiding God,” Heschel uses language such as contemporary humans being witnesses to
“history’s most terrible horrors,”181 history being “a stage for the dance of might and
evil,”182 and that in the contemporary world the “decay of consciousness fills the air with
a pungent smell.”183 While all of these examples doubtlessly allude to the Holocaust with
more or less vividness (the mention of smell, in particular, is a visceral reminder of the
smell of burning flesh in concentration camps), it is not explicit. Rather, Heschel is vivid
and precise affectively. Heschel is invoking the Holocaust without being precise
purposefully. The Holocaust here is presented as a universal evil. While this heightens
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the significance of the Holocaust (as the Holocaust here is associated with a supreme
evil, or pure evil) some of the particularities is lost.
Overall, Man is Not Alone focuses on the ways in which humans enabled and
allowed the Holocaust to occur. In “The Peril of Living,” Heschel writes,
A single vicious thought may spread like canker at the roots of all other thoughts,
and one person with evil becomes quickly a majority against a multitude of
people impartial to evil. Man is not made for neutrality, for being aloof and
indifferent… With a capacity to hurt boundless and unchecked, with the immense
expansion of power and the rapid decay of compassion, life has, indeed, become
a synonym for peril.184
What the above quote shows is two-fold. Firstly, Heschel appears to be deliberately
avoiding spelling out evils such as anti-Semitism and racism for the less specific term
“vicious thoughts” and secondly, it is easy for humans to fall into the trap of evil, life is
perilous. What both of these elements do in tandem is universalize the Holocaust: the
Holocaust is something that could happen to anyone, anywhere. The specificity of the
Holocaust is all but lost in Man is Not Alone.
Later in Man is Not Alone, Heschel discusses the biblical scene of the golden
calf. Removed from the Holocaust, removed even from modernity, Heschel still seems
quite concerned and uncomfortable with human anger – even when it is displayed by
the figure of Moses himself! He continually presents human anger as potentially flawed.
This is in contrast to the way Heschel presents Divine anger, which is always justified.
Heschel references anger in a section of Man is Not Alone entitled “Compassion,”
wherein Heschel discusses the anger that Moses felt upon seeing the Israelites
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worshiping the Golden Calf. “Moses,” Heschel writes, “blazed down in anger, flung
down the tablets and broke them.”185 Significantly, human anger is here connected with
intense, bodily actions, and destruction. Here, again we see that heightened emotion is
connected with the body: both the directionality of Moses’s body is heightened, as are
the actions his body took. Immediately after discussing this “blaze” of anger Moses felt,
Heschel moves to when Moses is no longer experiencing this anger and quickly moves
from Moses to God’s emotions. When Moses stands again on the mountain, about to
descend once more, God sweeps by Moses and declares God’s own compassion. Of
God’s compassion, Heschel writes, “His compassion is not mere emotion; it is blazing
with the power of which only He is capable.”186 Here, the discussion of Moses’s anger is
all but subsumed in a larger conversation about Divine compassion; a compassion so
great that Heschel says that no human could experience it.
Zachary Braiterman also notes that Heschel’s deferral to God’s goodness runs
deeply throughout Heschel’s discussions of the Holocaust. “For his part Heschel,”
Braiterman writes, “refused to blame the God of History when the immediate
responsibility for evil lay with human beings.”187 Braiterman continues that “modern man”
receives the brunt of Heschel’s anger in the face of the Holocaust.188 It is wrong of
humans to question God after the Holocaust; God is not wrong for allowing the
Holocaust to occur! While Heschel was deeply concerned with the plight of modern
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man, I argue from the reading of Moses above that Heschel is uncomfortable with rage
throughout history. Humans are the problem, not God.189
This trend towards viewing human anger warily is also found in one of Heschel’s
earliest pieces of writing about the Holocaust, “The Meaning of This Hour.”190 Heschel is
also quick to re-orient the question from “Why did God allow the Holocaust to happen?”
to “Why have we allowed this to happen?” Heschel writes: “We have trifled with the
name of God. We have taken the ideals in vain. We have called out for the Lord. He
came. And was ignored.”191 Mentioning that while modernity enabled the Holocaust, it
can be used as an excuse for it, Heschel continues: “Let modern dictatorship not serve
as an alibi for our conscience. We have failed to right for right, for justice, for goodness;
as a result we must fight against wrong, against injustice, against evil.”192 And even
while fighting against that wrong and injustice, humans are still suspect: “A man with a
gun is like a beast without a gun. The killing of snakes [a metaphor Heschel uses
throughout the piece to refer to evil generally and the Nazis specifically] will save us for
this moment but not forever.”193
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Later in Man is Not Alone Heschel discusses anger as if it were a powerful lure to
ensnare people: “One may be learned and wicked, an authority on ethical theory and a
scoundrel, know how to condemn anger and be unable to curb if.” 194 Anger, here, is
something to be condemned, something that one is unable to stop feeling in spite of all
the ethical teaching they may have read and been taught. This passage is in a larger
discussion entitled “The Inadequacy of Ethics.”195 Ethics, for Heschel, are inadequate
because of the humanity of people: their emotions. Heschel associates ethics with pure,
cold reason. Heschel is often dismissive of “reason,” associating it with doubt, a lack of
wonder, and inhumanity. “It is true,” Heschel writes, “that our reason is responsive to
reasonable arguments. Yet, reason is a lonely stranger in the soul, while irrational
forces feel at home and are always in the majority.” 196 This statement, then,
simultaneously shows the inadequacy of reason and seems uncomfortable with
emotions! Emotions, surely here including anger, are “irrational forces” compared to the
“lonely stranger” of reason, making it impossible for the reader to sympathize with the
figure of the “lonely stranger” of reason.
The most explicit Heschel does come when discussing the Holocaust in Man is
Not Alone is when he is talking about the universality of right and wrong, of evilness and
goodness. Heschel writes:
If a universal state should ever be established and mankind by a majority of
notes should decide that a particular ethnic group is to be exterminated, because
this would suit the interests of mankind, would that decision be right? Or would
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the statement of a creditor nation that 2 + 2 = 5 be correct? An action is right, a
statement is true, regardless of whether it is expedient or not.197
While this quote is, of course, primarily about Heschel’s concern about moral relativism,
and his firm belief that “there is good and evil and there is right and wrong,” this quote
simultaneously evokes the Holocaust while distancing itself from it by wrapping the
evocation of the Holocaust in hugely universalistic ideas. State violence is mentioned
against an ethnic group in the above example, it is still non-specific by virtue of it being
a hypothetical. Furthermore, the hypothetical situation is as universal as can be: the
nation is a hypothetical universal nation, made up of all humans. Directly after this
hypothetical-universal-state example, he uses a math equation: something even more
universal, something easy to understand and grasp. Heschel seems to be shielding the
reader from the Holocaust: evoking but not being explicit, almost using coded language
and double entendre.
While the lack of a clear vocabulary through which to discuss the Holocaust at
this point in time might explain Heschel’s usage of metaphor and broader discussions of
state violence, rage, and evil as opposed to clearly discussing the Holocaust, this is not
the full story. American Jews, Heschel included, were quick to universalize the lessons
learned from the Holocaust when speaking to a broader non-Jewish audience.
Heschel’s discussion of the Holocaust in Man is Not Alone follows this universalizing
trend. In particular, the way in which Heschel discusses the Holocaust in Man is Not
Alone follows a universalizing impulse -- a desire to use the Holocaust to make claims
about the importance of a universal morality. Shaul Magid, in American Post-Judaism,
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discusses the complicated and multi-variegated ways in which this plays out:
“Americans have a very strong need for universalizing the Holocaust as that is one way
to make it “familiar” and thus make it an event that is part of their (American) story.”198 A
part of this Americanization and universalizing story is the depiction of Nazis as
absolute evil,
The American myth painting Nazis as absolute evil made sure that the Jewish
understanding of the events as exclusively about the Jews would have a
sympathetic ear for millions of Americans for whom this was an event largely
irrelevant to their lives. On this reading the Jewish myth is already Americanized
or, perhaps, the Americanization of the Holocaust provided the necessary
conditions for the American Jewish story to be convincing to a non-Jewish
public.199
Heschel has a complicated relationship with the universalization of the Holocaust in
Man is Not Alone and God in Search of Man. Heschel does not explicitly mention the
Holocaust in Man is Not Alone, but discusses (implicitly or explicitly) the Nazis as a kind
of “ultimate evil” that can come from unchecked rage. In God in Search of Man, which I
will turn to later, Heschel is much more explicit. Heschel’s explicit nature in God in
Search of Man suggests that he understood that Jews were more likely to experience
rage and understand this rage than a broader non-Jewish audience.

Dread and Death in Man is Not Alone
In Man is Not Alone, Heschel describes death in more relatively positive terms.
This positivity is counter to the way death (and in particular, death of the victims of the
Holocaust) in God in Search of Man. Man is Not Alone presents death in three
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interconnected ways: firstly, as a homecoming where one is returned to Divine;
secondly, evidence of human frailty; and thirdly, a horizon of dread and fear which can
be ameliorated through faith. Even when death is presented as dreadful, the
dreadfulness of death can be offset by a relationship with the Divine.
“You and I,” Heschel writes in early pages of Man is Not Alone, “have not
invented the grandeur of the sky nor endowed man with the mystery of birth and death.
We do not create the ineffable, we encounter it.”200 Here, the mystery of death, the
inevitability of death, is linked with the beauty of the world and the universal ability to
perceive the sky.201 Similarly, Heschel later states that humans are “witnesses rather
than authors of birth and death.”202 We cannot control death just as we cannot control
the specifics of a human birth: some things are beyond the realm of human control,
science, and technology. Furthermore, Heschel repeatedly talks about the
universalizing nature of death. “Death wipes away that which seems mighty and
independent,”203 Heschel is explicit that a person’s status in society, and even their
relationship with their family “are blown away like chaff” 204 when faced with death.
Therefore, Heschel often uses language that emphasizes the uncertainty and
discomfort of the moment before death. Having parts of one’s identity being “blown
away like chaff,” does not sound particularly comfortable, as does the image of having
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sand thrown in one’s eyes, an image Heschel invokes when discussing human futility,
death, and the Tower of Babel.205 Heschel uses the Tower of Babel in Man is Not Alone
precisely as a metaphor for how people, feeling and believing themselves to be selfsufficient, feel when they approach death: “the tower begins to totter.”206 This language
of tottering towers, sand thrown in the eyes, and wind whipping away chaff are all
visceral examples of dread. In fact, the way in which Heschel describes this feeling is
strikingly similar to how contemporary affect thinkers discuss dread. Dread is bodily; so
bodily, in fact, that one often feels removed or outside of their own body. Dread moves
alongside the site of the body and affects the body as the body works through time and
space. Dread causes one to feel outside of space and time. The image of tower just
beginning to totter is similar to the sensation of dread, a sudden feeling that something
is wrong with my body at this particular moment, and it will only get worse in the future.
Contemporary affect theorists discuss this dread, this sense of the world being
out-of-order in a bodily, extremely present way. In Depression: A Public Feeling, Ann
Cvetkovich discusses the dread she felt when she realized a fall she had endured
earlier resulted in not a minor twisted ankle, but rather a broken bone: “everything
blurred together in an amorphous sense of dread.”207 Mark Ian Thomas Robson writes of
the amorphous, confused dread experienced by a woman with debilitating clinical
depression: it often “feels like something awful and momentously horrible is going to
happen to her, that horror lies just around the corner...Tight bands, like a metal cage,
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seem to crush her chest.”208 In these examples, significantly, dread is not ambient. Even
in the case of Cvetkovich the amorphous dread comes from the body, swelling up from
her ankle’s devastating encounter with the pavement. In the case of the female with
depression - there is something dreadful about what lies around the corner and within
her, but not everywhere. “The body,” Kathleen Stewart writes in Ordinary Affects,
“surges.”209 The body is not a passive site on which emotions and affects and
experienced upon, but rather moves alongside the feelings of dread. Cvetkovich agrees,
stating body “loves and dreads the encounters that make it.”210 Heschel would agree
with this as well: the body is affected by the relationships and interrelationships between
a person, their environment, and the Divine. And it is this: this interrelationship (and the
acknowledgement of this interrelationship) is the way Heschel writes that one can have
a more positive experience, a less tower-tottering experience, when coming close to the
hour of death.
The dreading body experiences relief only when the person in question is in a
relationship: when that person is in relationship with the Divine. The last sentence of
Man is Not Alone, the conclusion of the entire book, reads: “For the pious man it is a
privilege to die.”211 Death is not a horror, death is not to be dreaded, but is rather “a
home-coming.”212 When life is lived with the knowledge that God is the subject and
humans God’s objects, death is when humans are returned to God. Significantly, this
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sentence ends Man is Not Alone, not God in Search of Man. Gentiles and Jews alike
can live pious lives, gentiles and Jews alike can have this feeling of homecoming when
they are faced with death. Does this mean that a “truly” pious person would feel no
discomfort in the face of death? I do not think so. Instead, the pious person, by already
de-centering themselves in favor of a theocentric outlook, are used to the shock of
death, the shock of their powerlessness.

A Particularistic Anger: Rage at the Nazis
Turning now to God in Search of Man, Heschel’s work that is at times explicit
about the horrors of Nazism, Heschel is still, to use Kaplan’s term, “discreet,” when
discussing the Holocaust. There are no tirades against the Nazi party nor long
lamentations of Jewish suffering in the camps here. Of course, as mentioned earlier,
there was not yet a coherent language and/or vocabulary through which to memorialize
the Holocaust.213 For example, when talking about how human power allows great evil in
the world, Heschel says: “This is our predicament: our power may become our undoing.
We stand on a razor’s edge. It is so easy to hurt, to destroy, to kill. Giving birth to one
child is mystery; bringing death to millions is but a skill.” 214 Here, “bringing death to
millions” is obviously a reference to the Holocaust, but again mentioning the event
without totally mentioning it. In fact, Heschel only mentions the term “Nazi” once in the
entire book, in a breathtaking statement that I will analyze in some detail below.
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Heschel understood the Bible to be relevant and soothing for Jewish victims of
the Nazis. While certain passages may not be sensible or intelligible for a particular
generation, they may have been necessary for another. For example, Heschel mentions
that various biblical passages about wishing or desiring death to one’s enemy does not
seem rational, or beneficial. “But,” Heschel writes, “what other words could there be to
recite when mothers saw how their infants were sent to the gas chambers of Nazi
extermination camps?”215 These words, these statements about wanting to kill the
enemy are in the Bible for them, for people undergoing terrible fates.
Therefore, the death of the victims of the Holocaust and the Nazis is not the
same as the trembling before death mentioned in Man is Not Alone - far from it. This is
a horrible death. Even though the death of the victims of the Holocaust were deaths
surrounded by Jewishness, and many of the victims extremely traditionally pious, death
was still a horror. Heschel continues: “Shall we presume to sit in judgment in the name
of morality over those who taught the world what justice means?”216 No matter how pious
someone is, their life can be a disaster, they can be full of rage and dread in the face of
their impending death. The particularity of the situation can trump the general rule of the
pious man: particularity and specificity can cut across the general, universal rules. Here
is a death full of dread with no release. Nothing can stop of dread surging through the
body which emanates from the memory of the Holocaust, the dread of state-sanctioned
violence. Heschel here seems so passionate, so indiscreet, I wonder if he perhaps felt it
would be inappropriate for inclusion in Man is Not Alone. Jews have a special
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relationship to the Holocaust: they are angrier because of it. This anger is potentially
dangerous. Not only could this anger cause Jews to become violent, it could cause
them to become misunderstood and at-risk in as a minority in America.
Naomi Seidman’s important article about differing versions of Elie Weisel’s Night
is here significant. In the English version of the text, concentration camp survivors go
into the German town to look for something to eat, thinking only of bread. The Yiddish
version of Night (published earlier under the title Un di velt) however, paints a much
darker picture of the actions of these survivors: “But the Yiddish continues: ‘Early the
next day Jewish boys ran off to Weimar to steal clothing and potatoes. And to rape
German girls [un tsu fargvaldikn daytshe shikses]. The historical commandment of
revenge was not fulfilled.’”217 Seidman continues by parsing through the way this phrase
was translated in differing version of the work. In English, the survivors went to “sleep
with” German girls without “a thought of revenge” on their mind.218 Very different.
Seidman continues:
Un di velt depicts a post-Holocaust landscape in which Jewish boys "run off" to
steal provisions and rape German girls; Night extracts from this scene of lawless
retribution a far more innocent picture of the aftermath of the war, with young
men going off to the nearest city, to look for clothes and sex. In the Yiddish, the
survivors are explicitly described as Jews and their victims (or intended victims)
as German; in the French, they are just young men and women.219
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Seidman continues that Un di velt and Night are here so distinct from one another that
the two works truly present two different survivors: a Yiddish survivor and a French one.
“The Yiddish survivor,” Seidman writes, “is full of rage.” 220
This rage-filled survivor did not make it into the French version of Night. Seidman
views the relationship between Wiesel and his French non-Jewish publisher as one of
negotiating the appropriate way to remember the Holocaust. She writes that the French
text, in particular “represents a compromise between Jewish expression and the
capacities and desires of non-Jewish readers.” Seidman is quick to point out that she is
not attempting to claim that one version of Night is more “authentic” than the other:
I do not mean to suggest that this compromise, these negotiations, were either
calculated or hypocritical; any conversation is a balancing act between two
speakers, any text a reflection of its audience as much as its writers. That Wiesel
wrote his Yiddish memoir first and to a Jewish audience makes it no more
"authentic" than his better-known French work; the Yiddish genre in which Wiesel
participated imposed its own set of cultural conventions.221
Here, I too do not wish to state that Heschel’s depiction of rage or death is more
“authentic” in God in Search of Man than Man is Not Alone. Rather, the point I am
hoping to make is that Heschel clearly believed that different emotions and affects were
appropriate for differing groups of people. The Holocaust was unique in the fact that it
attempted to – and did – decimate the Jewish population. Jews may feel one way about
the Holocaust, gentiles (and Americans) another. Heschel also clearly negotiated the
way he talked about the Holocaust based on the overall topic and thrust of his book:
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Man is Not Alone is more universalistic, whereas God in Search of Man is more
particularistic.
In the early 1950s -- when The Earth is the Lord’s, Man is Not Alone, and God in
Search of Man were all published – was a time wherein Jews were still figuring out the
best ways to honor the victims of the Holocaust. I suggest that Heschel makes a case
for memorializing the Holocaust through emotions. The emotions that Heschel
articulates, nostalgia and rage at the Holocaust, were still emergent. Yes, rage was felt
by those affected by the Holocaust, but it was not yet integrated and accepted as a
completely appropriate response. The emergent nature of Jewish rage is heightened
when one considers presenting this rage to a broader, non-Jewish audience. A process
of memorializing the Jews of Eastern Europe though nostalgia and adoption of some
Eastern European affects and emotions is suggested in The Earth is the Lord’s. Living
like they Jews of Eastern Europe did, by taking the commitments and feelings of
Judaism and Yiddishkeit seriously, is a way to honor that profound loss and to deal with
the absence of the Jews in Eastern Europe. Anger, dread, and rage are also ways of
understanding and dealing with the Holocaust. But these emotions can be frightening –
they can lead the way towards violence against others. Heschel understands the rage of
the Yiddish version of Eliezar, the protagonist in Night/Un di velt. But that protagonist
goes on to do horrible things, things that are difficult to look at, particularly for the larger
non-Jewish community that American postwar Jews existed in. Perhaps it is safer,
Heschel seems to be suggesting, to universalize that anger away for now.
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Chapter Two: The Sabbath and Sylvia Heschel’s Christmas Cards
The 1950s was a time of transition and change for American Jews. As American
Jews began to move to the suburbs, build new synagogues, and become part of the socalled “tripartite” religious community of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, fears of losing
“authentic” Judaism abounded. This chapter examines claims of authenticity and
inauthenticity by looking at the historical and cultural background of 1950s Jewish
communities as well as the affects and gender found in The Sabbath. This chapter
argues two major interrelated points: firstly, that gender can serve as a kind of
“orientation” for Heschel. Secondly, that women are presented in a sense of awe, fear,
and respect. Women, Heschel suggests in The Sabbath, can have a specific role to play
in the celebration and ritual observance of Shabbat. The way in which women have a
particular role to play in the observance of Shabbat goes deeper for Heschel than just
his acceptance of traditional gender roles as set forth in halakhah and/or Jewish
tradition. This is not simply to say that Heschel was informed by the broader patriarchal
halakhic and Jewish theological framework in which he operated and was raised. But
additionally, Heschel believes that there is something wonderful about a celebration of
the Sabbath where one reaches across the table to join with others who have a differing
orientation than oneself. Because I read The Sabbath as reifying essential differences
between the genders, it is an extremely problematic text. However, there is space to
read Heschel against himself. I read Heschel as here being interested and invested in
not only the innately different orientations between men and women (which Heschel
seems to perceive as immutable categories of difference) but also the action of reaching
across the plane of difference itself.
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Before continuing my discussion of The Sabbath, I would like to first discuss an
image found in The Sabbath, and a collection of cards written to Sylvia Heschel,
Abraham Joshua Heschel’s wife. By placing a woodcut by Ilya Schor in relationship with
these cards, I hope to tease out the various ways femininity, domesticity, and
Jewishness were in movement and in flux on the postwar American Jewish landscape.
There are several woodcuts by Schor interspersed throughout The Sabbath.222 The
image placed directly before Chapter One depicts a man walking into his home on
Shabbat. He is flanked on either side by angels, a manifestation of the concept that
angels come and visit every Jew’s house on Shabbat.223 In front of him lays a
picturesque scene of a perfect Shabbat: the man’s young son stands proudly next to a
table laden with a large wine glass, ready for him to say Kiddush, the blessing for wine,
over it. On the other side of the table stands his wife: a tall woman with an ornate
headscarf, another child stands shyly in front of her.224 The woodcut image is executed
in a folkish style. Its strong lines and intricate details lend a sense of the not-quite
realistic but still approachable. The image looks happy; the family appears almost regal.
The collection of images I would like to put in conversation with this woodcut in
The Sabbath is a box full of holiday cards addressed to Abraham Joshua Heschel’s wife
Sylvia.225 One card in particular stuck out to me as I looked over the cards in the archive
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at Duke University: the front of the card depicts the following: angels pray over a
cherubic-looking baby Jesus, who is sleeping in a manger. The pre-printed words at the
bottom of the card read “The Stars in the Bright Sky Looked Down Where He Lay.”
Viewing the card, I was initially startled. Who would send Sylvia Heschel, the wife of
such a well-known rabbi as Heschel a Christmas card? And such a religious one to lift
up baby Jesus on the cover! Perhaps the person didn’t know Sylvia Heschel very well, I
thought, flipping the card open. The printed message in the card was another Christmas
greeting,226 but surrounding that was small neat handwriting. The card was full of tiny
cursive writing to Sylvia, destroying my preconceived notion that the sender was not
close to Sylvia. The person writing the card clearly had lots of personal news to share
with Sylvia!
As I continued to leaf through the collection of cards to Sylvia, I found many other
holiday cards addressed to Sylvia. Many were holiday cards from other wives of rabbis
and clergy. One card in particular struck a chord with me: the front of the card shows
the three wise men marching through the desert to see the birth of baby Jesus. Printed
on the inside of the card is the sentence “May Your Christmas Be Happy.” However, in
an acknowledgement of Sylvia Heschel’s Jewishness, the writer of the card has
bracketed off the word Christmas and written “Holidays” above it.227 This card is a
material representation of the changing place rabbis (and their wives) were beginning to
occupy in the postwar period. As Jews began to occupy the middle- and upper-middle
class, domestic rituals such as sending holiday cards and other forms of relational
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etiquette became increasingly important. The role of the rebbetzin (rabbi’s wife) was
seen by the Jewish community at this time as primarily a homemaker and mother, and
only secondarily as a supporter of her husband’s vocation.228 Additionally, Jews were
increasingly accepted as an important part of a tripartite community of American
religiosity comprised of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews229 it was only just becoming
strange to send a Jew an overly religious Christmas card. Some awkwardly added the
word “Holiday,” others just avoided the strangeness and barreled on with their news.
Even when “holidays” was bracketed off, as is the case with the one card, the frame of
reference for the sending of the cards was undeniably Christmas, was something
obviously and overtly non-Jewish.
These two phenomena demonstrate two differing modes of Jewish domesticity.
The first, a woodcut made by a man for a book written by a man, represents how
women are traditionally intended to behave during Shabbat. They light Shabbat
candles, look after children, and prepare food. They are located in the home; they wait
for their husband to return home from the synagogue on Shabbat. They are surrounded
by their children; they stand next to the tables they have laden with food. The second,
the collection of cards, show a form of domesticity wherein American (and largely
Christian) forms of etiquette (the importance of sending Christmas cards) is a way of
sedimenting the place of the rabbi (and the wife of the rabbi) as in a particular place in
American society.
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Authenticity and Inauthenticity in America: A Sticky Sign
Both of these images also portray what could be called “authentic” modality of
Jewish femininity. Being in the house and preparing meals and sending out holiday
correspondence are both customarily roles performed by women. The reasoning behind
the gendered assumptions of these behaviors may differ (rabbinic sources equate
femininity with domesticity as does normative ambient Jewish culture; American
sensibilities mandate that women send and receive holiday cards) they nevertheless
remain authentic models of Jewish femininity, domesticity, and womanhood. When I say
these forms of Jewishness are authentic it is not because they are historical, or because
they have justifications in rabbinic writings. Instead, when I say they are authentic, I
mean that they likely feel authentic to the people engaging in these activities. Ilya Schor
attempted to channel this affective authenticity of Jewishness when making the image
of the woman standing with her child in the home. Sylvia, too, likely acted from an
affective orientation that bolstered her sense of herself as modern and American wife of
a rabbi.
Authenticity – and more to the point, inauthenticity, operated as an Ahmedian
sticky sign in the 1950s American Jewish landscape. Jews were increasingly concerned
about Jewish practice becoming inauthentic, shallow, materialistic, and hollow. What I
bring forth from Sara Ahmed’s discussion of sticky signs is the way in which these
discussions of authenticity vs. inauthenticity were always deeply value-laden.
Something being described as “inauthentic” is never deployed in a positive way;
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“inauthentic” is and was always used as a way to mark something as “less than”
authentic. Specifically, when practices were labeled as inauthentic, fears of losing what
was perceived to be “authentic” was always at play. Inauthenticity was perceived as
dangerous because it was seen as something that could ensnare modern Jews, leading
them to unknowingly throw away their spiritual heritage and tradition. Gender also plays
a large role in authenticity discourse: when women occupied space that they weren’t
“supposed” to be in, they were often labelled as “inauthentic” regardless of historical
reality. When women attended synagogue at higher rates than men, for example, in the
1950s, this was considered a new and inauthentic trait of American postwar Judaism.
However, Karla Goldman’s important work demonstrates that women had been outattending synagogue than their male counterparts for nearly one hundred years!230
When inauthenticity was discussed in relation to American Judaism at this time,
gender was always at play. When gender was behaved or performed “correctly,” it was
lauded as “authentic.” When people became out-of-place, they became “inauthentic.” In
this way, inauthenticity becomes a kind of “sticky sign.” For Sara Ahmed, sticky signs
are those words, images, or concepts that carry with them more than their simple
meaning. Of Ahmed’s discussion of a sticky sign, Margaret Wetherall writes, “Such
figures [sticky signs] become ‘sticky surfaces’ where affects nestle and densely cluster.
Ahmed maintains that affect can operate rather like the creation of surplus value in
Marxist theory, intensifying and accumulating as it moves and circulates between signs
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(objects and subjects).”231 These affects which cluster and nestle around the meaning of
a word do so in a transmissive and non-obvious way. Ahmed writes, “The association
between words that generate meanings is concealed: it is this concealment of such
associations that allows such signs to accumulate value. I am describing this
accumulation of affective value as a form of stickiness, or a sticky sign.”232
Penny Rossiter’s work on Australian ‘redneck’ communities (referred to as
‘bogans’ in Austrailian slang) describes the way the word and concept of ‘bogan’
operates in contemporary Australian communities: “‘Bogan’ is unstable, uncertain,
ambiguous and conflicted but you know what a bogan is: ‘you see them on trains’. We
are familiar with the consolidations of ‘bogan’, the stopping points that materialize in
representations and experiences of bodies, practices and places.” 233 Bogan is difficult to
define, but one senses that they know one when they see one. Rossiter continues,
articulating Ahmed’s understanding of sticky signs, “The affective economies that
mediate, and constitute in their mediation, work by ‘binding’ or ‘sticking’ subjects
together and ‘sticky signs’ have a particular importance in the generation, translation
and transfer of affective intensity.”234 Just as Ahmed uses the term “Paki” as a sticky
sign to always mean something other than simply one being “from Pakistan”,
Ahmed argued that in the British context ‘Paki’ never simply means ‘from
Pakistan’ but is always associated with ‘immigrant, outsider, dirty’. Those words,
with specific historical origins – ‘Paki’ became commonplace in anti-Asian, anti231
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immigration discourses in 1960s Britain – have congealed and stuck to ‘Paki’
without being spoken.235
So with the term ‘Bogan’: although the term means something akin to ‘low-class’ it does
not only mean that. The concept ‘inauthentic’ Judaism carries with it fears of
assimilation and loss. Thinkers and theologians of Judaism – including Heschel – do not
fear and worry about inauthenticity in Jewish practice just because it might be
inauthentic. The concern is that there may be a permanent transformation of Jewish
practice in postwar America. And, as we have seen above, there is a particular worry
when people step outside of their traditional ascribed gender roles. Women at
synagogue makes the synagogue feel more inauthentic; the lack of men at the
synagogue feels inauthentic. There is something wrong here, these worries of
inauthenticity carry with them.

Overview of The Sabbath: What are the Realms of Space and Time?
The Sabbath is a slim volume devoted to the importance of the Jewish day of
rest. In 1951, the United Synagogue, a national alliance and organization of American
Conservative synagogues, asked Heschel to write some remarks on the importance of
the Jewish day of rest.236 Instead of writing the short sermon or speech that was
originally asked of him, Heschel “conceived of a larger work.”237 Like The Earth is the
Lord’s, this work is an expanded speech. Ending at only 101 pages, The Sabbath,
published the same year as its composition (1951) is shorter and more accessible than
Man is Not Alone, God in Search of Man, and The Prophets, all of which are all
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extremely long. A reviewer of the work, noting its difference from Heschel’s more
academic texts, commented that Heschel’s reflections are “not addressed to the
Scripture scholar,” but nevertheless poetically remarks that the book is “on the side of
the angels.”238
The major claim of The Sabbath is that the “modern man” is trapped within the
realm of space rather than the realm of time.239 By setting up these parallel and
opposing “realms,” Heschel once again sets up a dichotomous relationship between two
concepts. Heschel regularly uses dichotomous relationships throughout his work, such
as the tension between monistic worldview and a polytheistic worldview, the tension
between aggadah and halakhah, and the differences in halakhic jurisprudence between
Rabbis Ishmael and Akiva.240 Fritz Rothschild uses Morris R. Cohen’s conception of
“scissor words” to explain the way these parts of polarities interact with one another:
they depend upon one another, they reinforce one another, in the way that the blades of
scissors work together to cut through a piece of paper. “Each term implies the other”
within these scissor-pair polarities, aggadah could not exist without halakhah, etc.241
Cohen’s articulation of “scissor words” is helpful for realizing that the dichotomies
set up by Heschel rely on one another. However, calling the differences between
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Heschel’s realm of space and realm of time a “scissor pair” does not adequately explain
the relationship, nor does the simple statement that the realms of space and time are a
simple dichotomy. Rather, I argue in this chapter that the realms of space and times are
best thought of as differing “orientations” towards the world. Taking this statement in
tandem with my previous statement that gender also works as a kind of orientation may
make it seem as though I am working towards an eventual argument that Heschel
associates one gender with either the realm of space or the space of time, and then vice
versa. I do not. Rather, just as the realms of space and time are orientations towards
the world, gender is another orientation that works in conjunction with the other.
Subjectivities of individuals are multi-faceted and complex, with many orientations and
ways of being working in tandem.
The realm of space, for Heschel, is a kind of orientation towards materiality that
emphasizes control, conquest, and manipulation. “Technical civilization,” Heschel
writes, “is man’s conquest of space.”242 What Heschel refers to as ‘technical civilization’
is not limited to modernity; ‘technical civilization’ includes even premodern tasks such as
“the manufacture of tools, the art of spinning and farming, the building of houses, [and]
the craft of sailing.”243 However, the prologue of The Sabbath quickly shifts from a
general description of spatial tasks to an admonishment: “We are all infatuated with the
splendor of space, with the grandeur of things in space.”244 This fascination with things,
“lies heavy on our minds, tyrannizing all our thoughts.”245 While Heschel’s view of the
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realm of space is not entirely negative--Heschel was no luddite, and certainly he
understood that humans need to cultivate food and shelter in order to survive the
harshness of the material world. The problem for Heschel is not when humans interact
with the world through the realm of space – the real problem is when they only interact
with the world through the realm of space.
The realm of time is, for Heschel, tricky for many humans to understand. “Things
of space are at the mercy of man,”246 Heschel writes, indicating that humans feel
themselves to be the rulers of the realm of space. Humans manipulate things; they
cook, clean, create – and most importantly, humans feel as though they are somehow in
control of the world of the world around them. However, time progresses whether
humans want it to or not:247 “Indeed, we know what to do with space but do not know
what to do about time, except to make it subservient to space.”248 Heschel writes of the
almost-frightening nature of time,
Time to us is sarcasm, a slick treacherous monster with a jaw like a furnace
incinerating every moment of our lives. Shrinking, therefore, from facing time, we
escape for shelter to things of space. The intentions we are unable to carry out
we deposit in space; possessions become the symbols of our repressions,
jubilees of frustrations. But things of space are not fireproof; they only add fuel to
the flames.249
We measure our worth in the realm of space precisely because time is so unsettling and
so frightening; time never stops, time reminds humans of our mortality. The things we
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gather to assuage our discomfort with time, however, do not help. “Is the joy of
possession,” Heschel asks rhetorically, “an antidote to the terror of time which grows to
be a dread of inevitable death?”250
But while time can be unsettling, it is through interacting with the realm of time
that humans can learn to coexist with time. Heschel writes that the “higher goal of
spiritual living is not to amass a wealth of information,251 but to face sacred moments.”252
In particular moments of time, humans can sense what is eternal about those moments:
“Spiritual life begins to decay when we fail to sense the grandeur of what is eternal in
time.”253 The grandeur felt when we experience the sublime and the ineffable of the
Divine is eternal. The need for this ability to face sacred moments and feel the eternal in
the temporal moment can be filled by Jewish practice. In fact, Heschel believes that
Judaism prioritizes time over space. Judaism, Heschel writes, is "a religion of time
aimed at the sanctification of time,"254 and that this sanctification of time allows Jews to
"experience the taste of eternity or eternal life within time."255 Throughout The Sabbath,
and particularly in a retelling of a Talmudic tale of a rabbi and his son who flee from
Roman civilization – under threat of the death penalty from the Roman authorities -- to
spend all their time studying Torah, Heschel sets up a dichotomous relationship
between Rome and Jerusalem – suggesting that Rome was always oriented towards
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the realm of space whereas Jerusalem was always oriented toward the realm of time. 256
“When the Romans met the Jews,” Heschel writes at the beginning of chapter one of
The Sabbath, “and noticed their strict adherence to the law of abstaining from labor on
the Sabbath, their only reaction was contempt.”257 There is something inherent in
Judaism, Heschel believes, that enables it to deal with and sanctify time rather than
space.
Every week, Jews sanctify time through traditional Shabbat/Sabbath observance.
Celebrating the Sabbath is not merely a day when Jews are commanded to abstain
from a variety of tasks,258 but should rather be thought of as “the climax of living.”259 The
Sabbath becomes “a palace in time which we build. It is made of soul, of joy, and in
reticence. In its atmosphere, a discipline is a reminder of adjacency to eternity.”260 The
discipline of the Sabbath enables humans to experience this eternity, and the emotion
saturating the Sabbath is not one of restriction (as in, this is the one day where one
cannot do this or that) but rather one of love. Heschel writes “There is a word seldom
said, a word for an emotion almost too deep to be expressed: the love of the Sabbath.
The word is rarely found in our literature, yet for more than two thousand years the
emotion filled our songs and moods.”261
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While Heschel continuously privileges the realm of time throughout The Sabbath,
the way he speaks of the realm of space is not always clear. Heschel, understands the
importance of agriculture, science, and architecture, and he acknowledges that the
problem is not simple interaction with the realm of space. Rather “the danger begins
when in gaining power in the realm of space we forfeit all aspirations in the realm of
time.”262 This realm of time is, then, a realm wherein “the goal is not to have but to be,
not to own but to give, not to control but to share, not to subdue but to be in accord.”263
At first, the realm of space seems clearly connected to technology and to the resulting
power that comes from technology; however, as one continues to read The Sabbath it
becomes clear that the realms of both time and space are more connected to emotions,
states of mind, and ways of being. One could not, for example, easily and seamlessly
place different occupations and claim that this activity falls into the realm of space
whereas that occupation or activity falls into the realm of time. Even Torah-study, or
prayer, could be performed in the realm of space if it was performed with an
inappropriate emotional state, with the goal of having but not being.
Ultimately, the realms of time and space are best thought of orientations towards
the world. Ahmed’s understanding of orientation is both spatial and non-spatial. She
writes, “What does it mean to be oriented? This book begins with the question of
orientation, of how it is that we come to find our way in the world that acquires new
shapes, depending on the way we turn.”264 The world transforms based on how we
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interact with the world, and specifically the people, things, and entities we reach towards
because of our orientations, “if orientation is a matter of how we reside in space, then
sexual orientation might also be a matter of residence; of how we inhabit spaces as well
as “who” or “what” we inhabit spaces with.”265 But this matter of orientation is not only
spatial; there is a part of the concept of orientation that is interior and affective:
“Orientations shape not only how we inhabit space, but how we apprehend this world of
shared inhabitance.”266 Apprehension of not only the objects that surround us, but our
lives themselves -- and how that apprehension affects us -- is part of this concept of
orientation.
The subtlety of the relationship between the realms of space and time have
confused many. The fact that that humans cannot simply step out of either space or
time is rather obvious, and something that Heschel was obviously aware of. Nothing in
The Sabbath suggests otherwise. However, the impossibility of this space/time duality
caused many reviewers of the work confusion and bewilderment. Ira Eisenstein, who
reviewed the work for The Reconstructionist shortly after its publication wrote that the
distinction between the realms of space and time was “a fallacious one, but which takes
his work out of the reach of most uninitiated lovers of books and of the Sabbath.” 267
Trude Weiss-Rosmarin, another reviewer, disparaged the work by stating that time at
the expense of space was not a traditionally Jewish concept.268 Judaism is full of
concepts that would be considered the realm of space, she argued, there are laws
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concerning business, agriculture, making and preparing clothing, cooking – activities
that would all certainly seem to fall into the realm of space. Shlomo Balter’s review also
noted that Heschel’s focus on time over and against the material and spatial
demonstrates a “radical departure from accustomed religious thinking.” 269 What these
understandings of The Sabbath miss, of course, is that there is a material and spatial
element to Heschel’s conception of Sabbath observance. Indeed, traditional
observances of the Sabbath involve plenty of material objects: Challah bread, wine,
candles, Torah scrolls, etc. These material objects, while being part of the material
realm of space, are significant parts of temporal Sabbath observance for Heschel.
While there is a fair amount of secondary literature devoted to The Sabbath,
many thinkers of Heschel often dismiss the text, spending little time expanding upon it,
or dismissing it in favor of Heschel’s more robust philosophical and theological texts. 270
Ken Koltun-Fromm is explicit about this, mentioning a tendency of scholars of Heschel
to “skip over” The Sabbath in favor of more theological works such as Man is Not Alone
and God in Search of Man.271 Many readers of the The Sabbath view the work as having
relevance almost only as a discussion of Jewish law and time.272 Others, like Joseph
Harp Britton and Byron Sherwin see the work as more significant to Heschel’s overall
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project of synthesizing Hasidic Jewish customs with American Jewish social mores, or
Heschel’s overall concern with encouraging American Jews to have emotionally
meaningful religious experiences.273
Ken Koltun-Fromm offers up rich theoretical readings of The Sabbath by
demonstrating the ways in which the space/time dichotomous relationship is not
accidentally impossible or tenuous, but instead is purposefully complicated.274 Being in
the realm of time does not and cannot mean that humans never interact with the
material, but instead, "the seventh day allows us to use things, yet we remain free of
their allure.”275 Celebrating The Sabbath requires ritual objects and food, and Heschel
speaks of these objects positively throughout the work. Heschel is ultimately “both
repulsed and seduced by things in space.”276 Repulsed, because things are temporary
and they do not carry within them an awareness of God's awesome presence in the
world. Seduced, because things can be breathtaking. Things have the ability to make
people feel good, and even become more aware of God’s presence in the world.
Koltun-Fromm’s analyses of The Sabbath rest on examining how The Sabbath
encourages gazing at particular objects.277 Koltun-Fromm writes, "[Heschel’s] portrayal
of sabbatical time as a revelatory moment of the ineffable requires a visual practice in
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which Jews unlearn consumerist forms of gazing at objects in space.”278 A particular
kind of relationality is expected between people and objects. The realm of space is
therefore one wherein a particular form of gazing is expected. Heschel does not hope
that people cease looking at or engaging with objects altogether. Rather, Heschel hopes
to inculcate a form of relationality with material objects and materiality that rests on
interdependence, peace, and gentleness. The fleeting, temporal aspect of the Sabbath
allows one to feel “exempt from domination of things as well as from domination of
people.”279 By feeling connected and related to things and other people, Jews can
experience a sense of anti-consumerist and anti-domineering peace. Through the
observance of shabbat, Jews can “experience the taste of eternity or eternal life within
time.”280 This is the realm of time, not the eschewing of material objects, but orienting
towards them differently.

Gender in the Realms of Space of Time
The way in which gender plays a role in Heschel’s work is largely understudied,
and the scholarship about The Sabbath is no exception. There is one article focused on
gender and The Sabbath. Bonna Devora Haberman has written an article specifically
about The Sabbath and gender, "Israel, A Palace in Space: A Gendered Re-Vision of
Territoriality." Haberman's basic premise is that The Sabbath follows a diasporist and
masculine understanding of Judaism. Of her diasporist readings, she writes,
[The Sabbath] also inscribed a Diaspora-oriented, temporal theology just as the
modern State of Israel was at the foundling stage. Harboring a tinge of discontent
278
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with the lasting destruction, he nonetheless expresses profound affirmation of
Diaspora living.281
While it's true that the work is geared towards American Jews and privileges time over
space, the diasporist tendencies of this work are, I think, more complicated than
Haberman’s assertion here. As Bonnie Honig writes, the performance of various rituals
in The Sabbath is “a rehearsal of a world...it is a scaffold of a future life-world.”282 The
rituals done in the Sabbath are a way to prepare for the messianic era -- not the Zionist
era. Additionally, unlike various holiday observances that have calendar or liturgical
differences for observances in the land of Israel than in the diaspora (either by adding
an additional day, such as on Passover, or changing some liturgical statements, such
as the statement "Next Year In Jerusalem!" at the end of the Passover seder), the
rituals that accompany the Sabbath do not do this. Shabbat can be celebrated
everywhere in the world, and is largely celebrated in the home and local synagogue.
Haberman links Heschel's focus on time with masculinity. She draws her reading
by using a quote in The Sabbath that calls the Earth "our mother" and God "our
father:”283 "We usually think that the earth is our mother," Heschel writes, "that time is
money and profit our mate. The seventh day is a reminder that God is our father, that
time is life and the spirit our mate.”284 Thinking of the earth as a mother and God as a
father does have sexist and problematic implications, some of which feminist thinkers
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besides Haberman have reclaimed. Feminist theologians Carol B. Christ and Judith
Plaskow write,
One of [our] central premises […] is that theology matters. Beliefs about the
sacred are not simply private concerns. They articulate a sense of meaning and
provide ethical orientation, helping us envision the world we would like to bring
into being. We criticize the traditional and widely held image of God as an old
white man who rules the world from outside it, arguing that this view has been
destructive to human beings and the earth. As feminist theologians beginning
with Mary Daly have argued, when God is imagined as a man, then man is
God.285
Viewing the earth as a mother, and God as a father, as Heschel so casually does in The
Sabbath, re-scripts sexist understandings of power, space, and sacrality. However, as
problematic as Heschel here is, I remain unconvinced that it necessarily means that
Heschel always viewed the realm of time as masculine and the realm of space as
feminine.
In particular, I will explore whether Haberman’s account overlooks some of the
important elements about Heschel's understanding of the realm of space. As mentioned
above, Heschel understands the realm of space to be about manipulating things and
people. Curiously, Haberman herself remarks upon this,
For Heschel, time is not the fearsome opponent that heralds triumphant mortality.
Rather, it stands for and contrasts with space, the domain of power, control,
acquisition, and labor, where perceptions of material substance blind us from
apprehending that which is first sanctified, time.286
Words like power, control, acquisition and labor are not culturally understood as
feminine, but rather as masculine. However, I am not sure that the realms of time and/or
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space lend themselves to be placed on an easy grid from masculine to feminine like
this. What this view misses is the complexity and subtleness of the orientational-quality
of the realms of space and time discussed in this article. However, this is not to say that
gender is absent from The Sabbath, or that gender would not be a fruitful course of
study in the future. Indeed, as this chapter will demonstrate, gender is at play in The
Sabbath, but the way in which gender operates is not univocal nor simple: just as the
differences between the realms of space and time are not simple. Before I turn to the
gendered dynamics of this text, I need to provide a bit of cultural background as the
context for a concern for authenticity.

Social and Cultural Backdrop to The Sabbath
The form of Sabbath experience which Heschel uplifts as normative in The
Sabbath consists of performing commandments and traditions at home and in the
synagogue. This kind of synagogue observance which Heschel discusses in The
Sabbath goes something as follows: the Sabbath Evening consists of a short Friday
evening service followed by a festive meal complete with blessings over candles, wine,
and challah bread. Saturday morning consists of a lengthy (usually about three-and-ahalf hours, but it is customary to come late) synagogue service followed by a lunch
consisting of food that has been left to simmer the entire night. Some return to
synagogue for afternoon services; other common Sabbath activities include napping,
reading, chatting with family, and playing board games that do not require writing. In
most traditional (commandment-bound) Jewish communities, and in the community in
which Heschel existed, women had a less ritually important place within the
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synagogue.287 Additionally, as Rachel Adler states, “in no form of Judaism did women
have equal access to communal participation, leadership, or religious education” before
the broader feminist “critique of society initiated in the 1960s and 1970s.”288 Adler
continues, discussing how women are marginalized systematically in traditional rabbinic
Jewish theology and texts,
Discrimination against women on halakhic (Jewish legal) grounds was common,
not only in Orthodoxy but in all the other branches of Judaism [before and during
the 1960s and parts of the 1970s]. Halakhic discrimination is considerable.
Women may not be included in the minyan and hence may not lead worship.
They may not be called to Torah. Their credibility as witnesses is severely
limited. Moreover, they are powerless to effect changes in their own marital
status.289
Because women are not considered “obligated” to give prayers to God at particular
times of the day, they are not counted in a minyan, the required quorum of ten needed
to read from the Torah or say particular prayers.290 Because of this, there is an
assumption that women do not attend synagogue as much as their male counterparts:
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their celebration of the Sabbath consists of taking care of children, preparing meals, and
keeping the house organized.291
In the 1950s, American Jewish women attended synagogue more than American
Jewish men, particularly in non-Orthodox synagogues. Jenna Weissman Joselit notes
that at this time, “in synagogue after synagogue, women constituted close to threequarters of those in attendance.”292 Significantly, the better-attended service became a
later-in-the-evening Friday evening service, a service that in Jewish law is less
significant and important to attend than the Saturday morning service wherein the Torah
is read. Of “Jewish families surveyed in 1950,” Joselit Weissman continued, “less than
one-third attended the late-night Friday evening survive as a ‘unit.’”293 What this means
is that adult women were attending these services alone, without their husbands or
other family members. Rabbis from the 1930s to the 50s wondered how to make the
synagogue more “friendly to men” and less of a “women’s institution,” – ironically
claiming that the synagogue was too feminine when, in most of these synagogues,
women did not have the same ritual rights as the men. Here, I suggest that the fear that
American Judaism was spiritually bereft and barren – as was commonly echoed by the
male Jewish intelligentsia mentioned above – really stems from an awareness that the
synagogue was unappealing to men.
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Additionally, the women in the synagogue were at times lambasted for being ‘too
materialistic’ and ‘not spiritual enough,’ echoing the statement that American Judaism of
the 1950s was spiritually lacking. One person surveyed wrote dismissively of these
women, stating that they “they wore expensive and knowing hats. Their shoes were
beautifully put together and cut. Their hair was marcelled, their hands were jewelled
[sic]. They wore too much jewelry.”294 Here, significantly, these women are talked about
dismissively not because they were non-observant in other areas (data of the time does
show that many of these same women who attended services on Friday night would not
be opposed to, say, shopping or spending money on Saturday – things strongly
prohibited by Jewish law) but because they are overly materialistic and imageobsessed. The materialism these women are accused of is highly gendered: the women
are here not shown as being materialistic with their possessions, but specifically in the
care they take to look feminine and fancy on the Sabbath, usually considered a positive
action - if not a commandment in its own right — in rabbinic sources.295
This concern over women in the synagogue is especially striking because, while
the synagogue was ritually dominated by men, as Karla Goldman notes, American
Jewish women have been going to synagogue more frequently than their male
counterparts since the 1800s. Indeed, these earlier American Jewish communities even
deliberately made their synagogues more egalitarian in terms of seating arrangements
(often forgoing the “women’s gallery” or balcony) as a way to demonstrate how well
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these synagogues fit into an American Protestant landscape wherein women and men
sat together in the church pews.296
This concern with what was considered an inappropriate display of materialism
— and particularly an inappropriate display of feminine materialism — parallels other
trends of heightening female-oriented materiality as a bid to try and increase female
Jewish observance. As synagogues began installing gift shops in the 1920s throughout
the 1950s, women were encouraged to “educate through the gift shop,” seamlessly
blending a kind of feminine materiality — shopping, and the Judaica goods which are
shopped for — and a zeal to become, and help other Jewish women to become more
Jewishly observant.297 The concern over femininity in spaces which were traditionally
coded as “male” relates to a broader concern about ‘authenticity’ of postwar American
Jewish practice. Synagogues and prayer spaces were coded as “male”, an “authentic”
synagogue is one wherein the majority of the people praying are male.
This concern over authenticity was intimately related to the shifting cultural,
social, and political landscape facing American Jews at the time. Postwar American
Jewry was indeed in such a state of transition and change, making it ripe for the
development of such a structure. Jews were increasingly suburban rather than urban,
and they were generally becoming more affluent. Jews were living alongside Christian
neighbors, living less and less in all-Jewish enclaves and more and more in mixed
neighborhoods.298 Jews were living so far away from synagogues that the Conservative

296

Goldman, “When the Women Came to Shul.”

297

Weissman Joselit, The Wonders of America, 161.

298

Koltun-Fromm, Material Culture and Jewish Thought in America, 49.

108

movement officially allowed driving from home to synagogue on Shabbat – previously
unthinkable – in a responsum in 1950.299
The 1950s also were a time when participation in religious institutions was seen
as an American (and, particularly, an anti-communist) goal. Kenneth Ward writes “the
anticommunist ethos [during the Cold War] was also strongly conditioned by the
religious character of the United States.”300 Will Herberg’s 1955 sociological classic
Protestant, Catholic, Jew describes how affiliation with one of these three major
religious identities became a way of participating in American culture.301 However, while
this triad of religious identification was seen as a critical force in American politics and
identity, there was also a perceived feeling of the growing importance of secularism.
Discussing a survey wherein thirty Americans were asked to rank significant historical
events, Herberg dryly notes that the birth or crucifixion of Christ ranked as number 14,
the same number as “the discovery of X-rays and the Wright brothers’ first plane
flight.”302 Herberg writes: “The secularism that pervades the American consciousness is
essentially in this kind: it is thinking and living in terms of a framework of reality and
value remote from the religious beliefs simultaneously professed.”303 The secularism
pointed out by Herberg, then, was a framework of thinking and living, and not
necessarily tied to whether or not a person attended or was a member of a synagogue.
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In fact, as Herberg notes “membership is increasing [in synagogues], particularly in the
growing suburban communities.”304
A pervasive feeling that American religion had become stale, impotent, stagnant
and inauthentic was common at this time. Sociologist and philosopher of American
Judaism Arnold Eisen recounts that growing up in the 1950s and 1960s, “Synagogue
[…] meant boring sermons, rote performances, people strutting about with great
importance and making other people’s lives quite miserable.”305 Eisen felt similarly to
Heschel himself; Eisen discusses how he felt when he read a quote from God in Search
of Man where Heschel lambasts religion. Heschel writes, “religion declined [in
modernity] not because it was refuted, but because it became irrelevant, dull,
oppressive, insipid.”306 “’My God!’ I exclaimed aloud (according to memory),” Eisen
quips, “’He’s been to my shul!’”307 In “The Doctrine of Religious Behaviorism” Heschel
himself lambasts those who “seem to believe that religious deeds can be performed in a
spiritual wasteland, in the absence of the soul, with a heart hermetically sealed; that
external action is the essential mode of worship.”308
However, while the Jewish American landscape was increasingly middle-toupper-middle-class and suburban, Heschel himself represented an urban, New York
City, intellectual elite population. Eli Lederhendler groups Heschel with a number of
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other New York City Jewish intellectuals and intellectual rabbis, including Mordecai
Kaplan, Joseph Soloveitchik, Will Herberg, and others.309 Although this group of
intellectuals were based in New York, they were deeply sensitive to the overall trends of
American Jewry to the suburbs and the resulting loss of a particular kind of geographic
(urban) community. Lederhendler shows three main areas where all of the intellectuals
in which all the members of the group wrote. These include, firstly, that thencontemporary Judaism was spiritually barren; Jews were, and should be understood as
a moral community and the continued professionalization of clergy ought to be looked
on with suspicion; and finally the importance of the religious/ethical imperatives which
grew out of post-Holocaust sensibilities.310 The writings of this New York group were,
importantly, not descriptive, but rather prescriptive. Lederhendler writes:
The orientation towards a Judaism as yet unrealized had several ramifications: It
prevented the Jewish religious-ideological discourse from retreating into a
pastness-fixation or a retrievalist position. At the same time, it seemed to lack
firm anchorage in the actual, prosaic practice of Judaism (which, as we have
seen, was in an ambiguous state).311
We see that the concerns of Heschel and others in that same circle look like they are
responding to affects. They were writing about concerns which all shared, yet these
concerns “felt” ambiguous, unmoored, and were occasionally unconnected to the knittygritty world, everyday world of American Judaism. The American Jewish scene (or,
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perhaps, “scenes”) was in flux at this time; a fear of inauthenticity and concern over the
future animated all in this social group.

Interest in Shabbat “Things”
Interest is one of Silvan Tompkins’s nine affects which animate human
experience and combine to create more complex emotions and feelings. Heschel
speaks of positive moods throughout The Sabbath. Using Tompkins’s theory of affects,
one might initially believe that the joy of the Sabbath Heschel discusses is synonymous
with Tompkins’s articulation of joy. However, this is not the case. I read the positive
affect discussed in The Sabbath as being similar to Tompkins’s articulation of interest.
What this difference points to is the way in which Heschel’s discussion of happy or
positive feelings in The Sabbath are always tied up and knotted with a sense of
engagement with the material world.
Tompkins defines interest as supporting what “is necessary and in what is
possible” for the sustaining of one’s life.312 Tompkins notes that interest is understudied,
and that interest is often confused and difficult to understand.313 “Just as one may look,”
Tompkins writes, “with accompanying excitement, so one may think with excitement, yet
the affect in each case may not be differentiated from the function it accompanies.”314
Because interest is prevalent in many situations and accompanying so many actions, it
can be misattributed and misunderstood. One is interested when one reads a book,
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takes a hike, or goes on a date. Interest is engagement with the world around oneself;
interest is a desire to feel the possibilities of one’s engagement with the world.
At times a lack of interest may be even easier to pin down than really separating
out interest from its concurrent activities. Tompkins writes, “A domesticated animal such
as the cat, once it has thoroughly explored its environment and if restricted to this
environment, loses its characteristic curiosity and spends much of its adult life
sleeping.”315 Interest, therefore, is necessary to have any significant interaction with
one’s surroundings, to interact with other people, or even to think complex thoughts.
Tomkins writes, “interest is not only a necessary support of perception but of the state of
wakefulness… Again, without interest the development of thinking and the conceptual
apparatus would be seriously impaired.”316 Interest-excitement, then, is a turning
outward toward the world around oneself - an interaction with something besides the
self. Because of the outward-facing nature of interest-excitement, interest is caught up
by the materiality of things around the subject.
Returning to Ilya Schor’s woodcut image found in The Sabbath, there are
material objects in the image. The man is entering his home: a kiddush cup, shabbat
candlesticks, and a covered loaf of challah stand proudly next to his family. The family
are wearing fancy-looking garments: the young boy, a suit, the wife, a dress with puffy
sleeves. The Sabbath does not ask people to escape materiality, but rather to engage
with it in a different way. The man is interested in the things around him: he is interested
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in the kiddush cup, candles, the trappings of Shabbat observance. Turning now to the
theoretical concept of materiality, I argue that a conception of materiality which
emphasizes interconnectedness and relationality can be another way to better
understand The Sabbath.

Materialism and Interrelationality
In thinking through materialism, and the kind of materialism found within The Sabbath, I
draw from discussions from Stacy Alaimo and Marika Cifor. Alaimo’s discussion of materiality
rests on understand the multi-variegated ways in which matter is always enmeshed with and
interconnected with the human subject. Cifor expounds upon particular pieces of matter found
during archival research, demonstrating how these pieces of matter have a sort of “liveliness”
about them which resists typical understandings of matter as being passive, inert, or impotent.
Alaimo and Cifor have different scopes. Alaimo discusses matter as a critical concept
throughout her ecological and ethical work, whereas Cifor talks of how a particular piece of
matter transformed her thinking of the possibilities of matter. By thinking through matter with
these individuals, I argue that Heschel has a similar understanding of matter: humans are
interrelated with all matter, but some objects do have this vibrant liveliness or “life-force” about
them.
Stacy Alaimo, in Bodily Natures, writes about the importance of not being overly
simplistic with our view or definition of matter, “Matter, the vast stuff of the world and of
ourselves, has been subdivided into manageable “bits” or flattened into a “blank slate” for
human inscription.”317 Specifically, the trend not to define matter but yet discuss matter has the
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effect of “flattening” out matter: matter is anything that humans can manipulate. The definition
itself makes matter passive and humans active; humans are the presupposed definers of
matter. This definition of matter is unidirectional – matter is the passive stuff that humans
manipulate and change. This definition of matter misses the way that matter can impact and
change human subjects, and the fact that human bodies are comprised of a kind of matter
itself. Because of this, Alaimo prefers an approach with emphasizes the interconnectedness
between the subject and matter: “Specifically, Bodily Matters explores the interconnections,
interchanges, and transits between human bodies and nonhuman natures.”318 Focusing on the
human and non-human world does not mean that human bodies themselves are not also
made out of matter, “by attending to the material interconnections between human and morethan-human world, it may be possible to configure an ethics lurking in an idiomatic definition of
matter.”319 Alaimo then looks at the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of the word matter:
“The condition of or the state of things regarding a person or thing, esp. As a subject of
concern or wonder.” Here, using this definition of the word “matter” — as in, something matters
to someone — transforms matter from the “flatness” Alaimo speaks of earlier when describing
matter as all physical material upon which humans act upon. Matter demands ethics; the
things humans engage with and how (and how these things change and impress upon
humans) is a necessarily ethical project.
Alaimo draws on a Spinozistic monism to describe this shimmering vibrant force of
matter, ultimately calling for a “trans-corporeal” turn.320 She writes, “imagining human
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corporeality as trans-corporeality, in which the human is always intermeshed with the morethan-human world, underlines the extent to which the substance of the human is ultimately
inseparable from ‘“the environment.’”321 Here, matter is not something upon which humans act,
but rather is something totally ingrained and intertwined within the human. Marika Cifor
discusses how the archival materials had a “liveliness” of their own. Cifor, working in an
archive devoted to the late assassinated politician Harvey Milk, encountered a cardboard box
containing Milk’s shorn ponytail. Not what she had been expecting. After this startling
experience, she concludes that the “power” of the archival materials can be best described as
having “liveliness.” Drawing on the work of Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, and Mel Y. Chen, Cifor
describes liveliness as articulating “how matter itself, including the bodily matter, is animate
and imbued with a particular kind of agential and affective vitality.”322 Like Cifor, I also find the
turn towards “liveliness” helpful and illuminating. Some of the material objects in this chapter —
specifically, ritual objects — have a kind of liveliness about them. The objects, through their
interaction with the inevitably trans-corporeal humans, have the ability to transform the
subjectivity of humans in question for ethical and social results.
The understanding of material as having “agential” vitality creeps close to Jane
Bennett’s Vibrant Matter. While it is impossible to speak of vibrancy of matter without evoking
Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter, I tend to nevertheless continue to center the human (and their
relationship with and enmeshing into) the world around them. While Bennett writes about “the
strangely vital things that will rise up to meet” the reader in her book, I will write about the
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orientation of the human within the material world.323 Although this way of looking at matter
may be disturbingly anthropomorphic - as it privileges matter when it is being observed
by/interacting with/part of a human - this nevertheless does describe the way I will talk about
material here.324 The reason for this is because Heschel himself privileges the human; this
privileging of the human is, of course, similar to Heschel would think about matter and
humanity: for Heschel, the most important relationship is that between the people Israel (and,
for non-Jews, all humans) and God. Furthermore, here I continue to follow Alaimo’s thinking.
Although her focus on materiality and trans-materiality enables a new way of looking at
humans and the landscapes upon which they exist: “What I argue throughout the book is that
understanding the substance of one’s self as interconnected with the wider environment marks
a profound shift in subjectivity.”325 For Alaimo, this new subjectivity is a kind of ethical
subjectivity, a new way of existing that encourages fostering positive relationships with the
environment and ecologies that surround us.
This is the kind of materialism seen in The Sabbath: a profound shift in subjectivity, a
shift in orientation, where humans can exist with a sense of interconnectedness between
themselves, ritual objects, time, and the landscapes on which they exist. Discussing the role
candles play in traditional Sabbath observance, Heschel writes: “When all work is brought to a
standstill, the candles are lit. Just as creation begins with the word, “let there be light!” so does
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the celebration of creation begin with the kindling of lights.” 326 The candles being lit hearkens
back to the creation of the world, the candles shimmer with vibrancy and alive-ness. They are
not mere candles, the flames atop them not mere flames. They are sacred windows into the
cosmology of the world, bursting with energy and possibility.
While certain ritual objects “shimmer” with the kind of liveliness of which Cifor
discussed, observing the sabbath also creates an awareness of one’s subjectivity as
interconnected and dependent on others. Heschel opens the first chapter of The Sabbath
thusly:
He who wants to enter the holiness of the day must first lay down the profanity of
clattering commerce, of being yoked to toil. He must go away from the screech of
dissonant days, from the nervousness and fury of acquisitiveness and the betrayal in
embezzling his own life. He must say farewell to manual work and learn to understand
that the world has already been created and will survive without the help of man.327
Yes, part of stepping into the holiness of the Sabbath involves laying down some particular
tools and items, items related to commerce and labor. However, the primary way one becomes
enfolded by the Sabbath is by realizing that the landscape on which one exists on was created
by God. The very stuff through which humans grow food, write, teach, and build was created
by God. This already positions humans in a relationship with God: just as humans are created
by God, so do they walk among God’s many creations.
Realizing and understanding that the world would continue along without the help of
humans could lead one to read Heschel as not taking Alaimo’s ecological imperative of matter
seriously. And when Heschel was writing, stewardship of the earth was less on the mind of the
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populace than it is today. But while the above quote of Heschel seems to limit human
responsibility (is not what Heschel here is saying that a temporary cessation of human activity
would not radically alter the world? Perhaps humans are less strong or agential than we
believe we are!), what it points to is Heschel’s theocentrism. For Heschel, the primary
relationship of the human is the human-Divine relationship. Heschel continues, being explicit
that humans must also be aware of the Divine-Humans entanglement in order to fully “enter
into” the aura of Shabbat. Heschel continues: “The world has our hands, but our soul belongs
to Someone Else.”328 Humans “belong” to the Divine, they are always in a complex relationship
with the Divine.
While in the above sentence Heschel states that the relationship is one of “ownership,”
he is not always clear in this respect. The relationship between God and humans is not precise
or limited to one form. Immediately after stating that the souls of humans “belong” to God,
Heschel continues, “Six days a week we attempt to dominate the world, on the seventh day we
try to dominate the self.”329 Now the self is something that ought to be auto-dominated,
dominated by itself. The relationship between God and humans is, therefore, not always
described in exactly the same way by Heschel, but is ever-present. “The seventh day,”
Heschel writes, “is a palace in time which we build. It is made of joy, of soul, of reticence. In its
atmosphere, a discipline is a reminder of adjacency to eternity.” 330 The discipline of the sabbath
which is so critical to Heschel is the overwhelming and consistent understanding of our
relationality with God. The materiality shown in The Sabbath is a strange kind of materiality: a
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materiality through which one becomes ever-present of their own relationality to the nonmaterial Divine.
Just as people become aware of their relationship with the Divine through the
observance of the Sabbath, I read The Sabbath as also advocating for reaching across
the plane of difference between genders. While in the realm of time it becomes easier to
recognize the importance of those who have differing orientations towards the world.
While I will discuss how Heschel suggests that gender can be thought of as an
orientation to the material world throughout the text of The Sabbath later in this chapter,
here I bring forward a passage from the introduction of The Sabbath. Susannah
Heschel, Heschel’s daughter, recounts some of the Sabbath observances her family
would observe weekly in the introduction to the 2005 reprinting of The Sabbath. She
writes:
When my father raised his kiddush cup on Friday evenings, closed his eyes, and
chanted the prayer sanctifying the wine, I always felt a rush of emotion. … My
mother and I kindled the lights for the Sabbath, and all of a sudden I felt
transformed, emotionally and even physically. After lighting the candles in the
dining room, we would walk into the living room, which had windows overlooking
the Hudson River, facing west, and we would marvel at the sunset that soon
arrived.331
What is interesting to me is not only the way that Susannah Heschel recounts the
gendered aspect of these ritual observances, but the way these gendered rituals
brought her family closer together. Her mother lit candles; her father recited kaddish. All
together the family gazed out at the Hudson reader, transformed by proximity to one
another’s differing relationships to the material ritual objects which surrounded them.
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Being aware of their relationship to the Divine, to one another, and the differences
between them, allowed the Heschel family to become transformed.

Gender as an Orientation: Reading Gender in The Sabbath
Gender can be found in several passages in The Sabbath. This section will
analyze four passages with an eye towards gender, materiality, and authenticity. First,
a passage wherein Heschel discusses the importance of men preparing for the Sabbath
in ways that are traditionally coded as feminine; second, a short statement discussing
the gendered and traditional roles women perform during The Sabbath; third, a
discussion of how female domestic workers enjoyed peace during the Sabbath in a
famous rabbi’s house; and finally, a long retelling of a Talmudic tale where father and
son hide in a cave for years in order to spend all of their time studying Torah.
Specifically, this study focuses on the image(s) and role(s) of women within the text. I
will also spend some time talking about tasks and chores that are “gendered” as
feminine — specifically, chores and housework. I here do not wish to essentialize
women or claim that every time a home or a kitchen is mentioned in The Sabbath,
Heschel is talking about some crypto-woman-figure. Rather, because women are often
orientated towards these domestic chores, these chores become femininized and
“gendered” as female.
Heschel discusses the importance of preparing for the Sabbath by quoting and
summarizing a passage from a pietistic Jewish work:
It is incumbent on every man to be very, very zealous in making the Sabbath day
preparations … He would say to his servants: ‘Arrange the house, clean and tidy
it, and prepare the beds in honor of the arrival, and I will go to purchase the
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bread, meat, and fish’ … Such a man will busy himself in the preparation of
Sabbath food, even if he has a thousand servants. 332
But because these actions are in service of honoring the Sabbath, the material and
fleshy activities of shopping and preparing the house for the Sabbath are nevertheless
connected to the realm of time. By increasing the level of excitement and good feelings
surrounding the Sabbath, these tasks increase the holiness of the Sabbath, of the realm
of time. “Anxiety and tension,” Heschel writes, “give place to the excitement that
precedes the great event.”333
This sense of wonder arising from material culture takes elements from Hasidic
Judaism - the religious tradition in which Heschel was raised - and places it on top of
the American cultural landscape in which he was writing. Sensing wonder from the
universe can be attributed to Heschel’s Hasidic background. Heschel’s “work is
Hasidic,” writes Art Green, “in that it maintains a sense of wonder about God who fills
the universe.”334 Heschel, viewing the American cultural landscape, “was profoundly
distressed by the secularization of consciousness among modern Jews.”335 Green goes
so far as to say that The Sabbath, in particular, “is a work only possible against the
backdrop of Hasidism.”336 Heschel, by using concepts and themes in Hasidism, was not
hoping to make all American Jews Hasidic, but was rather hoping to imbue and infuse
parts of the American Jewish tradition with Hasidic elements and feelings.
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Heschel’s Hasidic influences here also seem significant when considering his
thoughts on gender and, in particular, rituals with gender norms. Even today, Hasidism
generally has strict gender norms and mores.337 Additionally, Marcin Wodsiński has
argued that historically, many women in Hasidic communities did not even use the term
“Hasidic” to describe themselves, instead preferring to say that they were the wife or
daughter of a Hasidic man.338 In the Hasidic communities in which Heschel was raised,
women were often at the periphery of significant and defining Hasidic moments and
events, such as male-communal mikvah submersion, male-only prayer spaces, and
pilgrimages.339 The domestic sphere was the one area in these communities where
women were enabled to carve out their religious space and (potentially) show an
affiliation for Hasidim, “Alternative modes of expressing affiliation with Hasidism
available to women were few and generally confined to the private sphere of domestic
life. In the public sphere such forms of expression were virtually non-existent.”340 The
fact that the domestic was such an important place for Jewish women - including and
especially Hasidic women - also is significant when thinking of the role of the domestic
in Heschel’s envisioned Sabbath observance.
Having a zeal for shopping and making the home appear pristine in order to
make Shabbat sacred and holy was an activity that fit in nicely to the already pervasive
consumerist culture of 1950s Jewish America. Shopping and tidying the house in
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preparation for the Sabbath were activities that then-upwardly mobile Jewish women
used not only to embrace the holiness of the Sabbath, but also to embrace a middleclass consciousness.341 Because of the then-cultural imperative to appear middle-class,
Heschel likely viewed many preparing for the Sabbath in ways Heschel found hollow
and spiritually barren. Instead of simply shopping and creating challah, Heschel desires
that people imbue these shopping and cooking with a “zeal” and sense of wonder. Only
then will these activities become activities in the realm of time.
Shopping and household management were not activities usually performed by
male Jews in the 1950s. A 1950s book written about and for the wives of American
clergy opened acknowledging that although wives of pastors or rabbis have special
roles in the community, their first occupation was undeniably that of a homemaker.342 A
feminist Jewish book written in the 1980s outlines the importance for feminist Jews to
“unlearn” sexist patterns of behavior:
The only danger when you begin to introduce Shabbat--for yourself or your
family--is that you will fall back into roles you may have been conditioned to since
childhood. We expect ourselves to do everything and do it perfectly, magically
“creating” Shabbat for our significant others.343
Here, we see that for this feminist thinker, observing the Sabbath can almost be
dangerous because of the assumptions that it would be the women in the household
who were charged with the domestic tasks involved in making the Sabbath “perfect.”
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Later on in this chapter, I will return to this discussion of the importance of gender and
performative domesticity by offering up a reading of The Jewish Home Beautiful as a
woman-created and woman-centric discussion of the ways pursuits traditionally
gendered as feminine (and engaged in by women) at this time could also be seen as an
important foil to Heschel’s The Sabbath.
When Heschel explicitly discusses the role(s) women play in traditional Shabbat
observance, he does not explicitly mention shopping or household work. Instead,
Heschel focuses on some of the rituals associated with Shabbat that have gendered
implications. Returning to the quote about the importance of women lighting in candles
to usher in Shabbat, I now look at a larger portion of the quote:
When all work is brought to a standstill, the candles are lit. Just as creation
begins with the word, “let there be light!” so does the celebration of creation
begin with the kindling of lights. It is the woman who ushers in the joy, and sets
up the most exquisite symbol, light, to dominate the atmosphere of the home.344
Lighting candles is a tradition usually observed by women; here Heschel specifically
states that women are tasked with this ritual. Women, then, are oriented differently
towards the Sabbath: they are oriented towards the lit candles, the food they prepare,
etc. Women are also those who usher in the “joy” of Shabbat. Significantly, they are not
here presented as creating this joy, but rather accompanying the joy of Shabbat to the
home. The “joy” described in this statement can be read as a Tompkinsian joy – the
affect is one of relief after the anxiety and labor of preparing for Shabbat. However, this
joy is accompanied by a pervasive affect of interest and engagement with the ritual
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items associated with Shabbat itself: it is the light of the candles that also bring in this
joy and relief. The candles shimmer, they are full of vitality and life. It is by being near
them and oriented to them (either oriented towards them as a woman-who-lights or a
man-who-observes) that one can experience the rest of Shabbat. Significantly, they are
not here presented as creating this joy, but rather accompanying the joy of Shabbat to
the home. The “joy” described in this statement can be read as a Tompkinsian joy – the
affect is one of relief after the anxiety and labor of preparing for Shabbat. However, this
joy is accompanied by a pervasive affect of interest and engagement with the ritual
items associated with Shabbat itself: it is the light of the candles that also bring in this
joy and relief.
The calming effects of Shabbat are expanded further by Heschel when he
discusses an old Hasidic tale. Heschel writes that a Rabbi Solomon, when traveling,
met an old woman who knew a famous rabbi, Rabbi Elimelech. Rabbi Solomon then
interviewed the woman, asking her about her experiences with the famous man. The
woman, Heschel writes, states the following:
I do not know what went on in his room, because I worked as one of the maids in
the kitchen of his house. Only one thing I can tell you. During the week the maids
would often quarrel with one another, as is common. But, week after week, on
Friday when the Sabbath was about to arrive, the spirit in the kitchen was like the
spirit on the eve of the Day of Atonement. Everybody would be overcome with an
urge to ask forgiveness of each other. We were all seized by a feeling of affection
and inner peace.345
Gender, and particularly the relationship between gender and domesticity, play a
significant role in this story. The old woman, being interviewed for her closeness to the
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great (male) rabbi, begins by saying she did not dwell in his personal rooms, but rather
only worked in the kitchen. Spatially, then, the kitchen serves to separate herself from
the greatness of the rabbi - she is separated from him as she is associated with the
feminine work of cooking. The women in the kitchen would “quarrel with one another, as
is common.” Women in this story are relegated to the kitchen and destined to bicker
with one another.
Although the woman here has very little direct interaction with the great rabbi,
she does have one interesting tidbit to share: on Friday night, a peaceful spirit would
descend on the kitchen and all of the maids would be affected by a “feeling of affection
and inner peace.” Apparently, this feeling is somehow associated with the great rabbi
himself, or else the elderly woman here would not feel compelled to share the anecdote
when specifically asked about the rabbi. It was the piety and power of the rabbi which
caused this oasis of calm to descend throughout his household, even affecting the
kitchen staff.
Heschel does not comment the gendered dynamics of this story —the women
presented as being largely passive kitchen workers, prone to bickering with one
another, only to be affected by the magnanimous presence of Rabbi Elimelech every
Friday evening — in The Sabbath. Instead, he considers this story to demonstrate the
ways in which the Sabbath can demonstrate a supreme kind of rest. “The Sabbath,
thus, is more than an armistice, more than interlude,” Heschel writes, “it is a profound
conscious harmony of man and the world, a sympathy for all things and a participation
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in the spirit that unites what is below and what is above.”346 What Heschel does not here
explain is how, by simply virtue of simply being near Rabbi Elimelech, were these
women affected. He simply continues: “[On the Sabbath] all that is divine in the world is
brought into union with God. This is Sabbath, and the true happiness of the universe.”347
The beginning of chapter three, the first chapter in Part II of the book, begins with
a long retelling of a Talmudic tale. The main thrust of the story goes as follows: Three
rabbis and one “outsider” sit together. One rabbi remarks how lovely the material
advancements of the Romans are, remarking upon structures such as roads,
marketplaces, and bathhouses. One rabbi is silent at this pronouncement, but Rabbi
Shimeon ben Yohai states “All that they made, they made for themselves. They have
made roads and market places to put harlots there; they built bridges to levy tolls for
them; they erected bathhouses to delight their bodies.”348 The outsider observing this
exchange promptly went home and recounted it to his parents, and the story eventually
spread to the Roman government. The Romans “exalted” the rabbi who praised the
material advancements of the Romans, banished the silent rabbi, and sentenced Rabbi
Shimeon to death.
Upon hearing this, Rabbi Shimeon took himself and his son to the house of study
to hide from the government. His wife brought them food, but Rabbi Shimeon, worried
that she would eventually tell the Romans where they hid, fled with his son to a cave.
They there hid in fine white sand for twelve years, doing little besides eating, drinking,
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sleeping, and studying the Torah. After the twelve years the prophet Elijah came to the
cave and exclaimed to them that the Roman decree sentencing Rabbi Shimeon to
death had been lifted! Rabbi Shimeon and his son excitedly exit the cave. Upon seeing
people engaged in agriculture and trade, the two scholars lament that the population
had “forsaken eternal life and are engaged in temporary life” (I.e., involved in trades
other than studying Torah).349
A voice from heaven then calls down “Have ye emerged to destroy My world! Go
back to your cave!”350 The two went back to the cave and studied Torah for another
twelve months. At that time, another voice from heaven came down telling the two to
leave their cave. When they left, Rabbi Shimeon told his son, “My son, if only we two
remain to study the Torah, that will be sufficient for the world.”351 It was Friday evening
when they left the cave this second time, and on their way home, the two ran into an
elderly man carrying springs of myrtle. They asked this man what they were for, and the
man responded that they were “to honor the Sabbath.”352 At this, Rabbi Shimeon turns
to his son and says, delighted and awed, “Behold and see how dear God’s
commandments are to Israel.” At that moment, the story goes, “they both found
tranquility of the soul.”353
The original reason for Rabbi Shimeon and his son to go to the cave, was
because Rabbi Shimeon worried about his wife’s ability to not tell the Roman
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government where he and his son hid in the House of Study. Specifically, Rabbi
Shimeon tells his son: “We cannot rely on a woman’s discretion, because she can easily
be talked over. Or perhaps she may be tortured until she discloses our place of
concealment.”354 Firstly, Rabbi Shimeon doesn’t believe that a woman can be trusted
due to a pathological lack of discretion. Secondly, there seems to be some concern that
his wife may be tortured and forced to confess where the two are hiding. The fact that
the fear of torture is given as only a secondary concern is interesting: this reasonable
fear of torture is here relegated to an aside, another reason for.
The wife plays a significant role in this story. While the two men are hiding in the
House of Study, she provides the only link to the outside world. She comes into the
male-dominated House of Study, and brings her family members sustenance. This act
of care-giving the unnamed wife provides works bi-directionally: An outsider to the
House of Study herself due to her gender, she becomes intertwined with the
environment of the House of Study in order to bring her family material sustenance from
a world hostile and foreign to them. As stated in the story, it is the gender of the wife
which causes Rabbi Shimeon to flee to the insular cave with his son. However, because
the wife here provides the only link Rabbi Shimeon and his son now have to the
Roman-ruled world, it seems that by fleeing, he also wishes to sever any remaining tie
he has with that world. Here, we see how the wife in this story is feared: she is feared
for a sexist understanding of women being unable to keep secrets. Particularly, she is
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particularly feared in the Beit Midrash – a place where she would be considered an
“inauthentic” visitor.
And so, by turning inwards to the cave, Rabbi Shimeon and his son lose a
Tompkinsian interest in the larger world around them. They find food within the cave,
not needing to ever venture outside for sustenance. We are told they submerge
themselves in fine white sand, demonstrating a lack of connection to their own corporeal
bodies. While individuals really submerged in sand would likely not be disconnected
from their own bodies, but rather hyper-aware of the sand surrounding themselves, here
the function of the reader imagining two disembodied heads resting on top of a pile of
sand seems to be a symbol of disembodiment.
And this departure from the world is ultimately not what God desires. After the
two leave the cave and are dismissive of those individuals interacting with their
environment, a heavenly voice tells them that they must return again to their cave.
While this certainly seems like a punishment for being dismissive of those who need to
labor to earn their living, it is unclear whether or not Rabbi Shimeon and his son did not
enjoy this turning away from the world. Twelve months later, however, the exited the
cave and found “tranquility of the soul” upon seeing an old man hurrying home to
celebrate the Sabbath with sprigs of myrtle.
Analyzing the story, Heschel writes, “What stirred these men [to speak out
against the Romans] was not, as it is usually understood by historians, mere patriotic
resentment against [the Roman power]. From the development of the story, it is obvious
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that from the outset the issue was not only Roman rule but Roman civilization.”355 Then,
“after they had spent twelve years in the cave, the scope of the issue expanded even
further. It was not anymore a particular civilization but all civilization, the worth of worldly
living became the problem.”356 Here, civilization seems to mean for Heschel a desire for
an active engagement with the world, and therefore a pursuit of temporary life.
After discussing the ways in which a study of Torah is synonymous with
everlasting life,357 Heschel moves on to discussing the dangers of being absent, or
turned away from the world. Chapter Four, entitled “Only Heaven and Nothing Else?”
opens in the following way:
It was not the force of despair that bred Rabbi Shimeon’s contempt for the affairs
of this world. Behind his blunt repudiation of worldliness we discern a thirst for
treasures of eternity and a sense of horror at seeing how people were wasting
their lives in the pursuit of temporary life and neglecting the pursuit of eternal life.
In his boundless thirst, he saw no middle way, no ground for compromise.358
Later, Heschel remarks that Rabbi Shimeon and his son were, in a way, the “antipodes
of Prometheus. […] Rabbi Shimeon tried, as it were, to take fire away from men,
reproving them for pursuing the art of cultivating the ground.”359 Here, Heschel makes
clear that in his understanding of this story Rabbi Shimeon and his son were not only
turning away from the material world, but turning away from any interactions with the
material world.
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Heschel describes the scene with the old man and myrtle the “most baffling”
moment of the story.360 Why should the simple sight of a few sprigs of myrtle have such
a dramatic change of orientation for these two men? He then describes how the “old
man” symbolized the people Israel “who went out to meet the Sabbath with myrtles in
his hand as if the Sabbath was a bride.”361 Myrtle, Heschel continues, was commonly
used at this time period to adorn brides before weddings.362 In this story, then, the
myrtles have a kind of liveliness associated with them - the myrtles reach out towards
not only the man holding her leaves, but also to Rabbi Shimeon and his son,
encouraging them that there are people in the world who do care about their Jewish
identity and their responsibilities to God. The myrtle, this ritual plant, changes and
affects the orientation of these two men.
Returning now to the wife who was so feared that Rabbi Shimeon and his son
fled the House of Story, we see how this ending almost valorizes her. While the wife
herself is never mentioned again (and I would be remiss to not mention that), it is only
when the son and Rabbi Shimeon see someone interacting with a ritual object for a
bride (albeit, in this case, a dehumanized, metaphorical one) when they were enabled to
join the world around them with a sense of peace.
What this suggests, in combination with my insistence that the realms of space
and time are best understood as orientations, is that interaction with women (or tasks
associated with women) help anchor men in the realm of space which enables them to
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fully appreciate the realm of time. In the story of Rabbi Elimelech, a woman household
worker is asked how the great Rabbi behaved during the Sabbath - she is apparently
easier to contact than the great rabbi himself! -- she is the only pathway to that kernel of
truth. In the story of the two men in the cave, their mother/wife tried to sustain them,
tried to get them not to run away, but they refused. While a simple reading of this story
might argue that the two men were indeed in the realm of time while in the cave, they
were so deep into the realm of time they could not appropriately appreciate it. They
were in the realm of time, perhaps, but their orientation towards it was incorrect. And
lastly, of course, there is the statement that men ought to shop and prepare the
household for the Sabbath - for what use is the Sabbath without a house to enjoy it in,
without the ritual objects which are required for its observance?
This approach - that Heschel wants to emphasize the importance of interacting
with people of differing orientations than his - runs close to the so-called
“complementarian” “feminist” approach. Popular among conservative Christians and
some conservative Jews, this approach maintains that men and women are
ontologically different and embraces “normative masculinity, essential gender
differences, and separate roles and expectations for men and women with respect to
leadership, modesty, and dating/marriage.”363 While this was the norm (and may have
even been considered feminist) in the 1950s, this approach does not hold water for
those who do not necessarily believe gender to be an ontologically stable category of
identity. I am here not trying to make the point that The Sabbath is or is not a crypto363
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feminist or crypto-regressive text. While the concerns of women in traditionally male
spaces being inauthentic is obviously a non-feminist and regressive take, what is
interesting to me is rather how these economies of “authenticity” and femininity operate.
Additionally, what remains interesting is Heschel’s continued insistence on the
importance of interacting with others than one self. Shai Held, in Abraham Joshua
Heschel: The Call of Transcendence, notes that Heschel’s major ethical claim is rooted
in the concept of “self-reflexivity.” Held writes, “Heschel is therefore a theologian of selftranscendence. But what exactly does that mean? Heschel distinguishes between
“reflexive concern”, or concern with the self and its future, on the one hand, and
“transitive concern,” or concern with the interests of others, on the other.” 364 However,
Held’s focus on the importance of “transitive concern” and “self-transcendence” to
Heschel misses how Heschel himself specifically talks about the importance and
inevitability of being trans-corporeal — inevitably linked to objects and people around
oneself. The interests of others, then, will always include those with differing
orientations towards the world. By interacting with those of differing orientations as
himself – women, for example - is the only way to truly appreciate and experience the
realm of time.

The Jewish Home Beautiful: Another Orientation
Earlier in this dissertation, the idea that American Jewish men of the time
believed that American Jewish women attended synagogue too dressed-up, in hats that
were too “knowing” and showy for synagogue. The women and the hats were
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inauthentic, there was something perceived to be wrong with them. This chapter
suggests that what was seen as so inauthentic were not the ornamentations (or the
hats) in question, but rather the fact that these women brought these feminine items
with them into the generally coded-as-masculine synagogue. Because the synagogue
was hoped-to-be a male space, the problem of these women in the synagogue is not
because of what they are wearing or how they are behaving, but rather a foregone
conclusion.
The flawed logic of this “foreground conclusion” can be seen in Sara Ahmed’s
article “Mixed Orientations.” Ahmed discusses the horror and shock she felt when a
(male) family friend bluntly told her and her mother that it was unsurprising that Ahmed’s
father had just left her (White) mother because, as the friend said, “this is what happens
when you marry a Muslim.”365 Ahmed notes that this family friend was silent about the
“impending doom” of the relationship when things were going well, but when the
relationship did eventually collapse this friend used it to not only reaffirm a bias he held,
but to extend it into the past as well. (“This was always going to happen,” he seems to
be suggesting by stating “This is what happens when you marry a Muslim.”) Ahmed
writes that here the “break up acquires a certain meaning: as an ending assumed to be
what we were heading for, right from the beginning; an end that is interpreted as fate,
fatality, even fatalism. This is what happens when: as if the ‘when’ leads only to this.”366
Here, the presence of women in the synagogue is also presented as a way to explain
the barrenness and perceived inauthenticity of the postwar synagogue. The presence of
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women and absence of men in the synagogue means that the synagogue must be
inauthentic and non-spiritual, or else women wouldn’t outnumber the men. This is why
the image of the woman in the beit midrash was so disturbing to Rabbi Shimeon ben
Yohai and his son.367 It was not only the sexist fear that Rabbi Shimeon ben Yohai’s wife
would gossip, tell the authorities, or be tortured. Rather, the discomfort arose from the
fact that she didn’t belong there. Her orientation wasn’t sensible there. It was
inauthentic, it was strange and bizarre.
Women at the time also worried about authenticity in American Jewish practice,
but their fears were about when gendered-as-feminine pursuits became less Jewish and
more Christian, more American. Jewish womanhood being connected to domesticity
has extremely long roots. In early rabbinic Judaism, “female industry and thrift still
matter […] but the control of her labor becomes part of the definition of being female in
a rabbinic society. Domesticity […] becomes a discipline.”368 Domesticity was
considered such a key part of womanhood that rabbinic sources even forbade a
husband from commanding his wife to not engage in domestic tasks! Such a concept
would strip a woman of her gender identity, her womanhood, and be tantamount to
abuse.369 By looking at The Jewish Home Beautiful – a tablescaping-slash-performancepiece extolling the virtues of Jewish domestic homemaking - it is clear that women in
this time period were concerned that their homemaking ought to be authentic as well.
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The Jewish Home Beautiful pageants-slash-tablescaping-expose is another example of
how feminine materiality was celebrated and cultivated as a way to encourage Jewish
women to be more “authentically” Jewish. The Jewish Home Beautiful was an event,
held in Conservative synagogues throughout America from the 1930s throughout the
1950s. The event consisted of setting up several tables themed for a Jewish holiday
(Rosh HaShanah, Shabbat, Purim, etc.). The tables were set with beautiful
centerpieces, fine china, and in some cases, platters of food. The event was so popular
that a cookbook-cum-guidebook for the event was published in 1941, and had seven
subsequent re-printings. A narrator would explain the holiday and its significance while
women would pantomime various Jewish rituals done at the table. For example, the
entry on the Sabbath is as follows:
Choir sings Sholom Aleihem “softly as woman dressed in taffeta dress, wearing a
soft white apron and a white lace scarf over her shoulders, walks slowly to
Sabbath table. She covers the two Sabbath loaves with a Hallah cover, lights the
candles, covers her head with white scarf, and as singing off-stage is concluded,
raises her hands and recites the blessing for the kindling of the Sabbath lights.370
Here, we see that the clothing of the actor is given as much as, if not more, attention
than the stage directions themselves. Additionally, the stage directions demonstrate that
the woman in this scene is completely surrounded with Jewish ritual objects and the
manipulation of these objects.
The women in this piece exhibit a Tompkinsian interest in the objects around
them. (Because The Jewish Home Beautiful is an educational performance piece, the
work also demonstrates the normative interest that all Jewish women ought to have
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towards these Jewish ritual objects. It is not only that the actors themselves
demonstrate their interest, but also that they dynamically encourage any Jewish women
watching the performance to also become interested.) They are captivated by the ritual
objects of Shabbat. The objects have a liveliness about them, they transform the actors
of Jewish Home Beautiful as they move them throughout the scene. Jewish Home
Beautiful is extremely invested in provided avenues for “authentic” Jewish experience.
The introduction to the volume states: “Jewish mothers of today have not lost their
desire to introduce beautiful pageantry into their homes. But they have turned to foreign
sources [such as celebrating Valentine’s Day and Halloween in the home] for their
inspiration.”371 A major point of the Jewish Home Beautiful, then, is to mandate that the
Jewish home can be surrounded with authentic Jewish materiality. Furthermore, it is
important not only for Jewish women to have a particular orientation and fascination
towards “authentic” Jewish material objects, but also that this orientation takes place
within the family unit: it is Jewish mothers that are addressed in the introduction, not
women. Koltun-Fromm writes that the Jewish Home Beautiful “shows us how to think
well about visual authenticity as a performative Jewish practice.”372 Being authentically
Jewish is, then, performative: on the tables that do include food, only hyper-traditional
Ashkenazi foods are prescribed, such as kugel, chicken soup, etc. However, the
importance of authenticity within the Jewish Home Beautiful does not mean that it wants
traditions to be stale or stagnant. Instead, the event encourages the modern-1940s and
1950s Jewish woman to make the rituals “upscale” and “modern” by placing these
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traditional Ashkenazi foods on an upscale table with upscale china, the Jewish daughter
can “reimagine Jewish ritual in her mother’s style” in a way that is “traditional and
fitting.”373
Women in The Jewish Home Beautiful can feel authentic – they are protected
from the sticky sign of the inauthentic that comes from being a woman out of place.
Authenticity happens when women are surrounded by the domestic, inauthenticity
happens when women are surrounded by the male-dominated synagogue. Protected by
a “safe” way of updating Jewish traditions by sliding kugel onto a different style of plate,
the women who organized and promoted The Jewish Home Beautiful can feel still
moored in tradition. They are enabled to be oriented correctly. Even if they lived in a
world where women attended synagogue more than men, they still maintain an
“authentic” orientation towards domesticity. Even if this domesticity was shaped by the
dominant American consumerist culture of the time,

Conclusion
Through my discussion of these four passages that treat gender in The Sabbath,
it is clear that Heschel’s thoughts about gender and women are not univocal or simple.
On the one hand, Heschel remains in awe of women. Women light candles which usher
in Shabbat; woman are key participants in Shabbat that play an important role in childrearing, food preparation, and domesticity. The domestic tasks in which they engage of
are crucially important for a successful orientation towards the realm of time during
Shabbat. Without having ritual objects and an appropriate orientation towards these
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ritual objects, a ‘true’ Shabbat cannot happen. However, there is also something
strange about a woman in an incorrect place; a woman in the beit midrash. Even
bringing food for her husband and son, she is dangerous. She does not belong in the
beit midrash, she is sure to gossip and give the father and son away. But, significantly,
the decision Rabbi Shimeon and his son made were not the ultimate choice, the final
choice. Turning away from the woman, from the person with the other orientation that
Rabbi Shimeon himself, only caused isolation to the point of comedy. Shrinking away
from others with differing orientations leads only to living in a cave, eating only carob,
and sitting half-submerged in sand: “And a miracle happened: a carob tree grew up
inside the cave and a well of water opened, so that they had enough to eat and enough
to drink. They took off their clothes and sat up to their necks in sand.”374 And,
significantly, when they finally exited the cave the sight they saw was the myrtle, one of
heterosexual marriage. Men and women, with their differing orientations towards the
world, joining together is the image on which the story of Rabbi Shimeon ends.
The end of The Sabbath includes some statements about the inability to occupy
time alone. Heschel writes: “The portion of space which my body occupies is taken up
by myself in exclusion of anyone else. Yet, no one possesses time. There is no moment
which I possess exclusively. […] We share time, we own space.”375 Ultimately, even
though Heschel seems conflicted in the way he discusses (and uses rabbinic sources to
discuss) women, he does maintain the importance of meeting others who have different
orientations towards the world in The Sabbath. Because the realm of time is immutable
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and slippery, the realm of time reminds humans of their limitations. Furthermore, the
realm of time reminds humans of their orientations towards the materiality of the world:
for it is only when a particular orientation towards things is achieved that one can truly
experience the realm of time. The realm of time is meant to be shared, potentially with
an Other that has a different orientation than oneself -- hopefully, with an Other that has
an ‘appropriate’ and ‘authentic’ orientation.376
By pairing The Sabbath and The Jewish Home Beautiful, I argue that both texts
were wrestling with concerns about authenticity when engaging with the material world
of postwar American Jews.377 Heschel believed that American Jews needed to
experience the Sabbath in order to feel in relation to God and to others. A Tompkinsian
interest in material objects tempered with the awareness of the Divine is important for
Heschel: it is through this engagement with the materials of Shabbat observance that
one becomes transported to another, higher plane. Similarly with The Jewish Home
Beautiful: women were encouraged to participate in the tablescaping event as a way to
both demonstrate their “appropriate” and “authentically Jewish” engagement with
material culture and strengthen their own identity as Jewish, American homemakers. A
deep concern about the continued “authentic” existence of Jewish community,
peoplehood, and relationships runs through both works. Abraham Joshua Heschel
wrote a book about the importance traditional Shabbat observance can strengthen the
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American Jewish community and be a balm for the soul. Sylvia Heschel wrote holiday
cards to an expanding network of clergy as the wife of a rabbi. Both, perhaps, worried
about the continuation of (what they considered to be) authentic Jewish practice during
this time of social upheaval and change.
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Chapter Three: Emotional Zionism
Introduction
When Heschel discusses Israel or Zionism, he does so primarily through evoking
emotions. Heschel’s emphasis and focus on emotion runs so deep that I read Israel:
The Echo of Eternity as an outline towards a new form of Zionism: Emotional Zionism. I
use this phraseology intentionally to put Emotional Zionism in a chain of tradition with
“Political Zionism” (associated with Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau) and “Cultural
Zionism” (often associated with Ahad Ha-Am). While Political Zionism focused on the
importance of establishing a Jewish political state and Cultural Zionism focused on the
importance of the creation of a vibrant Jewish cultural center in the Land of Israel,
Emotional Zionism focuses on the importance of experiencing (and talking about)
particular emotions related to the Land of Israel. Israel: An Echo of Eternity discusses
four emotional states. Firstly, fear and anxiety for the potential destruction of the state of
Israel and its inhabitants; secondly, joy at the continued existence of a Jewish state and
the ability of the Jewish people to gather in the land of Israel; thirdly, a vague sense of
embarrassment for not living in the land of Israel; and finally an emotional, naive
certainty that the State of Israel is always more just than other nations with which it may
be in political conflict.
“The dreadful anxiety passed,” Heschel writes of the palpable relief he felt after
the 1967 War.378 Leading up to and during the Six-Day War (many) American Jews were
anxious. Fearing that a war between Israel and the Arab nations of Jordan, Egypt and
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present-day Syria would constitute the utter decimation of the State of Israel, American
Jews felt that another Holocaust was about to occur. The Six-Day War, however,
concluded with Israel’s victory and substantial land gains in the Levant, including the
Old City in Jerusalem which included the Western Wall. A sense of palpable relief and
joy was common in Jewish communities both in Israel and America. Heschel writes that
this dreadful anxiety “will not be easily erased from our conscience. It was a moment of
purification and spiritual self-identification. The walls fell, the walls that separated the
diverse parts of our people.”379 Here, Heschel is clear that it was the emotions that
surrounded the 1967 War that had this transformative effect. It was not primarily the
military victory of the 1967 War itself, it was the resolution of fear and the feeling of joy
that is so important to Heschel.

Overview and Backdrop of Heschel’s Israel: An Echo of Eternity
Abraham Joshua Heschel’s Israel: An Echo of Eternity was written immediately
following the 1967 War. Heschel was asked to write the work by the Anti-Defamation
League of B’nai B’rith with the explicit goal to explain “to Christians the Jewish people’s
passionate attachment to Israel,” particularly against the background of increasing
“Christian criticism of Israel in the wake of the 1967 war.”380 Lawrence Kaplan writes
that, therefore, Israel: An Echo of Eternity was “the only book Heschel wrote not
deriving from an inner call, but on commission.”381 Kaplan suggests that the fact that
Heschel was asked to write this book specifically to justify Jewish attachment to Israel
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caused the book to contain a larger emphasis on space and place rather than time.
Israel: An Echo of Eternity, Kaplan writes, encounters a “problem that throughout his
work Heschel consistently downplays the religious significance of space, as contrasted
with that of time,”382 and is therefore a confusing read for anyone versed in Heschel’s
other writings. I do not share this reading: as discussed earlier in this dissertation, 383 I
understand the separations between space and time to be less hard-and-fast than other
readers of Heschel. More significantly, I believe that it is not precisely space that
Heschel here discusses, but it is rather the emotions felt at a particular space in a
particular time. Heschel’s demand in Israel: An Echo of Eternity is for a connection with
the land of Israel on an emotional level, not necessarily the importance of the land itself.
In Jerusalem, Heschel writes, “the trees praise, the streets say grace, and my steps
give thanks.”384 It is the emotional interaction between Heschel’s steps and the trees and
the streets which are important here, not the land alone.
While American Jewry was always (and remains) a multivocal community, the
Six-Day War marked a shift in the way many American Jews related to the State of
Israel. American Jews became extremely worried that an Israeli military defeat would be
akin to “another Holocaust.” Ben Sales, a reporter for the Washington Jewish Week,
interviewed Modern Orthodox rabbi, Yitz Greenberg about his feelings during the war.
Greenberg recounted to Sales, “I said, 'They're not going to wipe out Israel, and if they
do, there's going to be a sign up: The shul is closed.' Faith could not go on with an
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unmitigated catastrophe of that size happening again.”385 Here, we see that the Six-Day
War was irrevocably linked to the Holocaust in the mind of many American Jews:
another catastrophe about to happen to the Jewish people. Sales continues, writing that
these American Jews felt “haunted by their failure to act during the Holocaust.”386
Because of this, American Jewry politically mobilized to a degree not reached before:
“tens of millions of dollars” were raised, the President was lobbied, and held several
rallies to encourage American to lend military and financial support to Israel. 387 Yitz
Greenberg even recounted a congregant who took out a second mortgage and sent the
proceeds to support Israel.388 While American Jews had not been apolitical before the
Six-Day War, the way in which this political activism manifested leading up to and
directly after the Six-Day War changed. These events “imbued many American Jews
with unprecedented pride in being Jewish as well as a willingness to assert their
Jewishness publicly.”389 Still reeling and traumatized from the memory of the Holocaust,
Jews became more comfortable being explicit about their Jewishness when agitating for
support for the State of Israel. fJews were more comfortable lobbying and rallying as
Jews rather than lobbying and rallying as concerned American citizens dealing with
universal ethical issues.390 Jewish identity -- and in particular, a Jewish identity aligned
with the State of Israel and -- was thrust into the forefront.
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The Fear of Another Jewish Catastrophe: The Relationship Between the State of
Israel and the Holocaust
“The darkness of Auschwitz is among us,” Heschel writes, “its memory is a
torment forever.”391 This torment was felt during the Six-Day War, so strong that the
feeling ceased to be simply one of “sympathy” for the Jewish community in Israel.
Instead, this feeling of anxiety and dread was a recognition, a “realization that the soil in
which the very meaning of our existence is rooted may be taken away from us that
rocked us to our depths.”392 This moment of realization of the potential disaster facing
the State of Israel sounds very similar to the sense of dread I previously discussed in an
earlier chapter of this dissertation: close to the realization that one might die. Heschel
here presents the idea of losing a large Jewish population and the political State of
Israel to be akin to a kind of death: the soil being ripped out from under someone, being
unmoored and floating unanchored in the modern world.
Facing this potential of this kind of death, Heschel writes “the world stood still.”393
This stillness of the world is, for some people, akin to looking on with bated breath, and
for others, more akin to looking away in a state of avoidance and ignorance. Heschel
continues, “The world that was silent while six million died, was silent again, save for
individual friends. The anxiety was grueling, the isolation was dreadful.”394 Here,
Heschel again draws a direct parallel from the days leading up to the Six-Day War and
the Holocaust: the similarity in this passage is based on (1) the isolation, (2) the anxiety,
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and (3) the perception that the world was doing nothing to help the Jewish People.
(Whether or not this is an accurate representation of the amount of international support
Israel received during and leading up to the Six-Day War is less of interest to me than
this was the pervasive mood which animated both Heschel’s thought and much of
American Jewry.)
Throughout Israel: An Echo of Eternity, Heschel discusses a pervasive kind of
anxiety for the sake of the State of Israel, a fear that a new catastrophe would happen
to the Jewish people. While this anxiety was, of course, most pronounced during the
Six-Day War, some of the anxiety remains ambient even after Israel’s victory. This
anxiety, this vicarious fear on behalf of the Jews in the land of Israel is an important
emotional landscape of Israel: An Echo of Eternity. For while Heschel and other
American Jews felt as though another Holocaust would occur in the land of Israel, they
were not there. Part of the anxiety American Jews felt was again being forced to look
on, to vicariously witness from afar, a genocide committed against their people. This
isn’t to say that all of these American Jews wished to be in harm’s way, but rather that
the emotion experienced was a strange feeling of being-there-yet-not-being-there, being
aside and beside oneself. While understandable to fear on behalf of others, this
vicarious anxiety and vicarious fear can have ethical complications. As Laura Levitt
writes about Holocaust memorialization, “the victims cannot speak, which leaves the
witness in the position of having to craft tales that are not his or her own.”395
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And this is precisely why American Jews linked this event with the Holocaust:
because, for the most part, American Jews were not in the Holocaust themselves.
Nevertheless, American Jews felt themselves invested and part of the War, and felt that
they needed to, were obligated to, somehow participate (by donating money and
lobbying). Ben Anderson discusses how the feelings surrounding the concept of war
changed with WWII, and how these feelings continue (although are expanded upon, of
course) in the contemporary period. Instead of feeling like there is a large gap between
soldier and civilian, in total war “the battlefield is extended.”396 Civilians are encouraged
to participate in the war through means of working in factories which create weapons,
send gifts and letters to the troops, etc. These actions are seen as a vital part of the war
effort and are mobilized through affects and emotions which rest on the assumption that
the war is everywhere, not only on the battlefield. This extension of the battlefield is key
for the mobilization of the population, and it is through affects that this is possible: “It is
also worth noting that understanding the ‘total’ battlefield as a site of swirling, resonating
affects has been central to analytical praise of “total war” as the revelation of inhuman
forces that undo and disperse the fragile form of the human.”397
The way that civilians are considered part of the war effort is through their
interactions with ordinary, everyday objects and actions: letters, gardens, philanthropic
fundraising campaigns, etc. Similarly, Kathleen Stewart’s Ordinary Affects tracks and
traces emotions and affects which are completely ordinary, everyday, almost boring.
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The work itself, however, is not boring: instead, it reverberates with the reader with the
remarkable realization of the familiar, that the author is describing situations and
sensations which are all-too familiar. Stewart writes of the American Dream: “The
American Dream comes into sharp-edged focus. There are only winners and losers
now.”398 She continues, “Dream meets nightmare in the flick of an eye… Anxiety ranges
without object. But so does the potential.”399 Here, anxiety is linked with potentiality,
failure, and without an object. Anxiety is a feeling of unsettledness, being out-of-place,
not necessarily tied to a particular temporal event, but at the same time a feeling of
deep concern and ambivalence about the future: will things go well for me, or will they
be a disaster? Was the lead-up to the Six-Day War ordinary? Yes and no. It was
ordinary in the sense that, as mentioned above, the battlefield is everywhere: the sense
of the war pervaded into the ordinary and transformed the relationship to many
American Jews, including Heschel.
While Heschel describes this emotion as “anxiety,” it shares some similarities to
Tompkins’s description of fear. Interestingly, the first sentence of Tompkins’s section of
fear-terror in Affect, Imagery, Consciousness demonstrates this link between anxiety
and fear: “Human beings are, at once, the most violent and the most anxious of
animals.”400 Tompkins continues by describing a “yoked pair” of affects: 401 anxiety and
aggression, the relationship of which can result in fear.402 However, Tompkins believes
that “anxiety has become a weasel word” and that many times a feeling of anxiety or
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anxiousness is described would be better attributed to another affect.403 Because of the
way the word “anxiety” can be used to describe several affects or affective moods,
(most disturbingly for Tompkins is the usage of “anxiety” to describe a relatively benign
wish or desire, such as “I am anxious to get home”, etc.) Tompkins suggests using the
term terror instead.404 And the way that Heschel uses “anxiety” in Israel: An Echo of
Eternity is certainly a kind of anxiety that is serious and dreadful, full of terror.
This is not to say that Tompkins would believe that the entire lead-up to the SixDay War and the six days of the war were equally terrifying for the Heschel and the
broader diasporic Jewish community. Terror is an intense affect; the intensity of terror
makes it “toxic even in small doses.”405 The intensity of terror means that the affect is
usually short-lived, usually being replaced by a more pervasive “distress response.”406
The biological imperative of terror’s “toxicity and urgency is similar to that of pain--to
reduce the toxic state as quickly as possible.”407 And while the diasporic Jewish
community was not in the land of Israel, they did feel as though they were taking action
to “reduce the toxic state” befalling the State of Israel through their political action.
Heschel was not alone in his desires to memorialize the Holocaust, support the state
of Israel, and to see these projects as somehow related. Memorializing the Holocaust
alongside a parallel impetus to support and show fidelity to the State of Israel became
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more and more significant in American Jewish culture in the late 1960s and 1970s. 408
Discussing the ways in which more contemporary Jewish generations feel less
connected to the State of Israel than older generations, Theodore Sassoon et al write,
According to this [generational and historical memory] view, members of the
oldest generation—those born in the 1920s and 1930s—have significant direct
and vicarious memories of the Holocaust and the founding of the State of Israel
and those born in the 1940s and 1950s recollect the Six Day and Yom Kippur
wars. As a consequence, members of these generations identify with Israel’s
cause and have a strong sense of Israel’s vulnerability.409
While Sassoon et al contrast this understanding of the perceived decline in affiliation
and attachment to the state of Israel with other hypotheses,410 what remains relevant to
this discussion is that Jews who remembered both the Holocaust and the founding of
the State of Israel had higher rates of support for the state of Israel. Even before the
Six-Day War, this turn towards a “civil religion” primarily comprised of the “twin pillars” of
Holocaust memorialization and political support for the State of Israel was so strong that
Johnathan Krasner quips that when Heschel himself gave an address at a General
Assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds in Montreal in 1965,
the audience was “bewildered” by his focus on “strengthening of Jewish identification
through education and spiritual engagement.”411 At that time, education and spiritual
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engagement were not highlighted as areas of interest for Jewish Federations, as much
as were political activism, philanthropy, and Holocaust remembrance.
In Israel, this linkage of the Holocaust to (then) present-day political and military
realities was deliberately invoked to increase support for particular political ends. As
Idith Zertal writes:
The assimilation of the organized Holocaust memory into the time-honored
Zionist polemic concerning the ideal and longed-for borders of the Jewish state,
and the representation of Israel’s international border – particularly since the
1967 war and the widespread Jewish settlement in the occupied territories – in
terms of the Holocaust, have contributed to the expansion and justification of
Israeli occupation of a land inhabited by another people.412
This so-called “assimilation” of organized Holocaust memory into the Zionist narrative
did not begin directly before the 1967 War; rather, this process had started years earlier.
Statements made during the Eichmann trial (1961) “stressed the ‘‘sanctity’’ of the
[Israeli] army, conceived of now as the venerated, holy executor of the last will and
testament of the six million.”413 This is not to say that in the immediate lead-up to the
Six-Day War furthered this association dramatically: “In a series of articles, op-ed
pieces, and news items written and published day after day by different correspondents
and essayists, the sense of an impending existential danger of Holocaust proportions
was accumulating.”414
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At times, the relationship between the Holocaust and the State of Israel were so
thoroughly linked to make others uncomfortable. The particularities of “link” between the
Holocaust and the State of Israel can be described thusly:
The creation of this state on the ruins of the Jewish nation and from the
devastation of the Holocaust—the ultimate Jewish catastrophe—was perceived
as the ultimate Jewish secular redemption. This encounter was fateful also
because of its significance in forging the ethos of the Zionist community and the
official discourse in Palestine toward the victims of the Holocaust within the
physical and cognitive space whose two poles were the ruined Diaspora and the
Zionist community of Palestine, a sovereign state in the making.415
Heschel himself refers to the State of Israel (and its resulting military victories) in a
similar way in Israel: An Echo of Eternity. Of course, because of Heschel’s unfailing and
deep commitment to theocentricity, he does not view the creation of the state of Israel
as a secular redemption story. He writes: “The State of Israel is not only a place of
refuge for the survivors of the Holocaust, but also a tabernacle for the rebirth of faith
and justice, for the renewal of souls, for the cultivation of knowledge of the words of the
divine. By the promise and power and promise of prophetic visions we inhabit the land,
by faithfulness to God and Torah we continue to survive.”416 While Heschel here does
not explicitly link the creation of the State of Israel to the Holocaust by saying something
along the lines of the Holocaust happened so that the state of Israel could be born, or
even that the Holocaust directly lead to the State of Israel, he does nevertheless tie the
plight of survivors of the Holocaust who eventually settled in Israel with this kind of
spiritual rebirth he believes is happening in the second part of his quote. Earlier in the
work, Heschel writes, “And yet, there is no answer to Auschwitz.... To try to answer is to
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commit a severe blasphemy. Israel enables us to bear the agony of Auschwitz without
radical despair.”417
And while Heschel is here quite specific that Israel is not an answer to Auschwitz,
the linkages he does make (or even alludes to) was enough to rile the feathers of at
least one Christian theologian. In an article entitled “Towards an Authentic ChristianJewish Partnership,” A. Roy Eckardt, a Christian theologian and influential voice in
postwar Christian-Jewish relations, is seemingly mystified by Heschel’s Israel: An Echo
of Eternity.418 “Yet is Abraham Heschel totally misguided,” he asks, “in Israel: An Echo of
Eternity?”419 His bewilderment is because of Heschel’s re-framing of Jewish history in
light of the Jewish State. To Eckhardt, Heschel’s discussion of the importance of the
Jewish State after the Holocaust is unbearably similar to a theology which purports that
the State of Israel happened because of the Holocaust, or (even more troublingly) that
the Holocaust happened so that the State of Israel could be born. In Eckhardt’s words:
“Dare we relate the Holocaust to the resurrection to the Jewish state? Certainly not…”420
Eckhardt doesn’t return to Heschel during the rest of his article, although he clearly
prefers the post-Holocaust theology of Emil Fackenheim to Heschel’s discussion of the
Holocaust in relation to the State of Israel in Israel: An Echo of Eternity.
While Heschel does discuss the Holocaust frequently in Israel: An Echo of
Eternity, I do not believe that reading the work as a kind of post-Holocaust theology
(which Eckhardt appears to be doing) is particularly fruitful or helpful. Eckhardt’s reading
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of this work relies on the assumed causal nature between the Holocaust and the State
of Israel; what Heschel explores in this book, I argue, is the relationship between
emotions related to (remembering) the Holocaust and the State of Israel. While Heschel
does discuss the Holocaust frequently in the work, and while he does think that the
State of Israel enables Jews to “sense coherence” in Jewish history,421 I do not
understand Heschel as viewing the State of Israel as justifying the Holocaust or vice
versa. For Heschel, Zionism and the State of Israel have been elevated: a miracle, on a
different plane entirely than the Shoah. “The military conquest of Jerusalem [which
happened in the Six-Day War, which immediately preceded Israel: An Echo of Eternity]
was for Heschel a miracle,” David Moore writes, “a sign of God’s fidelity, of God’s
presence, and of God’s continuing revelation. It is an event that for him is of enormous
religious and historical significance.”422 Heschel, therefore, had an easier time attributing
a clear-cut religious significance to the Six-Day War than to the Holocaust: the Six-Day
War, for Heschel, “proved” God’s fidelity and love for the Jewish people, the Holocaust
complicated it. The State of Israel becomes, in this way, a pathway for Jews to make
the unintelligible agony of the Holocaust slightly more – not completely more, no –
bearable.
After this traumatic experience: after worrying so intently about the State of
Israel, there was a palpable, amazing sense of relief: Israel had not been annihilated but
had actually been victorious! Upon learning that Israel had won the war, Heschel
describes feeling a palpable sense of relief. This relief, this surprise that Israel would not
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be destroyed, leads eventually into a kind of joy for Heschel when interacting with the
State of Israel. However, even when talking about this joy, Heschel continually links this
joy with never-ending horror, anxiety, sorrow, and embarrassment.

Joy at Israel’s Victory
Heschel writes, “There is no joy without Jerusalem, and there is no perception of
Jerusalem without the perception of her mystery. What is the mystery of Jerusalem? A
promise: peace and God’s presence.”423 Here, Jerusalem is so important that Heschel
states that joy is impossible without it! And, starting from this vantage point, Heschel
goes backwards throughout Jewish history to discuss how Jerusalem, and this joy of
Jerusalem, affected earlier Jewish communities. “Jerusalem,” Heschel writes, “is more
than pure possibility.”424 Jerusalem is the promise of Jewish renewal, of Jewish peace,
of the covenant restored. Not only was Jerusalem synonymous with Jewish political
agency, but rather there was something inherent in the land itself which captivated
earlier Jews throughout history. He writes, “The love of this land was due to an
imperative, not an instinct, not a sentiment.”425 He continues by stating that there is a
kind of covenant between the Jewish people and the physical land of Israel, and then
goes so far as to make this love and longing for the land of Israel as a foundational
Jewish sentiment. “Intimate attachment to the land, waiting for the renewal of Jewish life
in the land of Israel, is part of our integrity an existential fact. Unique, sui generis, it lives
in our hopes, it abides in our hearts.”426
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The joy of Jerusalem is a Jerusalem ‘restored’, a Jerusalem which has survived
the Six Day War. This kind of joy is a relief, a preservation of good feelings as fear and
pain ebb away. Silvan Tompkins writes of this kind of joy: “Thus, sudden relief from
such negative stimulation as pain, or fear or distress or aggression will produce the
smile of joy.”427 After some instances of joy due to the reduction of pain, the sense of joy
may eventually “pass into indifference”428 after some period of time -- because of the
memory of the pain is too far away. What makes this kind of relief-joy so intense is
because of the “steepness of the gradient of stimulation reduction which is critical,” for
example, something that hurts more is more likely to be transformed into joy when the
pain is released. “Happy moods,” Sara Ahmed says, “are precarious,” they are possible
to be “brought down” by bad news, other people, or repetition.429
Similarly, Tompkins discusses how phenomena that are too familiar to the person
in question may not always provide a sense of joy. Things that are so familiar will not
create a response intense enough to lean into joy, “many familiar objects in the
environment may be too familiar to evoke enough even momentary excitement to evoke
the smile of joy at the recognition of the familiar.”430 Significantly, then, Heschel’s joy of
relief that Israel’s victory was due to an extreme decrease in pain, and because it was
something surprising. Heschel’s diasporic identity is important here: while he visited the
State of Israel, he never moved there. For Heschel, Israel was always another place, a
place of interest, an unusual place.
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Heschel’s discussion of the joy of Zionism, the joy of interacting with the State of
Israel, is the most pronounced when he discusses visiting and walking around
Jerusalem directly after the Six-Day War. The streets of Jerusalem were, of course,
even more unusual than the State of Israel for Heschel: not only did Heschel not live in
Jerusalem, the city had only recently been acquired in the war. Discussing the Western
Wall, Heschel recounts feeling almost connected to the Wall, almost akin to a kind of
unio mystica. He writes: “The Wall is silent? For a moment I am her tongue.” 431 Here, the
Wall becomes embodied just as Heschel becomes one with the Wall: Back to his
familiar focus on temporality, Heschel here collapses the distinctions between Jewish
past, present, and future; diasporic Jews and Israeli Jews; his Jewish human body and
Jewish nonhuman entity. This ecstatic moment is not for long, however: just as soon as
Heschel feels this profound union with the Wall, he almost immediately becomes
dissociated from it: “Then I hear, I am a man of unclean lips… Forgive my ecstasy. I am
afraid of detachments, of indifference, of disjunctions. Since Auschwitz my joys grieve,
pleasures are mixed with vexations.”432
Here, Heschel beautifully navigates the fear that the joy of a Jerusalem “restored”
could potentially decrease as the temporal distance between the Six-Day War and the
Jewish people widens. As mentioned above, Ahmed’s and Tompkins’s articulation of joy
rests on the quick decrease of pain. Heschel certainly felt this quick decrease of pain
and anxiety when Israel won what was perceived to be a difficult war with the odds
“stacked against” the State of Israel. But the joy of Jerusalem ought not to decrease as
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the war became a memory. However, Heschel’s immediate coupling of this joy with
Jerusalem throughout history and the idea that there is a kind of categorical imperative
about feeling joy when walking the streets of Israel reframes this joy as lasting, eternal.
For Heschel, the quick relief of Israel’s victory ought not to decrease as people become
temporally distant from the Six-Day War. Feeling joyous becomes a kind of a mandate,
proof of one’s relationship to God, the land of Israel, the State of Israel, and the Jewish
people as a whole. This mandated texture of the joy Heschel here discusses will be
addressed later in this chapter in a broader discussion about affect aliens.
Additionally, just as Heschel navigates the concern that walking around
Jerusalem could become commonplace and every day, we see that Heschel also adds
a sense of sadness and gravity to his joy. Heschel feels imperfect, Heschel remembers
the past. We see that not only does this moment of supreme connection with the Wall in
Jerusalem is immediately truncated because of Heschel’s feelings of imperfection and
humanity, he immediately shifts to thinking that his joys are always mixed with sorrow.
The Holocaust was profound for Heschel: after the Holocaust, all joys are tempered, the
Holocaust can never not be remembered by the Jewish people. Heschel goes even
further later in Israel: An Echo of Eternity, by associating the Holocaust with a biological
element of Jewishness, “Auschwitz is in our veins. It abides in the throbbing of our
heart. It burns in our imagination.”433 While obviously this is a metaphor, here Heschel is
nevertheless making a profound statement about the Holocaust and Jewish identity,
that the Holocaust is a defining moment of Jewish identity. By linking this memory of the
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Holocaust with blood, Heschel also suggests that the significance of the Holocaust can
be passed down through the generations.

Embarrassment at Being a Diaspora Jew
This joy that Heschel experiences in Israel is not only tempered by grief and
sorrow, but also by embarrassment. Embarrassment for living in the diaspora, for not
being in Israel while the war was occurring, and for feeling therefore emasculated. In
“Israel and the Diaspora” in a collection of Heschel’s essays, The Insecurity of Freedom,
Heschel discusses an “embarrassment” felt by diasporic Jews when they are reminded
that they are not living in the land of Israel. This sense of embarrassment is repeated in
the (later-published) Israel: An Echo of Eternity. In “Israel and the Diaspora,” Heschel
writes: “The State of Israel is not only an inspiration but also an embarrassment. One
feels abashed at the thought of being a distant spectator while the most dramatic act of
building and defending the land is being enacted by others.”434 While this statement is
descriptive and not prescriptive, Lawrence Kaplan clearly reads this statement as if it
were prescriptive. “Here Heschel,” Kaplan writes, “goes so far as to say that Jews in the
diaspora ought to be embarrassed at not living in the land of Israel. [...] Strong words.” 435
Sarah Imhoff writes how American Jewish Zionists also felt out-of-place when
thinking about their relationship to Zionism. “For Nordau,” Imhoff writes, “and others like
him, Zionism and the land of Palestine would restore a manliness that the diaspora had
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robbed.”436 Heschel discusses the early Zionists from the pioneer generation in a way to
emphasize their agricultural ‘rebuilding’ and ‘rebirth’ of the land of Israel. He writes of
“the daring […] the builders and pioneers”437 the following,
The [Zionist] pioneers were moved by a vision of the future, as well as by a love
of the soil. The things that evoked enthusiasm were a tree planted, a haystack at
harvest time. They lived with the cows and the sheep, and sensed a divine halo
hovering over simple things of soil. The draining of a swamp was an act of
redemptive connotation. One cannot appreciate the land rebuilt unless one
remembers the land in ruins, the cities laid waste, the land desolate.438
Here, these early Zionists were knowingly involved in a spiritual redemption tied to the
cultivation of what was viewed as a “desolate” land.439 They felt, and appreciated, the
“divine halo” hovering over their agricultural work. Significantly, here, Heschel is
motivated by the bodies in motion of these pioneers: these Zionists are significant
because they create haystacks, because they drain swamps, because they plant trees.
It is only through these activities do these early Zionists sense the holiness of what they
are engaging in.
While I do think Heschel’s preoccupation with these strong and courageous early
Zionist settlers likely does reflect some admiration for the Zionist, Israeli Jew as the
“New Jew,” it is important not to take this too far. Heschel here valorizes the “Pioneer”
generation and stays largely silent on the “Sabra” generation which follows them. The
“Sabra” generation (so-called for their “prickly” outward nature -- “Sabra” means prickly-
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pear cactus) and was considered by Israeli media and cultural consciousness to be the
epitome of masculine strength. Because this was the first generation of Zionists to be
born and raised in early-pre-State Israeli schools and communities, this connotation with
Sabras being “strong” and “masculine” fits in neatly with the prevailing myth that life in
the Diaspora makes Jews weak and effeminate. Oz Almog opens his study on the
memory of the Sabra generation, The Sabra, with a discussion of the character of Yaron
Zehavi in a children’s book series entitled HaSambra (shorthand for “The Absolutely
Absolute Secret Group”). Yaron Zehavi and his friends play and operate in Tel Aviv in
an underground Zionist and pro-Statehood group fighting against the British. Discussing
the character of Yaron Zehavi, Almog writes,
When blond, handsome, fearless Yaron Zehavi, commander of the Hasamba
gang, defied the evil British policeman Jack Smith, who threatened to throw him
and his valiant comrades in jail, how different he seemed from the cowed and
pious Diaspora yeshiva boy in Europe! Here was the new Jew, born and bred on
his own land, free of the inhibitions and superstitions of earlier ages; even his
physique was superior to that of his cousins in the old country. Zehavi, the hero
of the most popular series of children’s books produced by the new State of
Israel, was the classic Sabra, a native-born Israeli modeled on the ideal that the
book’s author, Yigal Mosinzon, himself exemplified.440
Significantly, it is not only that the Sabra is strong. It is not only significant that Yaron
Zehavi is able to beat up the “goyish” and British policeman. What is also significant is
that Yaron Zehavi is different from the cowed and pious Diaspora Jew!
The association with Israeli Jews and early Zionist pioneers was complex for
many American Zionist Jews. Most American Zionists did not wish to move to Israel, but
rather wanted to stay remain in (the diasporic country of) America. Caring about a
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political ethos which feminized the diaspora and masculinized the land of Israel created
a bind for American Zionists: “If Palestine symbolized strength and manliness, and the
diaspora symbolized weak passivity, where could American Zionists fit in the story?” 441
What American Zionists did was to reframe the way Zionism is linked to masculinity:
“Instead, [American Zionists] allegorized manly strength and bravery to be political and
philanthropic and reshaped the geography of galut (exile, or diaspora) so America was
not a place of exile.”442 Because American Jews philanthropically and politically support
the State of Israel, some form of the masculinity associated with Zionism is preserved.
Some embarrassment, however, remains. This feeling of embarrassment tracks
onto a broader concern of postwar American Jewish men not being “manly” or
“masculine” enough. Rachel Kranson writes,
Some American Jews continued to fear that Jewish men had not sufficiently
demonstrated their capacity for strength and heroism. This concern proved
especially evident in discussions over Jewish upward mobility, as the proliferation
of professional, breadwinning Jewish men—who seemed to live up to the 1950s
cultural specter of the “man in the grey flannel suit”—seemed to reinforce
stereotypes of Jewish men as greedy, puny, and cowardly.443
But it was not only a concern of American Jewish men that they were emasculated:
instead, many American Jewish men felt that as they moved out of historically-Jewish
urban enclaves into the suburban sprawl and became more upwardly-mobile and uppermiddle-class that they were somehow leaving a part of a more ‘authentic’ form of
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Judaism behind.444 Kranson opens this chapter on postwar American Jewish
masculinity with the following joke, frequently told in the 1950s. Several Jewish mothers
are talking about their sons’ careers. One says her son is a doctor and makes plenty of
money. Another says her son is a lawyer and makes even more money. A third sadly
says that her son is having trouble with money -- for he has become a rabbi. “Well,” the
two other women say, aghast, “What kind of job is that for a nice Jewish man!”445 Here,
the ability to remain in the upper middle class is presented as more important to one’s
Jewish identity than the rabbinate. Kranson continues that the rabbis who did work at
synagogues in the new Jewish suburban communities often felt uneasily disempowered
in their communities: that fundraising and money were more important than their
rabbinic credentials. “According to Rabbi Simon Greenberg, vice-chancellor of the
Conservative movement’s Jewish Theological Seminary, postwar rabbis often felt
guilty,” Kranson writes, “when they accepted posts in flush suburbs that offered them a
high salary and middle-class standard of living”446 and often felt uneasy that these
communities “prioritized wealth over more spiritual matters.” 447
While Heschel does write, as Kaplan notes, that Heschel develops a sort-of
remedy for this diasporic embarrassment -- the cultivation of “an inner spiritual and
cultural aliyah on the soil of America”448 – it is impossible to entirely rid oneself of this
embarrassment. At first glance, this remedy for the embarrassment seems to truly
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embrace the diaspora by linking the concept of aliyah (the term for Jews migrating to
the State of Israel) with cultural rebirth on the ‘soil of America’. However, this remedy for
diaspora life is also presented as a way to support the state of Israel. Even while
experiencing a rebirth of American Jewishness, Israel is still central.
In Israel: An Echo of Eternity, Heschel discusses the importance of placing Israel
in this central or important place in American Jewish thought. He writes,
What part did the State of Israel play in the day-to-day life of the Jews outside the
land until the recent events? It was a footnote to one’s existence enjoyed as a
fringe benefit, a nice addendum, a side dish, a source of self-congratulation and
pride. Israel was a place to visit, a place of pleasure and tourism, not a
challenge, not a voice demanding meditation, not an urging for spiritual renewal,
for moral re-examination. We have been occupied with many vitally important
issues. We disregarded the challenge of Israel. We have failed to clarify its
meaning, its value to our existence. We have failed to convey its significance to
our Christian friends.449
To treat Israel as a “side dish” -- or worse, not to care about it at all -- is shameful. “A
nice addendum,” Heschel writes, and I can feel the sad kind of snideness floating off of
these words: for doesn’t Heschel think that Israel should be more, much more, than an
addendum?
So far, I have shown that the joy Heschel felt at the State of Israel was because
of the fear that Israel would not survive the Six-Day War (following Tompkins’s theory of
joy), and how this joy seems constantly tempered by a remembrance of the Holocaust.
However, the joy of Zionism that Heschel presents here is not only because of the relief
of Israel’s victory, but rather also because of the feeling that the State of Israel won the
Six Day War because of the Holocaust. Because Jews in the Diaspora were horrified
and frightened of the possibility of another Holocaust, they mobilized and supported
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Israel in the hour of its need. Without that ambient fear of another Holocaust, Heschel
suggests, it is possible Israel would not have been victorious,
We, the generation that witnessed the holocaust, should stand by calmly while
rulers proclaim their intention to bring about a new holocaust? A new life in Israel
bestowed a sense of joy upon Jews everywhere, by creating a society based on
liberty, equality and justice, but the great moral accomplishments, by their
scientific, technical, and economic contributions. In the land of Israel those
rescued from the holocaust of Europe and the refugees from persecution in Arab
lands have found a home and are able to renew their lives.450
Here, Heschel is aghast at the idea that the generation who “witnessed the Holocaust”
would not rise up and support Israel in the time of country’s need. Directly after decrying
the horrors of forgetting the courageous builders of early Zionism, Heschel writes, “We
forgot the pain, the suffering, the hurt, the anguish, the anxiety which preceded the rise
of the state.”451 Continuing, Heschel writes that “we forgot the holiness of the deed” of
the State of Israel. Heschel is embarrassed not only because he is not as strong as a
Sabra Jew or as “masculine” as an IDF soldier in the Six-Day War, but rather because
he (along with the rest of American Jewry) allowed himself to become numb to the
holiness of the State and the perceived necessity to support the state philanthropically,
politically, and financially.
The potentiality of failure, the potentiality of the American and Diasporic Jewish
community to not help Israel in its time of need is what Heschel here finds so
embarrassing and shameful. Silvan Tompkins writes that as 1950s and 1960s American
culture became (gradually) more sexually permissive and more accepting of aggression,
“shame is now primarily shame about failure rather than about sexual or aggressive
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offence.”452 The potentiality of another disaster occurring to the Jewish people after the
Holocaust was not only anxiety producing, but it was shameful. Shameful because it
meant that the Jewish community didn’t do enough to help stop it, shameful because
the Jewish community didn’t regard itself as important enough to step in and try to save.
“What makes shame remarkable,” Elspeth Probyn writes, “is that it reveals with
precision our values, hopes, and aspirations, beyond the generalities of good manners
and cultural norms.”453

Affect Aliens: Those Oriented the Wrong Way Towards Israel
What, then, of those who do not appreciate the Zionist project, or the significance
of Jerusalem being absorbed into the State of Israel after the Six-Day War? Heschel
repeatedly suggests that these people are somehow feeling erroneously or acting in
bad faith. There seems to be no room for appropriate feelings of concern about Zionism,
or appropriate opposition to the Jewish State in Israel: An Echo of Eternity. Of course, it
is important to remember that this was a book written on behalf of a political entity and
was written very soon after the Six-Day War. Susannah Heschel, Abraham Joshua
Heschel’s daughter, has also suggested that her father became much more concerned
about some of Israel’s actions in the years between Israel: An Echo of Eternity and his
death.454 However, in Israel: An Echo of Eternity Heschel is clear: those who oppose
Israel or do not acknowledge the emotional importance of Israel are a kind of “affect
alien.”
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Sara Ahmed coined the term “affect alien” in her book on the cultural imperative
to find and manage a particular version of “happiness,” The Promise of Happiness. An
affect alien is someone who feels an inappropriate affect at a particular time: for
example, a bride who feels unhappy on her wedding day.455 The bride is therefore
pressured to “save the day by feeling right,” to change her orientation towards the day,
to put on a brave face.456 Ahmed herself recounts several times when she felt she
herself was an affect alien: “We can also feel alienated by forms of happiness that we
think are inappropriate. How many times have I sunk desperately into my chair when
that laughter has been expressed at points I find far from amusing!”457 The feeling of notlaughing when everyone else is laughing alienates oneself from one’s own moral or
ethical concerns with the joke, makes one feel alone and pressured to laugh, to “not
take things so seriously.”
Communities who share in similar affective landscapes are bound together by
these affects. “When happy objects are passed around,” Ahmed writes, “it is not
necessarily the feeling that passes. To share objects, or have a share in objects, might
mean simply that you share an orientation toward those objects as being good.”458
Heschel concurs with this concept; he is explicit that people caring about the State of
Israel during the Six-Day War were part of a larger and significant community. He
writes: “Community means community of concern, sharing joy as well as anxiety. At that
moment of crisis, it was good to witness such a community of concern among Jews, as
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well as among many non-Jews, for the situation of the Jews of Israel.” 459 Here, a
community is one which shares an emotional orientation toward the State of Israel and
the plight of the Jews inside of it. Those in the community, therefore, are those who
believe that Israel as a Jewish State, a home for many Israeli Jews, is a “good” object
which to “pass around.” People who do not share in these emotions are affect aliens,
they are excised from the community because they are not feeling appropriate feelings.
Interestingly, when the wrong people care about the land of Israel, it is also seen
by Heschel as having inappropriate affects. Discussing the Arab opposition to the State
of Israel, Heschel neatly erases any significant association of feeling Palestinians may
have to the land of Israel.460 For Heschel, “The thing that separates us from the Arabs is
the claim of two percent of the area of the Middle East, while the values and interests
that unite us comprise 90 percent of our personal and social being.”461 While this quote
does show a site of connection between Arabs (including Palestinians), and Jews
(including Israelis), the Arab-Israeli conflict is minimized to a mere quibble about two
percent of land. However, the emphasis on the “two percent” of land seems to diminish
the importance of Palestinian connection to the land of Israel/Palestine. There are lots
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of other Arab lands in the Middle East, Heschel seems to suggest with this
statement. Why do the Arab communities care so much about such a small strip of
land? Heschel’s positioning of the land of Israel as merely “two percent” of Middle
Eastern land is particularly strange when he understands how significant this particular
piece of land is for Jews and Muslims alike! It may be a small area, yes, but that does
not mean it is unimportant or insignificant!
There seems to be something therefore “inappropriate” about Arab fidelity to the
land of Israel/Palestine. Throughout Israel: An Echo of Eternity, Heschel does not
mention Palestinians. The terms “Palestine” and “Palestinians” were not yet in the
Western/American lexicon. This absence of the term “Palestinian” looms large in this
portion of Israel: An Echo of Eternity. The Palestinian is silent in this work; the
Palestinian is unnamed, so of course the Palestinian cannot be presented as someone
who cares deeply about the Levant.
In this way, the “love” of Palestinians towards their homeland is somehow less
significant than the Jewish cleaving to the land. This sentiment follows with Heschel’s
writing about Jerusalem: “Zion is not a symbol, but a home, and the land is not an
allegory but a possession, a commitment to destiny.”462 “Jerusalem,” Heschel continues,
“has been called the mother of Israel, and she is also used as a synonym for Israel.” 463
Jerusalem, therefore, is a home for the people Israel, a possession of the people Israel,
destiny of the people Israel, a mother of the people Israel, and lastly a synonym for the
people Israel. All of these things are intensely personal things: mothers, homes,

462
463

Ibid., 29.
Ibid., 15.

172

destinies, etc. In addition to being very personal, these descriptors also are examples of
things one might feel jealousy or discomfort at others showing too much affection
toward. Jerusalem is Israel’s mother, why can’t Arabs understand that and focus on the
rest of the Middle East which they control?
Significantly, at the time Israel: An Echo of Eternity was written, Palestinians
were often not considered a coherent people with a need for national self-determination.
Part of this overlooking of Palestinian national identity has to do with the way
Palestinian trauma and history was overlooked. Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi
notes that while Zionist and Israeli history is often linked as being “universally important”
to the world (in the way that European history is taught in ‘history’ classes, whereas the
topics of African or Asian history are often relegated to ‘World’ History or “African/Asian
History” respectively). Khalidi writes:
This is an important question because Middle Eastern issues and, indeed, other
ones from outside the privileged Euro-American sphere tend to be shunted off
into their own particular Oriental(ist) or African(ist) or Latino ghetto. Such issues
are supposedly highly complicated (code for sensitive and not to be talked about)
because it is falsely claimed that they go back to time immemorial, because they
involve hard-to-learn languages, and because they are said to be the province
only of specialists dealing with the arcane minutiae of those specific regions,
cultures, and histories. Moreover, they are never seen to have universal lessons
or relevance for central questions of world history, unlike a plethora of issues
growing out of Euro-American history. This is natural because Euro-American
history Euro-American history, writ large, is most often taken—mistaken really—
for universal and world history.464
While Khalidi is here discussing the trends of the contemporary sense (the above article
was written in 2014), the tendency to ignore or “pass over” Palestinian national identity
as distinct was even stronger in the time immediately following the 1967 War.
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While Khalidi rejects the hypothesis that Palestinian national identity emerged
solely or only as a reaction to Zionism and the founding of the State of Israel,
Palestinian national identity rapidly changed from 1948 onward. Palestinian identity is
complex, and a sense of Palestinian-ness was often mixed with other means of
identification: “identity for the Palestinians has and has always been intermingled with a
sense of identity on so many other levels, whether Islamic or Christian, Ottoman or
Arab, local or universal, or family and tribal.”465 Additionally, between the time of 1948
and 1964 constituted a “lost period” where the formation of Palestinian national
formation was perceived to ‘lag.’466 While Khalidi attributes this perceived “fallow” period
as a response to the trauma of the Nakba/the creation of the State of Israel, not a true
lack of emergent national consciousness, it is nevertheless unsurprising that Heschel
writing in 1967 would not have considered the Palestinians a discrete and coherent
people on their own journey of self-determination and nationalism.
Heschel does, it must be said, mention (and immediately reject) the possibility of
bi-national state in the Land of Israel. Today, the wording “bi-national state” is
considered very far-left and is often associated with Edward Said’s support of a binational state “One-State Solution” (instead of the more politically mainstream “TwoState Solution”) in The Question of Palestine, written in 1979. “Efforts to bring about a
reconciliation between Jews and Arabs,” Heschel writes, “to bring about good will and
readiness to cooperate by asking Arab consent to a bi-national state in Palestine, have
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found no response on the part of Arab leaders. On the contrary, Jewish settlements
were menaced with terror.”467
Heschel continually places the blame of the Palestinian refugee problem at the
feet of Arab leaders: “The Arab refugee was born out of this design. He is the victim of a
barren policy conceived by his own leaders.”468 The continuation of hardship faced by
Palestinian refugees is also because of Arab leaders: “Every proposal for his absorption
[the Arab refugee] and rehabilitation--and there have been many--has been killed so as
to guarantee that the refugee problems should live on, endlessly, as a tool of
propaganda and hatred.”469 The Palestinian refugee is here not only an affect alien, but
a sign of all the bad emotions Heschel projects onto the Arab leaders.
Heschel, concerned as always with covenantal and reciprocal relationships, does
maintain that Israeli Jews and the Jewish community at large has a moral obligation to
help the Palestinian refugee, but is careful to maintain that Jews already have a
disposition towards this. He writes,
The fact that the ultimate guilt for the Arab refugees lies with their leaders does
not absolve us of the responsibility for their plights. It is clear that the Jewish
people in Israel as well as the Jews everywhere are most eager to contribute
generously toward a just and charitable solution to this human tragedy.470
“It is clear,” Heschel writes, that Jews and Israelis want to end the suffering of the
Palestinian refugee. But from what evidence? Heschel here gives none. One could
suggest that Heschel’s previous nod to the many resettlement plans which were “killed”
by Arab leaders is his evidence for the Jewish support for a “just and charitable solution”
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to this issue, but I am not so sure. Instead, I suggest that Heschel believes that Jews
are so committed because they have (or, in Heschel’s mind, they ought to have) an
emotional connection to the concepts of “peace” and “justice.” These are “happy
objects,” so to speak, for Jews in Heschel’s mind.
Viewing peace in the Middle East as a “happy object” for Jews and Jewish
Israelis can be seen in Heschel’s chapter “Peace.” “The State of Israel,” Heschel
maintains, “from the very beginning sought peace and desired peace.”471 Significantly,
Heschel does not link this assertion that the modern State of Israel was a pursuer of
peace with historical details of Zionism or anything in Israel’s recent history. Instead,
Heschel turns towards the Bible as his justification. Heschel uses a Biblical verse to
prove his point: “I am for peace--but when they speak they are for war (Psalm 120:7).”472
Heschel’s usage of this verse is an indication of Heschel’s continued belief that “sacred
history has not come to an end”473 and that the Six-Day War shows the continuation of
the covenant from Biblical times. This verse also shows that, for Heschel, there is
something ontological about the Jewish orientation towards peace: “Bloodshed has
always been an abomination for our people.”474
In the introduction of this chapter, I mentioned that there seems something
terribly naive in the way Heschel discusses recent politics. While I do continue to think
that there is something somewhat naive in thinking that “your side” is always and
definitively on the “right” side of a conflict, it is not only naivete which animates
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Heschel’s political thoughts in Israel: An Echo of Eternity, Rather, at his core Heschel is
an emotional Zionist. It is the emotions he feels that is important to his Zionism: the love
of the State of Israel, the feeling of relief when the state was victorious in the Six-Day
War, and even the embarrassment, anxiety, and shame he feels as a diasporic Jew are
what animates Heschel’s Zionism. These emotions he feels also serve to bind him (or
perhaps re-bind him) to the Jewish community and the covenantal relationship between
God and the people Israel.
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Chapter Four: The Radical, Traumatized Prophet
For the American Jewish community today, Heschel is seen as an iconic figure.
His memory has to do (somewhat) with his prolific writings and the memory of him as a
teacher and rabbi, but for many his memory is much more sedimented around his
political activism and the political stances he took throughout his life. Heschel was
active in the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, the Vietnam antiwar effort, and was a
pioneer in the burgeoning field of interfaith relations. This chapter examines Heschel’s
memory in the American Jewish community today; Heschel’s articulation of prophecy as
emotional, reparative, and traumatic; and will link Heschel’s discussion of prophecy to
events and political work in his own life. Ultimately, this chapter will assert that the
American Jewish community’s means of remembering Heschel often overlooks
Heschel’s deep commitment to transformational and affective political activism. The
prophets as described by Heschel are so profoundly affected by their encounter with the
Divine that they are traumatized. They feel alienated, alone, yet compelled to make the
world a better, more sacred, and more holy place.
A picture of Heschel walking in a group with Martin Luther King, Jr. at the Selma
to Montgomery March is frequently displayed prominently in discussions of Heschel’s
public life and writings. This is particularly true of digital non-academic discussions of
Heschel. For example, the Wikipedia article on Abraham Joshua Heschel includes this
photograph,475 as does the article on Heschel from MyJewishLearning.com.476 The
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Jewish Virtual Library article on Heschel does not include any photo, but the first line of
the article reads: “Abraham Joshua Heschel was a Jewish American rabbi, scholar and
philosopher who was very active in the U.S. Civil Rights Movement.”477 A google image
search of the phrase “Abraham Joshua Heschel” (done on “incognito” mode so my
personal browsing history would not affect the algorithm) yields immediate results of
Heschel standing next to King. Of the top ten images, four of Heschel standing in close
proximity to Martin Luther King, Jr.
Discussing the preponderance of images of Heschel during the Civil Rights Era,
Jewish theologian, philosopher, and critic of Heschel’s thought, David Novak writes:
“One will inevitably see Heschel alongside Martin Luther King Jr. in the march from
Selma, Alabama, or one will frequently see Heschel marching in front of the White
House protesting the war in Vietnam.”478 Heschel is inevitable! The sight of Heschel in
these spaces is so routinized and standard that many Jews were extremely startled and
shocked at Heschel’s exclusion from Ava DuVerney’s 2014 historical drama Selma.
“Where was Heschel?,” Jewish social justice leader Al Vorspen writes of Selma’s
exclusion of Heschel on the Reform movement’s Religion Action Center’s blog.479
Writing for the Huffington Post, Peter Dreler notes “critics could also fault the film for a
glaring sin of omission: the absence of identifiable Jews and Jewish clergy - particularly
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Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel - from the film.”480 Incidentally, the banner image for
this online newspaper article is, of course, that iconic picture that was decidedly not
replicated in the movie. Susannah Heschel was reported as saying she was “shocked
and upset” by her father’s nonappearance in the movie.481 Heschel’s absence was
fiercely noticed and protested at by many. Heschel was supposed to be there, was the
feeling sustained by many American Jews after seeing the movie.
Many thinkers of Heschel have wondered if and how Heschel’s philosophy and
theology anticipated, influenced, or was the impetus for his political work. David Novak
outlines some of the questions related to Heschel and his political activism succinctly in
his article “The Theopolitics of Abraham Joshua Heschel.”482 Novak opens his article
with a series of rhetorical questions which are often posited about Heschel:
Nevertheless, what does this theoretical work have to do with his work as a
political activist? Is there a true correlation between his theology and his politics?
What does his concern for holiness (qedushah), which constitutes the
relationship between God and humans, have to do with his concern for public
morality, which ought to constitute inter-human relationships in the political
realm? Was Heschel's political activism, morally charged as it was, merely a
tangent in relation to his theoretical work? Or, was it, as some of Heschel's
detractors saw it, a way for him to catapult himself into the public eye and out of
his relative obscurity up to that point in history?483
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Novak rejects the characterizations of Heschel as not being truly invested in political
work, and further demonstrates how Heschel’s later political activism was a natural
outgrowth of his larger philosophical and theological work. Novak writes, “I submit that
Heschel was laying the groundwork for his political activism in his theological reflections
of divine pathos and humans as Imago Dei.”484 Novak reads Heschel’s theology as
leading up to more “political” texts, such as Heschel’s later writings on race and racism,
the Vietnam War, and commitment to interfaith relations. Heschel’s earlier works,
according to Novak, are largely theological and not political, and there is that there is
“little in Heschel's earlier work, written or oral, to intimate that, let alone how, he would
move into this kind of public role in the last years of his life.”485 For Novak, Heschel’s
deep theological roots is a foundation upon which later political thought could grow. I
view Heschel’s earlier work, specifically sections of The Prophets (that Heschel wrote
as his doctoral dissertation) and selections of The Sabbath as already being intensely
political. I do not see Heschel’s theology as a soil in which political thought can, like a
seed, grow. Rather, they are already hopelessly intermingled and intertwined.
Heschel’s doctoral dissertation at the University of Berlin, Die Prophetie, was
published in 1936.486 The Sabbath’s description of Rome as a hopelessly spatially
oriented society (as opposed to Jerusalem, which was more time-oriented) can be
easily seen as a judgement towards an overly capitalistic and image-obsessed
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American society.487 Additionally, a critically important message in The Prophets – the
subjectivity of the prophet affects their prophetic message -- is foreshadowed and
echoed in Heschel’s other early writings regarding the effect culture and past
experiences have on individual subjectivity.
Novak also wonders if liberal Jews, non-Jews, or people less invested in
Heschel’s larger theological project can truly understand and empathize with Heschel’s
political work. “Surely,” Novak writes, “Heschel's ideas about the obscenity of racism
resonated with his liberal audience. But did they really understand where Heschel was
coming from?”488 Here again, Novak views Heschel’s theology and religious
commitments as a necessary scaffolding or grid through which Heschel’s political
activism becomes legible and understandable. Novak’s understanding of Heschel
misses how Heschel articulates theology and the theological underpinnings of his
political action. Yes, it is theocentric, theological, and steeped in rabbinic Jewish
sources and Hasidic-infused piety. However, it is more precisely about affects and
emotions, specifically, the affects of God which cause the prophet to be affected and
then generate the prophet’s own affects and emotions. These affects, while not
necessarily universal to all humans, are understandable and readable to many
humans.489 The affects that Heschel teases out in The Prophets are those of profound
alienation, dissatisfaction at the immoral actions of the larger community, and shame.
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Understanding these emotions – and, particularly, the trauma which the prophet
experiences – is key to understanding Heschel’s understanding of social justice. Having
a deep appreciation for theology and the importance of the Divine would aid a reader of
The Prophets, but an understanding of these emotional states is essential.
This dissatisfaction with the broader community causes the prophet to become
something of a killjoy: there is something radical, different, and alienated about
Heschel’s prophets. Heschel himself was often marginalized and in the margins of
various Jewish communities, and maligned for his stance and involvement in the civil
rights movement. The way in which the Jewish community often memorializes
Heschel’s involvement in these movements misses the radicalism, alienation, and
sense of alterity that was so important to Heschel’s articulation of the prophets and his
own statements of social justice.

Overview and reception history of The Prophets
The Prophets, Heschel’s work on prophetic consciousness and an analysis of
prophets in the Hebrew Bible, was published in 1962. While The Prophets was
published relatively late in his publishing career; the last section of the work, however, is
based on his doctoral dissertation on prophetic consciousness, Die Prophetie.490 The
Prophets is a trifurcated work: the first section analyses several prophets through
Heschel’s methodology, the second section “defined biblical notions of history, justice,
chastisement, the theology of pathos, and the religion of sympathy.”491 The last section
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discusses the importance of Heschel’s own methodology coupled with the dangers of
modern readings which attempt to “shield the mystery of divine revelation from being
minimized by psychological or anthropological explanations of ecstasy, poetic
inspiration, or psychosis.”492 The Prophets, therefore, covers quite a lot of ground.
Because this chapter (and this dissertation writ large) is not one of Heschel’s biblical
exegesis or his characterizations of Biblical events or figures, I find the sections which
discuss Heschel’s overall methodology and broader thoughts about pathos to be
generally more relevant to my argument. These parts of The Prophets cover Heschel’s
overall thinking of the prophets, the importance of prophetic revelation in Heschel’s
larger theological project, and how these elements interact with Heschel’s later political
activity.
Heschel’s description of the prophet as well as his articulation of the correct
hermeneutic to use while reading prophetic texts continuously center the importance of
the individual subjectivity of the prophet. The individual prophet is transformed by a
Divine encounter; an encounter with something so unlike themselves that they are
changed forever. Both the Divine-human encounter and the resulting encounters which
society produces a strong sense of alienation, communion with alterity, and trauma.
Throughout this larger discussion of the subjectivity of the prophet, Heschel spends
quite a bit of time discussing the appropriate way to read prophetic texts themselves.
The kind of hermeneutic that Heschel discusses as appropriate in his book has
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interesting similarities to the form of “reparative reading” outlined by Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick.
The Prophets was received to mixed reviews. Many reviewers noted the
substantial differences between this work and the doctoral dissertation on which a large
section of the book is based, and many also noticed that the aforementioned sections of
the book read and felt very different to one another. Because of this trifurcated nature of
The Prophets, a consistent theme in the reviews is one of confusion about the intended
audience and genre of the work. Furthermore, reviewers correctly noticed that instead
of being a book primarily about explaining or exegeting passages from the Hebrew
Bible, it is instead primarily a book about Heschel’s methodology for understanding the
prophets. The methodology and philosophy undergirding the methodology are primary
for Heschel, the accounts of the prophets in the Hebrew Bible become gateways for
Heschel’s larger philosophy and theology. In this way, the figure of the prophet
becomes similar to an image for Heschel. Sedimented yet vibrant, the figures of the
prophets in the Hebrew Bible are distinct from one another yet similar, they occupy
similar affective spaces and transmit similar affective moods.493
Heschel’s methodology caused several reviewers of the work confusion. Many
reviewers commented that The Prophets is decidedly not a book primarily about source-
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criticism or philology,494 and at times reads more like a sermon than an academic text.495
Other reviewers were distressed by Heschel’s overall commitment to his theology,
worrying that he had (perhaps intentionally) overlooked versions of biblical prophecy
that did not fit into his theological worldview. One reviewer, Marten H. Woudstra flatly
states that Heschel does not provide “a consistent picture of what biblical prophecy is
like. The strong sense on mutuality, relationship, concern, involvement, has, it is to be
feared, obliterated other needful distinctions.”496
Some reviewers enjoyed The Prophet’s more casual relationship to traditional
source-criticism and incorporating theology into an academic text. E.H. Robertson
described the work as “fresh and readable”497 and continues that the work feels
unintended for academics and theologians but rather for the “growing body of Christians
and Jews who want to understand better their common heritage in the fragments that
remain of these disturbing men.”498 Another positive review was found in the Union
Seminary Quarterly, praising the work’s “perceptive” analysis and “great lucidity, in an
often striking epigrammatic style.”499 One review was unequivocally positive, even for
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more academic readers: A review in the Anglican Theological Review called The
Prophets “a great work” and “a must for all students of the prophets.”500
While one reviewer, Samuel Terrien, found Heschel’s apparent lack of fear of
anthropomorphizing God refreshing,501 distaste for Heschel’s anthropopathism was
common in reviews and critiques of The Prophets. Marten Woudstra went so far as to
state that Heschel could not possibly truly believe that God has emotions, and wonders
whether or not Heschel thinks that pathos is either a “functional” or “substantial
reality.”502 Modern Jewish philosopher Eliezer Berkovits found the anthropopathism in
The Prophets to be completely unfounded from Jewish sources or a Jewish
understanding of theology. It is in Christianity, not Judaism, Berkovits argues, that “God
does have pathos in exactly the same sense as Dr. Heschel understands the term.” 503 In
a later publication Berkovits walked this back slightly, stating that he had not intended to
label Heschel as ‘Christian’, but rather that Heschel was doing something outside of the
frame of reference of Judaism: “As if I had criticized Heschel for being ‘too’ Christian.
The truth is that I was showing that what makes sense within the frame of reference of
Christianity is utterly meaningless in the context of Judaism.”504
Steven Katz, analyzing Berkovits’s rejection of The Prophets, correctly notes that
Heschel was obviously aware of the philosophical discussion of anthropopathism, as
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Heschel had written a full-length book on Maimonides, whose critiques of
anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism are well-known.505 However, Katz’s rebuttal of
Berkovits claims that Heschel did not ‘truly’ intend to anthropopathize God at all. Katz
writes, “In no sense is Heschel trying to write a metaphysical treatise about God’s being;
rather he is making one of the most sustained contemporary attempts to explain what
the relation of God and man entails, and why God needs man as much as man needs
God.”506 While I am much less certain than Katz that Heschel did not intend to make
claims about God’s being in The Prophets, Katz is correct that the main thrust of the
argumentation of The Prophets is about prophets and God in relationship with one
another. Neither party exists without the other in The Prophets.
Shai Held and Robert Erlewine both pick up the importance of the God-prophet
relationship, the necessity of understanding both the prophet and God as existing in an
interlocking grid with one another. The prophet was enabled to hear God’s voice
immediately, with nothing (besides the prophet’s own subjectivity) neither filtering nor
transmitting this message on behalf of God.507 Robert Erlewine notes that Heschel’s
major contributions to Jewish philosophy is the “radicality of prophetic revelation by
stressing its immediacy. The prophet is directly confronted by the divine and as such
tradition does not serve as an intermediary.”508 Held contrasts this understanding of the
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immediate sensed experience the prophets in the Hebrew Bible felt with a more
modulated sense of God’s pathos a reader might feel today.
For Held, it is important to distinguish the prophets in the Hebrew Bible with
people who might be called “a modern-day” prophet. This discussion is particularly
relevant for this dissertation, as many people call Heschel himself a prophet – I will go
further into this discussion later in this chapter. Held writes: “Heschel suggests
important points of continuity between the prophet’s full-blooded experience of
revelation, on the one hand, and our often faint sense of divine beckoning, on the
other.”509 This distinction between the prophecy of old and the potential-prophecy of
modernity may not initially seem to be a discussion of Heschel’s fidelity to Jewish
tradition. However, there is an important Jewish understanding that the period of
prophecy ended after Malachi, Zechariah, and Haggai and that any further individuals
who purport to be prophets are false.510 Heschel, however, flatly rebukes this claim in
Prophetic Inspiration After the Prophets, arguing that prophetic inspiration continued
throughout Jewish history, and that Maimonides considered himself to be a prophet.511
Heschel writes: “A soul as refined and noble as Maimonides’ would not say, ‘Behold, I
am now ready fit and ready for the highest perfection. A man does not declare himself a
prophet. Nevertheless, this secret, which was so well-hidden in the folds of his
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personality, does peep forth in hints scattered throughout his writings.” 512 The reason
Maimonides never claimed he was a prophet was not because he did not consider
himself one, according to Heschel, but was due to his own humility. The fact that
Heschel here so flatly departs from tradition also points to his radicalism and antitraditionalism in his political thought.
Edward K. Kaplan spends quite a bit of time discussing The Prophets and its
relationship to Heschel’s later activism. After demonstrating the ways in which The
Prophets was seen by some Protestant thinkers as a “re-animation of the Hebrew
spirit,”513 Kaplan writes: “The book [The Prophets] soon provided Heschel with
inspiration – and quotations – as a defender of civil rights and, especially, as an
opponent to America’s intervention in Vietnam.”514 Kaplan sees Heschel as a prophet for
American Jews. He is not the only one in that regard, an article on the (non-academic,
Jewish communal education) website about Heschel’s political activism is entitled
“Abraham Joshua Heschel: A Prophet’s Prophet.”515 Edward K. Kaplan and Samuel
Dresner’s first biography on Heschel is subtitled “Prophetic Witness.”516 While Heschel’s
understanding of the prophets doubtlessly inspired Heschel himself, I remain a bit
uncomfortable declaring that Heschel thought of himself as a prophet.517 However,
whether or not Heschel considered himself a kind of prophet I do not feel equipped to
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answer; but I do feel comfortable stating that he at least found himself prophet-like.
Heschel in this case may be similar to the way he describes Maimonides: thinking of
himself as a prophet, but not wanting to actually state it out loud!

Heschel’s Anthropopathism: God as Affected
Just as Heschel wanted the accounts of Hebrew prophets to be understandable
to lay people and non-scholars, he hoped that people would be transformed by the
gravity and seriousness of the prophetic voice. Prophets felt the pathos of God, the
pathos of God flowed into their bodies and their hearts. No mean feat, the prophets
became utterly transfixed and transformed by this experience: they became traumatized
and alienated from their communities. These stories of prophetic transformation,
trauma, and alienation should be read in a way so that the reader can also undergo a
similar transformation: to become horrified by evil and injustice in the world, and wanting
to take a stand against it.
“God,” Heschel writes, “is raging in the prophet’s words.”518 And these words of
God so rage in the prophet’s words because the prophet feels and senses the pathos of
God. While Heschel is clear that the moment of sensing God’s message is not the only
significant moment in the life of the prophet - but rather that the entire life of the prophet
is significant and purposeful - prophets become prophets by virtue of their ability to
sense messages from God. Teresa Brennan’s concept of discernment is here helpful.
Of discernment, Brennan writes,
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Discernment begins with considered sensing (by smell, or listening, as well as
observation) -- the process of feeling that also operates, or seems to operate, as
the gateway to emotional response. When we do not feel, we open the gates to
all kinds of affective flotsam, being unaware of its passage or its significance. We
cease to discern the transmission of affect.519
Continuing to expound on discernment, Brennan notes how this process of
discernment is one wherein people understand themselves as standing in interrelated
positions with one another. Brennan writes, “Understanding the influences to which we
are subject in terms of passions and emotions, as well as living attention, means lifting
off the burden of the ego's belief that it is self-contained in terms of the affects it
experiences.”520 The process of discernment is ego-shattering, it forces the subject to be
aware of their relationality with others and the world around them.
God, for Heschel, has something akin to feelings.521 In the following paragraphs, I
will attempt to tease out how Heschel envisions these “feelings” or “sensations” of God.
Heschel is not particularly clear on this point, and the way Heschel writes about pathos
often feels jumbled and confused. This sense of confusion is even more pronounced
when one attempts to place pathos on an affect vs. emotions binary. Because of this
issue, I resist both categorizations of pathos and instead use the word “feeling.” In some
senses, God’s pathos is like an affect, in others, like an emotion.
When discussing God’s pathos and God’s emotions, Heschel frequently relates
the divine ability for pathos to God being extremely personal and in a kind of
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relationship with the prophet. Heschel writes: “The God of Israel is never impersonal.”522
This notion of “never impersonal” gives me pause when thinking of pathos as an affect.
While pure potentiality emanating from God would square nicely with some articulations
of God, not so for the way Heschel understands God. Heschel’s understanding of God
is not only “pure possibility” or “pure energy.” God is an entity in which humans had
complex relationships with, and God understood God’s self to be in relation with these
humans. Heschel writes, “the prophets had no theory of “idea” of God.”523 The prophets
did not reach a conclusion that God must exist because of “syllogism, analysis, or
induction.”524 Instead, the undeniable conclusion that God was real, and that God was a
part of their lives was because of the experience of “living together” with God.525
The experience of living together with God includes the ability to sense God’s
pathos. Pathos resists easy categorization; it is too fungible. The pathos of God is
creative: it creates prophets through the relationship between God’s pathos and the
prophet. Additionally, Heschel distinguishes between pathos and passions, writing:
Did the prophets conceive of divine pathos as a passion such as may powerfully
grip a human being? By passion we mean drunkenness of the mind, an agitation
of the soul devoid of reasoned purpose. In contrast, pathos was understood not
as unreasoned emotion, but as an act formed with intention, depending on free
will, the result of decision and determination.526
Pathos, then is: (1) not unreasoned, (2) an act formed with intention, (3) depends on
free will, and (4) the result of a conscious decision. At first, these four points make
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pathos seem incredibly different from affect: affect is so quick to be prelinguistic and is
decidedly not reasoned. Affect, as a prelinguistic force and intensity of movement
ceases to be affect when it is integrated into the self and cognized about and reflected
upon. In differentiating the passions and pathos, Heschel explains what he means by
‘passions’ in a footnote which furthers the separation of pathos and affect: “By passions
I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing,
jealousy, pity; and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by
pleasure or pain. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, l l 05b, 20 ff. ; cf. Eudemian Ethics,
l220b, l2 ff).”527
Because pathos is “an act formed with intention,” it is difficult to think of pathos
as pure generative force, an affect, or a prelinguistic / precognitive “quick” response.
However, there is a significant element where pathos is similar to affect: it is highly
interstitial. Pathos affects prophets, and almost seems somewhat constituted by the
prophet’s receptive body. Pathos flows in two separate directions: pathos exists
because of God’s concern for God’s creation and then, in turn, affect the receptive
people within God’s creation (i.e., the prophets). Heschel writes:
The idea of pathos is both a paradox and a mystery. He Who created All should
be affected by what a tiny particle of His creation does or fails to do? Pathos is
both a disclosure of His concern and a concealment of His power. The human
mind may be inclined to associate the idea of God with absolute majesty, with
unmitigated grandeur, with omnipotence and perfection. God is most commonly
thought of as a First Cause that started the world's mechanism working, and
which continues to function according to its own inherent laws and processes. It
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seems inconceivable that the Supreme Being should be involved in the affairs of
human existence.528
Here again Heschel makes a point against hyper-rationalistic concepts of religion.
Instead, God is intensely involved in the human experience, is affected by it. God’s
pathos is anything but static. Heschel writes that God’s pathos is not “an attribute” but
rather is “an experience.”529
Heschel’s focus on the experiential, sensing, and feeling nature of God stands in
direct opposition to hyper-rationalistic forms of Jewish theology. For Maimonides, God
was the “unmoved mover” who could never “possess” anything as unstable and discrete
as emotions, moods, or affects. While Heschel’s understanding of God is very different
from Maimonides, he did respect and understand Maimonidean philosophy (as was
mentioned above in the discussion re: Eliezer Berkovits’s dismissal of The Prophets as
being not indigenous to Judaism). Heschel wrote a book about Maimonides, simply
entitled Maimonides: A Biography. While it is in part a biography, much of the book
discusses Maimonidean philosophy in general. Heschel understands Maimonides to be
extremely invested in the limits of reason and rationality.
Maimonides was interested in prophecy because, according to Heschel, “from his
[Maimonides’s] youth on, he sensed the limits of intellect.”530 Prophecy is beyond the
intellect, there is something inherently a-rational about the experience. Maimonides
linked prophecy to the imagination. Of Maimonides, Heschel declares that Maimonides
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believed the “prerequisite of prophecy” was “the perfection” of the imagination.”531
Imagination, and the ability to conceive of possibilities of the world in a generative and
constructive way was, for Heschel, a spiritual pursuit. Heschel writes that Maimonides
understood the “imagination as an independent spiritual power.”532 The ability of a
person to have this imaginative-spiritual capacity is linked with a person’s individual
subjectivity and intellectual capability, “as convinced that personal qualities are the
foundation on which to construct the prophetic man.”533 A person’s personality, qualities,
and even their past experiences profoundly affect their ability to receive and transmit the
prophetic and divine message.

The Holistic Nature of the Prophet: Subjectivity and Cultural Backdrop
Similar to how Maimonides (as read and refracted through by Heschel)
understands that a person’s particular background and subjectivity is key to their ability
to become a prophet, Heschel is adamant throughout The Prophets that the individual
subjectivity of the prophet themselves is key to their prophetic message. “The prophet is
a person,” Heschel writes in the introduction of The Prophets, “not a microphone.”534
While the prophet may receive kinds of messages from God, it is extremely important to
Heschel that the prophet does not simply repeat these messages verbatim. Additionally,
as I will show below, the messages that the prophets of the Hebrew Bible receive are
more than simply words and verbal messages; they may be verbal messages, words,
but they are also always the thrilling, overwhelming sense of God’s pathos. God’s
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pathos has an overwhelming effect on the prophet: Heschel writes: “The prophets, as
said above, did not simply absorb the content of inspiration, they also claimed to
understand its meaning, and sought to bring such meaning into coherence with all other
knowledge they possessed.”535
While Heschel is here explicit that the “other knowledge” that the prophet holds
contributes to the overall impression that the prophet receives from God, Heschel here
also suggests the individual subjectivity and orientation in life also causes the prophet to
understand and receive God’s messages differently. This emphasis on subjectivity and
orientation is significant when discussing the affect and pathos of the prophet. While all
humans experience affect and emotion, the way in which a particular emotion will be
synthesized into a person’s particular history, life-story, and made sensible by the
person in question is all highly particularistic and unique. For Heschel, the message of
God is objective and universal – just as objective as the fact that God exists. But the
message of the prophet is distinct: because a person’s awareness of the prophetic
message is colored by their place in the world. Similar to Steven Katz’s groundbreaking
article on the importance culture plays in epistemology and mystical experience,
Heschel here understands how a person’s background affects their interpretation of
affective and religious experiences.536
What this emphasis on the subjectivity of the prophet emphasizes as well is
power. At play in the prophetic experience are power dynamics in society in which the

535

Ibid., 286.

536

Steven T. Katz, “Diversity and the Study of Mysticism,” in The Future in the Study of
Religion, ed. Slavica Jakelic and Lori Pearson (Boston: Brill, 2000), 189–210.
197

prophet resides, as well as the power between the prophet and God. By thinking though
the way power operates as a vector in the prophetic moment, we are able to think more
broadly about the place of power and impotence in Heschel’s thought and later political
activity. Heschel’s understanding of the prophet (and, ultimately, all people) as being
oriented in their particular and constructed communities also can mitigate the critique
that Heschel’s phenomenologist-of-religion approach is hopelessly outdated. Heschel
may understand that all people have the innate ability to perceive affects of God, but the
way those affects are systematized and routinized into emotions depends on an
amalgam of social realities.
After remarking on the individual subjectivity of the prophet, Heschel quickly
extrapolates from the singular prophet to all of humanity, “A person's perception
depends upon his experience, upon his assumptions, categories of thinking, degree of
sensitivity, environment, and cultural atmosphere. A person will notice what he is
conditioned to see. The prophet's perception was conditioned by his experience of
inspiration.”537 A person’s place in society: their class, race, gender, etc., causes them to
have different prophetic experiences.538 In particular, Heschel is invested in the way that
one’s religious background shapes their worldview.
The opening of Heschel’s famous article on the importance of Christian-Jewish
relations, “No Religion is an Island,” begins with some reflections on Heschel’s
particular Jewish (and Holocaust-surviving) background,
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I am a brand plucked from the fire of an altar of Satan on which millions of human
lives were exterminated to evil's greater glory, and on which so much else was
consumed: the divine image of so many human beings, many people's faith in
the God of justice and compassion, and much of the secret and power of
attachment to the Bible bred and cherished in the hearts of men for nearly two
thousand years. I speak as a person who is often afraid and terribly alarmed lest
God has turned away from us in disgust and even deprived us of the power to
understand His word.539
What links Christianity to Judaism is not only their shared historical background or the
fact that many Christians and Jews make the United States their home. Rather, what
links these religions together is the objective, untouchable, reality of God,
The supreme issue is today not the halacha for the Jew or the Church for the
Christian—but the premise underlying both religions, namely, whether there is a
pathos, a divine reality concerned with the destiny of man which mysteriously
impinges upon history; the supreme issue is whether we are alive or dead to the
challenge and the expectation of the living God. The crisis engulfs all of us. The
misery and fear of alienation from God make Jew and Christian cry together.540
Not only the awareness of God causes Christians and Jews to become linked to one
another, but rather the similarities of the alienation people in these groups feel! Their
relationships with God may be different – they may be oriented toward differing social
structures and sutured through with differing beliefs -- but the emotions lining the
relationship between humans and God remains the same.
Heschel’s understanding of the way cultural and social positioning affects one’s
relationship with the world is something seen throughout his work and is not limited to
The Prophets. Heschel’s understanding of subjectivity is critical for understanding The
Prophets: the prophet receives an objective message, and transmits it subjectivity.
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Much of Heschel’s understanding of cultural specificity and individual subjectivity can be
traced through William James’s influence on Heschel. Heschel’s appreciation for the
thought of William James likely stemmed from a seminar on Jewish Thought he took
with Dr. Koigen in Berlin in the 1930s.541
Heschel and James are similar primarily in that the two thinkers understand that
religious experience is based on emotional and affective experiences. Additionally,
Heschel and James both understand that these religious affects and emotions can differ
based on a person’s bodily landscape and broader cultural orientation. In this way,
Heschel understands religious affects as experienced as particularistic: a religious
feeling may have a singular, objective source (for Heschel, this would be God, or the
sense of the Divine) but it is channeled and refracted through one’s individual
subjectivity.
As Tobias Tan writes, “Although James agrees that definitive evidence may not
be forthcoming in the case of religious belief… he contends that it may nevertheless be
permissible and indeed beneficial to hold religious beliefs.” 542 This is, of course, similar
to Heschel, who repeatedly states that reason alone is insufficient for religious belief.543
Additionally, for both Heschel and James these “affective states are a cause, and not
merely a symptom of religious belief.”544 However, James believed that these affective
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“reasonings” as a means for justifying belief are “only decisive where the intellect is
inconclusive.”545 Obviously, this is in contrast to Heschel, who believes that the ability to
affectively feel and sense things is both a precondition for cognition and a resource one
can always use to make choices and decisions. For Heschel, “wonder or radical
amazement, the state of maladjustment to words and notions, is, therefore, a
prerequisite for an authentic awareness for that which is.”546 This “maladjustment to
words and notions,” this sensation of “wonder” is, therefore, necessary in order to
authentically experience and cognize the world.
This sensation of wonder is tied to Heschel’s articulation of the ineffable and the
sublime, which he discusses and outlines at length in Man is Not Alone. The feeling of
the ineffable is impossible to be encapsulated into language. Talking about the ineffable
can therefore seem inherently problematic, “the attempt to speak about that which
cannot be said looks like an attempt to do the impossible, which thus undermines itself.
How is it possible to respond to this objection, if at all?”547 However, the religious
language which accompanies discussions of the ineffable are generally not attempts to
convince others of the ineffable experience, “but to articulate deep spiritual concerns
which are guided by an attempt to find meaning in life, to make sense of things in a way
which is connected to spiritual concerns.”548 And indeed, for Heschel, the ineffable is
used not to convince non-religious or unobservant people to become more religious, but
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is taken as a given: for Heschel all humans experience the ineffable. The charge of the
ineffable, therefore, is to explain this universal phenomenon.
The ineffable is similar to a gasp, an inhalation, when seeing a majestic natural
sight, a shimmer. The ineffable is experiential (one needs to experience it to understand
it), it is both beyond and uncontainable within reason, and it is universal. Anyone has
the ability to sense the ineffable. Heschel opens his philosophy of religion, Man is Not
Alone, by a quick statement of this universality. He writes: “We take it equally for
granted that a person who is not affected by a vision of the earth and sky, who has no
eyes to see the grandeur of nature and to sense the sublime, is not human.”549 Heschel
here intends for this statement to be universal: he specifically says that interactions with
the ‘earth’ and ‘sky’ can affect a response in humans. All humans living on the planet
earth presumably interact with the earth and sky at some point: both stretch out
endlessly on the horizon. One does not need to interact with an extraordinary part of the
world to have an ineffable experience; the Grand Canyon or Mt. Kilimanjaro is not
necessary. However, while using this presumably universal language, Heschel
obviously does center the ability to see as a predicate for humanity. I do not think that
Heschel would say that blind people are not humans, but he seems to problematically
have stumbled into this.
This orientated nature of human existence is also the way Heschel discusses
cultural specificity in making concepts and thoughts intelligible. Like William James,
Heschel believes that religious experience will be contextualized by the broader cultural
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and religious structures one already lives within. For example, a “live” hypothesis,
according to James, is “one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is
proposed.”550 A “dead” religious hypothesis is one which lacks the necessary force
behind it to require such a break from rationality, whereas a “living” hypothesis makes
“deferring a decision until sufficient evidence is amassed” impossible.551 The distinction
between “living” and “dead” hypotheses can be culturally specific, with some religious
hypotheses being made more legible or illegible based on one’s cultural and historical
context.552 For example, someone unfamiliar with the Muslim concept of the Mahdi will
feel uninspired to answer the question: Do you believe in the Mahdi?553 Someone living
in the cultural and religious milieu wherein the Mahdi is intelligible will, on the other
hand, approach the hypothesis as “among the mind's possibilities: it is alive.”554 Not only
does James’s discussion of living and dead hypotheses show that these hypotheses are
culturally specific and but also that the livingness or deadness are, therefore, not
“intrinsic” properties of a hypothesis.555
James’s discussion and delineation of “living” and “dead” hypotheses are helpful
when thinking through Heschel’s definitions of conceptual and situational thinking.
Conceptual thinking deals with concepts, and Heschel describes conceptual thinking as
“an act of reasoning.”556 Conceptual thinking requires an air of “detachment” to the
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subject matter at hand, whereas situational thinking requires one take one’s own place
in the “situation” at hand seriously. Situational thinking is required by Heschel when
discussing arenas critical to the human populace: “One does not discuss the future of
mankind in the atomic age in the same way in which one discusses the weather.”557
Situational and conceptual thinking do not simply have differing stakes or a differing
sense of gravity, but rather the place and awareness of the thinker doing the thinking is
the key distinction between conceptual and situational thinking. “Situational thinking,”
Heschel writes, “is one of concern: the subject realizing that he is involved in a situation
that is in need of understanding.”558 This recognition of the significance of one’s
orientation towards the world – and, more to the point, one’s orientations towards the
thoughts being thought -- is, therefore, key to situational thinking.
Situational thinking is, therefore, full of concern, gravity, affect, and pathos: it is
alive. There is something inert about conceptual thinking: it is dead. What Heschel
layers onto the living/dead hypothesis which James outlines, therefore, is a sense of
morality and affect. Situational thinking, the questions and ideas which matter and reach
out to transform the thinker are alive, generative, helpful. Rationality for rationality’s
sake is dead; for Heschel, pointless. The prophets always thought in situational terms:
they always thought what the message of God meant for their communities, their world,
their culture, and for themselves.
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However, as significant as one’s cultural paradigm is for Heschel (for what could
be more culturally relativistic than believing that the message of God is transformed
through the prism of one’s cultural experiences?), Heschel does distinguish between the
message of God as received by the prophet, and the message of God as interpreted
and disseminated by the prophet. Heschel calls this difference the distinction between
the “objective” and “subjective” aspect of prophetic consciousness,
It is important to distinguish between the objective and the subjective aspect of
the prophetic consciousness of God. By the objective aspect we mean that which
is given to the prophet as a reality transcending his consciousness. By the
subjective aspect we mean the personal attitude or the response of the prophet
to that reality. The objective aspect may be properly designated as the theme of
prophetic theology; the subjective aspect may be designated as the theme of
prophetic religion.559
While there is an objective, and transcendent, reality that God transmits to the prophet,
it is significant that Heschel does not disparage the subjective understanding of
prophecy. Instead, this subjective nature of prophecy as refracted through the particular
humanity of the prophet creates religion: a relationship with God as understood through
the way in which humans understand and enact this relationship.
By focusing on the everyday-ness of the prophet, Heschel can encourage his
readers to think about the ways in which they may become prophetic themselves: just
as the prophets were humans with lives outside of their great deeds, so could his
readers be stirred to social and political action in their own day. Heschel’s focus on the
prophet’s life in their entirety reflects this: “The prophet is not only a prophet,” Heschel
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writes, “He is also a poet, preacher, patriot, statesman, social critic, moralist.”560 Even if
the prophet’s admonishments to their communities remain unheeded, the overall life of
the prophet remains a testament to the wonder of God, “The life of a prophet is not
futile. People may remain deaf to a prophet’s admonitions; they cannot remain callous
to a prophet’s existence.”561 The existence of a prophet, the prophet as they live their
lives, is louder than any one particular message. Through this messaging, Heschel
subtly encourages the reader to consider the ways they may also become “prophetic
and.” The double notion of identity is here embraced by Heschel: his readers may be
teachers, mothers, musicians, poets. But they still may be prophetic, by being
“Prophetic and motherly,” “prophetic and musical,” etc.

The Reparative Reading of the Prophets
The way in which Heschel discusses the appropriate way to read prophetic texts
and contextualize the prophets is similar to the feminist hermeneutic outlined by Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick, reparative reading. By pulling out the similarities between these
two ways of reading, the pragmatic and radical nature of Heschel’s discussion of the
prophets becomes clearer. In this section, I will demonstrate how Heschel’s reading of
the prophets of the Hebrew Bible and his overall theory of prophecy is similar to Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s notion of reparative reading. Instead, by examining the way in
which reparative reading is pragmatic and generative we can better see how Heschel’s
articulation of the prophets hopes to be pragmatic and generative. By reading the
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prophets, Heschel hopes, people will become enabled to enact social change
themselves.
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s article, humorously entitled “Paranoid Reading and
Reparative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay Is About
You” discusses the overwhelming trend Sedgwick finds for “paranoid” academic work,
particularly in queer studies. This “paranoid” work generally seeks to uncover truths
about power structures and hierarchies and the ways that these structures of power hurt
some populations more than others. This kind of work uncovers - and triumphs what it
uncovers. Sedgwick outlines five “pillars” of paranoid reading. First, paranoid reading is
anticipatory, or “dedicated to seeing what others do not see;”562 secondly, it is reflexive
and mimetic, especially by way of calling out similar critical work as not being critical or
rigorous enough;563 thirdly, it is tautological strong theory; fourthly it is associated with
negative affects; and finally, assumes that the work of uncovering itself has political
agency.564
Sedgwick, discussing a time when speculation about whether or not the U.S.
government had some involvement in the origin and continuation of the AIDS crises was
common in leftist academic circles, remembers a conversation she had with a friend
about the matter. Sedgwick’s friend resignedly tells her, “Supposing we were ever so
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sure of all those things—what would we know then that we don’t already know?”565 How
would knowing the origin of the AIDS epidemic help those suffering in the here and
now? The focus on this sort of paranoid research and writing is on the institutions of
power, on whatever it is being uncovered; the focus is on the big bad State apparatus,
and not those suffering and dying from AIDS.
The other problem Sedgwick has with paranoid reading is how it deals with the
concept of “truth.” While simultaneously being suspicious of over-arching truth-claims
this form of scholarship can nevertheless be dogmatic in its outlook. She writes, “it is
only paranoid knowledge that has so thorough a practice of disavowing its affective
motive and force and masquerading as the very stuff of truth,” 566 noting that paranoid
scholarship is so focused on uncovering and stating truth-claims that it almost turns into
a cosmological claim: this work, paranoid scholarship seems to tremble, is the truth.
And sometimes the truth does need to tremble, but is trembling all a subsection of
reality can do? Tremble?
This does not mean, of course, that Sedgwick does not think that paranoid
scholarship can give faithful descriptions of reality. Instead, it stops short of helping to
create a better and more bearable life. “Like the deinstitutionalized person on the
street,” Sedgwick writes, “who, betrayed and plotted against by everyone else in the
city, still urges on you the finger-worn dossier bristling with his precious
correspondence, paranoia for all its vaunted suspicion acts as though its work would be
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accomplished if only it could finally, this time, somehow get its story truly known.” 567
Even the knowledge of the “truth” would not necessarily help such a figure find shelter.
Paranoid scholarship is not about creating better material worlds for people, it is
primarily about discussing the ways that the world is unbearable! Heather Love’s
reading of Sedgwick is not one of wholesale rejection of paranoid scholarship, but rather
a desire to see paranoid reading(s) and reparative reading(s) at appropriate times.568
Similarly, I believe that both reparative reading and paranoid readings do have their
place in the academy: but one needs to be aware of which kind of scholarship one is
creating.
Sedgwick’s turn towards reparative reading, then, is one which privileges less
rigid ways of thinking about theory. The ability to transform the world for the better is
privileged. Reparative scholarship may “feel” and “seem” more suitable for a nonacademic audience, as it tries to demystify the rigidity of the ivory tower from within.
Sedgwick does this in her own writing, often writing in a style which feels more casual
than one usually finds in academic work. At one point, Sedgwick humorously quips that
some trends in academia “reminds me of the bumper stickers that instruct people in
other cars to ‘‘Question Authority.’’ Excellent advice, perhaps wasted on anyone who
does whatever they’re ordered to do by a strip of paper glued to an automobile!” 569
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Reparative reading, then, “allows for an encounter with forms of knowledge that depart
from the keyed-up, confident pronouncements of professional critics.”570
Similarly, Heschel’s way of reading the Hebrew prophets privileges a way of
reading that centers the ability for readers to make concrete changes in the world. By
focusing on a reading of the prophets that centers the humanity of the prophets, the
emotions the prophets felt, and the profound effect they had on their communities,
Heschel gives the reader a guidebook to become prophet-like. The introduction of The
Prophets outlines Heschel’s larger methodology for the book, as well as outlines a kind
of epistemology which privileges knowledge in the service of what Heschel would call
“understanding.” Lamenting the state of the secular academy, Heschel writes
“Explanation, when regarded as the only goal of inquiry, becomes a substitute for
understanding. Imperceptibly it becomes the beginning rather than the end of
perception.”571 The desire to explain confusing or perplexing passages — in this case,
passages of the Hebrew Bible which resist being put in one particular mode of
theological inquiry — without fully understanding them sets the scholar up for failure.
Here, Heschel does not explicitly state the difference between understanding and
explaining, but it seems to be related to “an attempt to think the present,” which is how
Heschel defines “insight.”572 Insight, Heschel continues, is “knowledge at first sight,”
meaning (I concur) not that there is something inherently visual or ocular about insight,
but rather that one can sense or understand something by the process of insight at first
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blush, rather quickly.573 Here, what Heschel means is situational thinking: the quick
awareness of how the thinker is affected by what they are reading. The stakes are high,
the thinker is deeply involved, and the thinking is emotional. Then can understanding
begin.
Speaking specifically of the prophets in the Hebrew Bible, Heschel here
discusses the violence enacted by analyzing the prophets too critically, too removed.
“Reducing them to dead objects of the mind,” Heschel writes, “…deprives them of the
power to affect us, to speak to us, to transcend our attitudes and conceptions.”574
Throughout The Prophets, Heschel talks about the transformative power of the figure of
the prophet to spur a nation or people toward ethical change. When readers of the
Hebrew Prophets lose the ability to read them in a way which can promote change,
something is lost: the prophets become “dead.” For Heschel, hyper-analyzing the
prophets in such a way to “explain away” their experiences with the pathos of God is
such an endeavor: when so-called psychological or political reading (explanation) of
prophetic activity foreclose the ability to be personally changed by the message(s) of
the prophet, the possibility of reparative reading is lost.
For Heschel, prophecy is part of a divine engagement and entanglement
between God and humankind, “Prophecy is not simply the application of timeless
standards to particular human situations, but rather an interpretation of a particular
moment in history, a divine understanding of a human situation.”575 Academic readings
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of the prophets as either politicians or psychologically disturbed irritate Heschel with
their shallowness; he believes that these readings distort the possibilities that
understanding and being affected by the prophets has to offer society as a whole. “To
interpret prophecy,” Heschel writes, “from any other perspective- such as sociology or
psychology-is like interpreting poetry from the perspective of the economic interests of
the poet.”576 While there may be a usefulness to such an economic analysis of a
particular poet, Heschel cannot see it. Such an analysis would miss the beauty of the
poet’s words, the accessibility and applicability of the poetry for a larger audience.
Heschel, as a reparative thinker, desires a pathway to look at the prophets
through a theoretical lens that will enable the reader to transform, to become touched by
the prophets, to sense them. While Heschel does not adopt an at-times casual sounding
style to achieve this goal in the way that Sedgwick does with her asides about bumper
stickers, he does want his source material of the Hebrew Bible to be accessible to lay
people.577 For Heschel, writing about the prophets of the Bible only for the sake of
academics would be the height of self-seeking arrogance. Furthermore, Heschel’s
maintenance that the prophets must spark positive social change parallel’s Sedgwick’s
call for critical theory to take ameliorative, reparative work seriously.
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The Trauma and Gravity of the Prophets: Becoming a Feminist Killjoy
Just as Heschel wanted the stories of Hebrew prophets to be understandable to
lay people and non-scholars, he hoped that people would be transformed by the gravity
and seriousness of the prophetic voice. Prophets felt the pathos of God, the pathos of
God flowed into their bodies and their hearts. No mean feat, the prophets became
utterly transfixed and changed by this experience: they became traumatized and
alienated from their communities. These stories of prophetic transformation, trauma,
and alienation should be read in a way so that the reader can also undergo a similar
transformation: to become so horrified by evil and injustice in the world that one
becomes prophetic. Prophetic, for Heschel, means willing to stand up to oppressors in
society and take a stand against injustice.
The prophet cannot simply be horrified by the world around them and then not
speak out against these injustices, the words of the prophet to the broader society are
of paramount importance. “God,” Heschel writes, “is raging in the prophet’s words.”578
And these words of God so rage in the prophet’s words because the prophet feels,
senses, the pathos of God. While Heschel is clear that the moment of sensing God’s
message is not the only significant moment in the life of the prophet - but rather that the
entire life of the prophet is significant and purposeful - prophets become prophets by
virtue of their ability to sense messages from God.
At times, Heschel describes the prophet as being so affected by the pathos of
God that the prophet is akin to someone who has experienced trauma. “Who could
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bear,” Heschel writes, “living in a state of disgust day and night?”579 This disgust the
prophet feels stems from the prophet’s understanding of how unfair and terrible is the
surrounding society. The prophet is horrified by people who only look to God for
support, “The prophet disdains those for whom God's presence is comfort and security;
to him it is a challenge, an incessant demand.”580 Heschel describes the words of the
prophet as a “scream in the night.”581 This “scream” emitting from the prophet is at once
an attempt to ‘wake up’ his or her contemporaries, but also a way to express the
prophet’s own feelings of shame and rage when remembering his or her experience of
sensing God’s pathos. Heschel is clear that terms such as “a religious experience,”
“communion with God,” or having the ability to perceive the voice of God are not
appropriate explanations of what happens the prophet when sensing God’s pathos.582
“Such terms,” Heschel writes, “hardly convey what happened to his soul: the
overwhelming impact of the divine pathos upon his mind and heart, completely involving
and gripping his personality in its depths, and the unrelieved distress which sprang from
his intimate involvement.”583 They were distressed; their “utterances were the unloading
of a burden.”584
But, by broader society the prophet is “stigmatized as a madman by his
contemporaries, and, by some modern scholars, as abnormal.”585 In the chapter
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recounting the prophet Amos, Heschel writes specifically, “The prophet's invectives
could not be tolerated by his people.”586 Because Amos so threatened peace and
threatened political authority with his pronouncements, he was shunned by the religious
establishment where he prophesized.587 Heschel’s inclusion here of “modern scholars”
points to, once again, the reparative nature of this text. The fact that some “modern
scholars” consider the prophet to be a madman is just as devastating as when the
contemporaries of the prophet did so.
Sara Ahmed’s articulation of the “feminist killjoy” inhabits a helpful role when
thinking though Heschel’s placing of the prophets as often-ostracized, non-tolerated
individuals. In Sara Ahmed’s The Promise of Happiness the figure of the “happy
housewife” is contrasted with the “feminist killjoy.” Women who want to be “good” in the
system of oppression they find themselves in begin to associate things associated with
their gender as “good.” Women “take on as happy-inducing” the objects towards which
they have already been directed, already been oriented.588 Women who resist this are
troublemakers. “The history of feminism,” Ahmed writes, “is thus a history of making
trouble, a history of women … who refuse to make others happy.”589 By refusing to be
happy by the things that women are “supposed” to be made happy by (a life of
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homemaking and rearing children, etc.) women “disrupt” the happiness of those they
are surrounded by.
Contemporary feminists, Ahmed argues, still find themselves in this role of being
the “disrupters” of society. Ahmed notes “feminists are thus attributed as the origin of
bad feeling, as the ones who ruin the atmosphere, which is how the atmosphere might
be imagined (retroactively) as shared.”590 Ahmed then thinks through this image of the
feminist killjoy, asking: “does the feminist kill other people’s joy by pointing out moments
of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated
under public signs of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses
anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the feelings get brought to the
surface in a certain way?”591
Heschel’s understanding of the ethical force of prophecy brings the prophet
surprisingly akin to a feminist killjoy. Here I am not trying to say that the prophets are
feminists — or even that Heschel reads them as such. Rather, the prophets are
outraged at times when it is considered socially unacceptable to be so. “To us a single
act of injustice-cheating in business, exploitation of the poor-is slight,” Heschel writes,
speaking of our jaded attitude towards everyday injustices “to the prophets, a
disaster.”592 Prophets take injustice more seriously than others. A situation where many
people would admit is an injustice, or wrong, is taken much stronger by a prophet. The
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prophets would consider it “a catastrophe, a threat to the world.”593 The prophets are
affected by injustices in the world to a more profound level than their peers.
A sense of alienation, embarrassment, and loneliness surrounds the prophet.
This causes the prophet to be alienated from society. This sense of ostracization comes
precisely because of what the prophet said, the prophet understands why they were
cast out, but the prophet cannot accept it. “The prophet,” Heschel writes, “was an
individual who said No to his society.”594 The prophet is comfortable even attacking the
authority of society, “The prophet is an iconoclast, challenging the apparently holy,
revered, and awesome. Beliefs cherished as certainties, institutions endowed with
supreme sanctity, he exposes as scandalous pretensions.”595 Being aghast at the
society the prophet lives in is no easy or restful task: “the prophet is sleepless and
grave,” Heschel writes, also asking, “Who could bear living in a state of disgust day and
night?”596 “It is embarrassing to be a prophet,”597 Heschel says. It is distressing to be
unsatisfied with the society one exists in.
In this way, the prophet is a liminal figure: the prophet exists in the society he or
she is so dissatisfied with, while at the same time being seen as outside society by
virtue of, well, condemning leaders of society all of the time! Heschel’s understanding of
the prophet as liminal - as inside and outside the community, as a kind of feminist killjoy
- likely reflects some of Heschel’s thoughts of his own identity and subjectivity. He was,
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of course, a refugee from the Holocaust, someone who carried with him the loss of most
of his immediate family to the Nazi regime. The Prophets is, after all, dedicated to those
who perished in the Holocaust.
But Heschel’s own identity was also liminal in America in which he settled and
lived. Heschel lived in America during the postwar 1950s and 1960s in which Ashkenazi
Jews began the process of “becoming” White. In Karen Brodkin’s important work How
Jews Became White Folks and What that Says About Race in America, Brodkin
recounts a time when she felt this transitional moment of Whiteness as it related to
American Jewishness acutely. As a teenager, she often spent summers at a Jewish
summer community where she and other teenage children would hang out, run around,
and play pranks on their unsuspecting parents. One night several of the teenagers
decided to tie their respective families’ rowboats together and push them to the center
of the lake. The next day, she eagerly awaited her parents’ and their friends’ reaction.
“We weren’t prepared,” Brodkin writes, “for their genuine alarm.”598 Her parents and their
fellows believed the act to be an anti-Semitic act perpetrated by “angry Yankees.”599
Brodkin continues,
We were surprised on two counts: that the adults didn’t assume we had done it,
since we were always playing practical jokes, and that they thought our
Jewishness mattered to Vermont Yankees. The execution of the Rosenbergs and
the Nazi Holocaust had left their indelible mark on our parents. They were all
children of immigrants who grew up in New York in the 1920s and 1930s, which
was the high tide of American anti-Semitism, a time when Jews were not
assigned to the white side of the American racial binary.600
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This shows how the period between the 1920s to the 1960s was a time of flux and
transition, and that not all American Jews who lived in America at that same time had
the same feelings about their own racial identity. For those who grew up later than the
postwar period, their racial identity was perceived by themselves as Whiter than the way
the older generation perceived themselves. Heschel, in particular, also emphasizes this
variegated and multivocal way American Jews would have considered their own racial
identity. While Jews were “becoming” White in the 1950s, it is highly improbable that
Heschel was ever able to think of himself as White. In this way, Heschel himself stands
in a liminal space throughout this process of Jewish de-racialization. Heschel was a
refugee from the Holocaust, escaping a regime which obviously did not view the Jews
as White. Heschel was also very obviously a recent immigrant and refugee to America,
setting him apart from American Jews with ancestry that resided in America for
generations.
Heschel’s liminality is part of his appeal; in the memory of American Jews, this
liminality seems important to his memorialization. In an article about Heschel’s
memorialization and legacy for American Jews, Rabbi Baruch Frydman-Kohl uses the
imagery of “crossing over” to explain both significant parts of Heschel’s life and his
appeal to North American Jews.601 Drawing a parallel between Heschel and other
“crossover” artists who were able to genre-hop, Frydman-Kohl isolates the following
times in Heschel’s life wherein he “crossed over.” Heschel crossed-over from one
framework to another when he (1) left his Hasidic community to study secular Jewish

601

Baruch Frydman-Kohl, “Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel: Theologian and Crossover Artist,”
Canadian Jewish News, April 5, 2007.

219

studies and philosophy at the University of Berlin, (2) moving from England (to where he
had fled the Nazi regime by way of Poland) to America, (3) moving from the Reform
institution Hebrew Union College to the Conservative Jewish Theological Seminary, and
finally (4) being politically involved as well as academically/theologically involved.
Frydman-Kohl finishes by linking Heschel to the Biblical figure of Abraham, “The biblical
Abraham was called ivri, one who ‘crossed over’ from the polytheism of Haran to the
land of Israel and to a monotheistic faith. Rabbi Heschel was a contemporary crossover
artist who came from prewar Europe to speak to a post-Holocaust world.”602 What this
shows is the way in which Heschel’s biography and work are interwoven together in
cultural memory. The fact that Heschel was a political activist is not only interesting in
and of itself, but because of his personal history.
Heschel was transformed by his own understanding of the Hebrew prophets just
as he was by his trauma which he had experienced by narrowly escaping the
Holocaust. Heschel felt out-of-kilter and liminal on the American Jewish scene.
Crossing-over, stepping over already existing social boundaries, he felt like a “killjoy.”
The similarities between crossing-over and feminist killjoys are large: suggesting that to
cross-over is already to be a kind of killjoy. To be in a new place, with differing
orientations and affects, leads one to feel out-of-place. Because of Heschel’s history,
theoretical commitments, and existing interest in the prophets, Heschel was in a perfect
position to enact his understanding of the ways in which the Hebrew prophet could
animate modern humans to create political change.
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Remembering Heschel
Today, Heschel is often used as an example of the coalition and cooperation
between Black America and the Jewish community during the civil rights movement.
Heschel lived in America during the time in which Ashkenazi Jews are said to have
started the process of “becoming” White: the post-WWII atmosphere of the 1950s and
1960s. However, Heschel himself stands in a liminal space throughout this process of
Jewish deracination: he was a refugee from the Holocaust, escaping a regime which
obviously did not view the Jews as White. In that famous picture of Heschel, and in his
famous statement that “his legs were praying” in Selma, Heschel is not only viewable as
an Other in America because of his extremely-visible Jewish attributes, but indeed
because of his involvement with the Civil Rights Movement. I argue that his relationship
with prominent Black leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr., his physical closeness and
proximity to King at the march enables the Jewish community – if not broader American
society – to continue view Heschel as nonwhite, a reminder of a time when Jews were
not yet White. In Borrowed Voices, Jennifer Glaser uses the term “racial ventriloquism”
to describe the practice of postwar Jewish authors to write in the voice of nonwhite
characters. These authors, Glaser claims, use non-White fictional character through
which to project their own insecurities about their own shifting and precarious place on
the American racial landscape,
We are able to discern not simply how Jews imaginatively use others to
represent their concerns or deal with their own ambivalence about race and
Jewish difference but also how Jews themselves continue to serve as lightning
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rods for a uniquely American anxiety about questions of identity in the years after
the civil rights movement.603
The contemporary Jewish community uses this same kind of “racial ventriloquism” no
longer through fictional characters, but through a process of memorializing and rememorializing Heschel as a stand-in for the Jewish community writ large.
But the Black-Jewish coalitions of the 1950s and the 1960s, while significant, can
be overstated. As Eric Goldstein writes in The Price of Whiteness, Southern Jews
“generally shied away from visible support for black civil rights, fearing such a stance
would incur the wrath of white neighbors.”604 In some Southern towns, Jewish
businessmen even signed up for “White Citizen Councils,” organizations which “actively
opposed integration.”605 While some rabbis and Jewish organizations did call for
integration and for civil rights, not all did. Championing Heschel’s involvement in the
Civil Rights movement at the expense of reckoning with the American Jewish’s
checkered past in social justice only erases some of the real alienation and agitation
Heschel himself felt because of his involvement in the social justice movement.
Additionally, Paul Berman’s “The Other and Almost the Same” suggests that
some of the Black-Jewish coalition building of this time was overly performative, and not
indicative of broader American Jewish feeling. He writes,
The sympathy for blacks that certain Jews began to feel was not, by and large, a
product of personal contact or cultural affinity--except, maybe, in the racially
integrated bohemia of jazz and a few other places. The Jews who typically came
in contact with blacks during the early and middle twentieth century--the old-time
Southern Jews and, around the country, the Jewish employers of black workers,
603
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the not very rich Jewish housewives who hired black housekeepers and were
famous for a lack of genteel courtesy, the landlords and the storekeepers who
lingered in Northern Jewish neighborhoods after black populations had replaced
the Jews--might feel no particular sympathy for the African-American cause.606
In the above quote, Berman shows how the Jews and Black Americans may have very
little interaction with one another – and when they did, it was often struck through with
the dynamics of class and socio-economic standing. Berman continues, suggesting that
Jewish snobbishness helped aide Jewish philanthropic giving to Black charities,

Sometimes Jewish snobbism played a part. One handsome check to the
N.A.A.C.P. and a proper snob could look down forever on his ordinary American
neighbors. It was possible to support black causes out of feelings that had more
to do with Jewish origins than with black realities--out of a need to justify a bristly
militant liberalism that no longer seemed to make much sense in relation to
American Jewish causes.607
Here, performative allyship becomes akin to a game wherein higher-class and wealthier
Jews could give more money to organizations than poorer, less-affluent Jewish families.
Donations to particular charities, therefore, became a kind of middle-class and domestic
virtue signaling.
Susannah Heschel recounts a passage in an unpublished memoir her father wrote,
“[Heschel] describes the extreme hostility he encountered from whites in Alabama from
the moment he arrived at the airport, in contrast to the kindness he was shown by
King’s assistants.”608 Susannah Heschel also writes, “Of course, my father’s involvement
in social issues did not always bring him the support of the Jewish community. On the
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contrary, he was also fiercely opposed for the positions he took. It hurt to read articles in
the local Jewish newspapers attacking him.”609 While Heschel was celebrated in some
Jewish circles, and was celebrated for his writings and teaching, he still felt alienated by
many segments of the Jewish community. Loneliness and alienation are part and parcel
of the process of becoming politically active. In many ways, he was a kind of “killjoy”
himself!
Heschel’s account of the prophets is radical. People, unique in their own
individuality, become transformed by an interaction with God that is so shocking, they
become traumatized. The prophets then funnel that experience through their own
particularistic and culturally specific lens and become alienated from their own
community. While this image of the prophet is full of negativity and bad affects (trauma
and alienation) it is also clear that Heschel believed that most people ought to follow the
example of the prophet. To be aware of justice is to be horrified by injustice in the world;
to be a moral voice in the modern period, one must suffer alienation. “The more deeply
immersed I became in the thinking of the prophets,” Heschel writes, “the more
powerfully it became clear to me what the lives of the Prophets sought to convey:
that morally speaking, there is no limit to the concern one must feel for
the suffering of human beings, that indifference to evil is worse than evil itself, that in
a free society, some are guilty, but all are responsible.”610
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Conclusion: The Heschel Sticker
The website redbubble is a place where artists can upload their original artwork
to be sold to consumers directly in the form of stickers, tee-shirts, canvases, and phone
cases. On this website, it is possible to purchase a multicolored sticker of Heschel’s
head for $2.60 (only $1.95 each if you buy a pack of four!).611 While the sticker is
entitled “Young Heschel Sticker,” the image is based off of a photo of Heschel as an
adult, complete with full beard and a somber look. Heschel looks off into the distance,
his poufy hair obscuring the kippah (yarmulke) that was surely atop his head in the
original photo. The image is done with largely cool colors: blues, teals, and greens, with
a splash of orange across his forehead. Heschel here is color, not as he is seen in the
majority of photographs of him, which are in black-and-white. The image is vibrant.
The artist of the sticker is listed as MASORTIX, a pun on the name for the
international and Israeli stream of what is called “Conservative Judaism” in America
(Masorti Judaism). There appears to be more than one artist creating art for the
MASORTIX page: some listings mention specific schools or groups, and the
subheading on the seller page states that MASORTIX is “Project Collab.”612 The graphic
header for the MASORTIX page reads “Creating dynamic renewal of authentic Jewish
tradition.”613 Other products by the organization ranges from serious to cheeky. A
cheeky example includes a sticker which reads “Tefillin date go bag: Egalitarianism will
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save Conservative Judaism.”614 A “tefillin date” is a phrase used in some Jewish
communities to refer to a date that goes well enough that one party stays the night,
needing access to their phylacteries the next morning to pray their morning prayers.
Traditionally tefillin are only worn by men, but another bag sold by MASORTIX
demonstrates the artist’s desire to subvert that tradition. The bag is emblazoned with
the following phrase, “Tallis. Tefillin. Tampons.: Egalitarianism will save Conservative
Judaism.”615
The insistence on the tagline “Egalitarianism will save Conservative Judaism”
seems strange, since Conservative Judaism largely “became” Egalitarian either in 1973,
when women were eligible to be counted in a minyan, or in 1983, when the North
American branch of Conservative Movement voted to ordain women as rabbis.616 Ezra
Kopelowitz, speaking of various streams of thought within the Conservative movement,
notes that “while it was rare to find Conservative rabbis who actively advocated [for]
such [egalitarian] changes before the 1970s, such advocacy quickly became
commonplace.”617 While there are still synagogues who offer non-egalitarian services
affiliated with the Conservative movement, the practice is becoming farther and farther

614

Masortix, “Tefillin Date Go Bag... Sticker,” accessed April 1, 2021,
https://www.redbubble.com/i/sticker/Tefillin-date-go-bag-by-MASORTIX/58135459.EJUG5.
615 Masortix, “Tallis. Tefillin. Tampons. Zipper Pouch,” accessed April 1, 2021,
https://www.redbubble.com/i/pouch/Tallis-Tefillin-Tampons-by-MASORTIX/58134563.440R3.
616 Ezra Kopelowitz, “Three Subcultures of Conservative Judaism and the Issue of Ordaining
Women,” Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women’s Studies and Gender Issues 1, no. 1 (Winter
1998): 136.
617 Ibid.
226

between.618 It seems possible (or even likely) that MASORTIX is using an expanded
understanding of the term “egalitarian” – transforming the term from referring only to the
exclusion of gender-based roles and obligations in the synagogue, to a more expansive
sense of openness, progressivity, and the removal of barriers for marginalized people.
The stickers and shirts which are created in Pride-rainbow colors which state “There’s
one in every minyan” could reflect this openness and progressivity (a minyan is a
quorum of 10 Jews required to say certain prayers, this is joke on the old statistic than
approximately one in ten individuals is LGBTQ). 619
As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, Heschel is often placed or
slotted into various categories, often based on who desires to “claim” him. He is
considered a philosopher or not a philosopher; a radical, a traditionalist, or someone
neither radical nor conservative; neo-Hasidic, Hasidic, Orthodox, or proud member of
the Conservative Movement. MASORTIX’s inclusion of the Young Heschel sticker
suggests they view him as kind of “hero” of the movement. Particularly, because of the
group’s parallel inclusion of humorous jokes relating to casual or premarital sex,
LGBTQIA+ acceptance, and liberal/progressive electoral politics, it seems that they view
Heschel as emblematic of a kind of progressive prophet of the Conservative Movement,
a harbinger of great things to come.
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The other fascinating element of MASORTIX is the insistence on Jewish
authenticity partnered with sexual freedom, gender liberation, and staunch acceptance
of LGBTQIA+ individuals. While this seems to run counter to my chapter on The
Sabbath, where I argue that terms of authenticity and inauthenticity always carried
within them the weight and expectations of gender roles and norms, I believe this
actually is a continuation of the same kind of discourse I examine in the postwar period.
Conservative Judaism, and other branches of liberal/progressive Judaism have
effectively reframed what it means to be gender “appropriate.” The discourse around
“appropriateness” has been deployed strategically to claim by liberal Judaism that it is
inappropriate and inauthentic to be a liberal Jew and be sexist, homophobic, and nonaffirming of marginalized gender identities. Keshet, a support and educational group
focused on Jewish LGBTQIA+ issues, has printable signs one can hang in support of
the LGBTQIA+ community. One reads “Homophobia is an Abomination,” effectively
claiming that Homophobia is the true “abomination,” not homosexual sex, as many
translate Leviticus 18:22.620 Homophobia becoming the abomination in this way makes
it seem authentic: fighting against homophobia is an integral, authentic part of liberal,
non-Orthodox Judaism.
While feelings about gender and sexuality have changed dramatically since the
1950s (and in particular for non-Orthodox Jews), feelings about Israel have changed
less dramatically. A sense of filiation and care for the State of Israel is still significant for
many American Jews. The “2017 Dyke March” incident demonstrates how feelings

620

“Keshet Online: LGBTQ Jewish Pride Signs,” accessed April 1, 2021,
https://www.keshetonline.org/resources/lgbtq-jewish-pride-signs/.
228

about LGBTQIA+ acceptance and a simultaneous commitment to Zionism and the State
of Israel have caused a recent clash for some American Jews. In 2017, Laurel Grauer
was asked to leave a Chicago Dyke March – an alternative Pride march – for her
support of Zionism. Grauer stated the reason she was asked to leave was because of
the similarities of her Jewish Pride flag to the Israeli flag (the flag she had the Star of
David in the size and location of the Star of David in the Israel Flag).621 Grauer
continues that when asked, she was vocal about her Zionist commitments,

Just as I did not hide my flag, I did not hide when asked point-blank, that, yes, I
care about the State of Israel. Yes, I believe it does exist and that it should
continue to exist. I also believe that it should continue to be held accountable and
challenged by the amazing Israeli Queer LGBTQ activists I proudly call my
colleagues, who struggle every day to make Israel more pluralistic, accepting and
accountable not only to Queer Israelis, but everyone, including Queer/non-Queer
Palestinians. In many ways, their work mirrors those of the LGBTQ activists I
work with here in Chicago, both on a personal level, and within my role at A
Wider Bridge.622

Organizers from the Dyke March claim a slightly different story than the one Grauer tell,
stating that Grauer repeatedly and loudly altered a pro-Palestinian chant that the
broader group had been chanting and was asked to leave only after a lengthy
conversation.623 Exactly what happened at the event is less interesting to me than the
resulting feelings surrounding it. Grauer presents herself as someone extremely proud
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to be Jewish, gay, and a Zionist. The three aspects of her identity are critically important
to her, such that suggesting that one of these aspects of her identity would not be
welcome at this event felt like an affront, a betrayal.
Socially progressive views of gender and sexuality, the State of Israel and
Zionism, and authenticity are recent and contemporary structures of feeling for
American Jews. What this dissertation demonstrated is some of sinews of the emotional
muscles which led us to this place. By examining Heschel as both a product and an
influencer of his time, we can see that he reflected and created affects and pervasive
moods which colored American Jewish life in the 1950s. Nostalgia for the forever-lost
shtetl coupled with dread, rage, and loss ran through American Jewish communities in
the 1950s, although a coherent vocabulary through which to express these emotions did
not yet exist. A sense of the urgency of the need to be Jewishly authentic animated both
female and male Jewish communities, albeit in differing ways. The sense of an
imperative to support for the State of Israel while having a complicated relationship with
the diaspora caused Jews to donate large sums of money to help Israel during the 1967
War, to leave their TVs on over Shabbat (so that they could continue watching the news
without turning on an electric switch), to valorize and extol the masculine figure of the
strong Israeli soldier. And lastly, Jews were navigating how they felt about their own
subjectivity as American Jews at this time. Going through a process where the greater
American society was beginning to both see Jews as White and as a political entity to
be reckoned with caused some, like Heschel, to be outspoken in the Civil Rights
movement and other social justice movements. Others worried that this could cost them
their new-found and precarious sense of Whiteness.
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I would love to claim that the artists behind MASORTIX understood Heschel as
intensely emotional and affectively complex, and this is why they decided to color in the
image of his head in a non-traditional, colorful, and surrealist way. I do not think that is
the case. A sticker of Mordecai Kaplan is sold by MASORTIX with a similar yet
complementary color story to the Heschel sticker, and Kaplan’s writings are much dryer
and less outwardly affective and emotional than Heschel’s! What Kaplan is considered
as is a visionary of American Jewry in a different yet parallel way to Heschel. Heschel
anticipated and aided the return to spirituality and emergence of neo-Hasidism as a
vibrant force in American Jewish life.624 Kaplan, on the other hand, anticipated and
aided the trend towards Jewishness as a marker of identity less focused on spirituality
or beliefs, and more focused on senses of belonging and peoplehood.625 Both were
harbingers of ways in which the American Jewish would change.
It is my hope that the above examples in this conclusion – the existence of the
Heschel sticker, the signs which claim “Homophobia is an abomination”, and the fallout
and hurt feelings generated from the Dyke Marches in 2017 and 2019 show that the
methodology towards looking at affect and American Jewish society and American
Jewish writings is as fruitful for the present American Jewish moment as it was for the
1950s to the 1960s. Affect and emotion pervades our lives, cognition itself is an
affective process.626 Beyond that, emotions animate movement though time, ideology,
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and space. By tracking these emotions, we can understand American Jewish life – and
American Jewish thinkers – better.

232

Bibliography
“Abraham Joshua Heschel.” In Wikipedia, February 6, 2021.
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Abraham_Joshua_Heschel&oldid=1005283119.
“Abraham Joshua Heschel.” Accessed February 14, 2021.
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/abraham-joshua-heschel.
“Abraham Joshua Heschel: A Prophet’s Prophet.” My Jewish Learning. Accessed February 14, 2021.
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/abraham-joshua-heschel-a-prophets-prophet/.
Adler, Rachel. Engendering Judaism: An Inclusive Theology and Ethics. Boston: Beacon Press, 1998.
Ahmed. Queer Phenomenology. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
Ahmed, Sara. “Affective Economies.” Social Text 79, no. 22 (2004).
———. “Collective Feelings, Or, The Impressions Left By Others.” Theory, Culture & Society 21, no. 2
(2004): 25–42. doi:doi:10.1177/0263276404042133.
———. “Mixed Orientations.” Subjectivity 7, no. 1 (April 2014): 92–109.
———. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. New York: Routledge, 2004.
———. The Promise of Happiness. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.
Alaimo, Stacy. Bodily Natures. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
Almog, Oz. The Sabra: The Creation of the New Jew. Translated by Haim Weitzman. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2000.
Anderson, Ben. “Modulating the Excess of Affect: Morale in a State of ‘Total War.’” In The Affect Theory
Reader, edited by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, 161–85. Durham: Duke University
Press, 2010.
Ariel, Yaakov. “Walking Together, Walking Apart: Conservative Judaism and Neo-Hasidism.” Jewish
Culture and History 21, no. 2 (June 2019): 172–87.
Azoulay, Ariella. “Potential History: Thinking Through Violence.” Critical Inquiry 39, no. 3 (March 2013):
548–74.
Baiasu, Roxana. “Religious Knowledge, Ineffability, and Gender.” Religions 9, no. 6 (2018): 170.
doi:https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9060170.
Balter, Shlomo. “Review of Abraham Joshua Heschel’s The Sabbath.” The New York Jewish Week, 1975.
Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.
Berger, Ronald J. “Jewish Americans and the Holocaust.” Contexts: Understanding People in Their Social
Worlds 9, no. 1 (Winter 2010).
Berkovits, Eliezer. “A Reaction to Tanezapf.” Judaism, Winter 1975, 115–16.
———. Major Themes in Modern Philosophies of Judaism. New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1975.
Berman, Paul. “Reflections: The Other and Almost the Same.” The New Yorker, February 28, 1994.
Braiterman, Zachary. (God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
———. “God or Nature and Vibrant Matter (Jane Bennett).” Jewish Philosophy Place, October 28, 2015.
https://jewishphilosophyplace.com/2015/10/28/god-or-nature-and-vibrant-matter-janebennett/.
Brennan, Teresa. The Transmission of Affect. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.
Britton, Joseph Harp. Abraham Joshua Heschel and the Phenomenon of Piety. London: Bloomsbury,
2013.
Brodkin, Karen. How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America. New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998.

233

Bryant, Alyssa N. “Negotiating the Complementarian Gender Ideology of an Evangelical Student
Subculture: Further Evidence from Women’s Narratives.” Gender and Education 21, no. 5
(August 2009).
“Cards and Correspondence to Sylvia Heschel, Letters for Ab and Me, 1930, 1937, 1946, 1958-1960; Box
19 Folder 4; Abraham Joshua Heschel Papers; David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript
Library; Duke University,” n.d.
Carson, Maria. “Gender and the Realms of Time and Space in Heschel’s The Sabbath.” Religion Compass
13, no. 3 (March 5, 2019). https://onlinelibrary-wileycom.libezproxy2.syr.edu/doi/abs/10.1111/rec3.12296.
Childs, Brevard. “Review of Abraham Joshua Heschel’s The Prophets.” Society of Biblical Literature 82,
no. 4 (December 1963): 328.
Christ, Carol P., and Judith Plaskow. “Two Views of Divinity in the World: Conversations in Embodied
Theology.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 33, no. 2 (2017): 97–103.
Cifor, Marika. “Stains and Remains: Liveliness, Materiality, and the Archival Lives of Queer Bodies.”
Australian Feminist Studies 31, no. 91 (2017).
Citron, Aryeh. “Laws Related to Clothing.” Chabad.Org: Jewish Practice, n.d.
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1163675/jewish/Laws-Relating-toClothing.htm.
Cohen, Laurie. “Remembrance of Things Past: Cultural Process and Practice in the Analysis of Career
Stories.” Journal of Vocational Behavior 69, no. 2 (October 2005): 189–201.
Cohen, Mark R. “The ‘Golden Age’ of Jewish-Muslim Relations: Myth and Reality.” In A History of JewishMuslim Relations: From the Origins to the Present Day, edited by Abdelwahab Meddem and
Benjamin Stora, 28–38. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
Cohen, Steven M. “Relationships of American Jews and Israel: What We Know, and What We Need to
Know.” Contemporary Jewry 23 (December 2002): 132–55.
Cooper, Tova. “Educating the Ostjuden: Abraham Cahan and Gestures of Resistance.” In The
Autobiography of Citizenship: Assimilation and Resistance in U.S. Education, 133–66. New
Brunswick: University of Rutgers Press, 2015.
Crispe, Sara Esther. “If Women Were Men: Counting Our Blessings.” TheJewishWoman.Org, n.d.
https://www.chabad.org/theJewishWoman/article_cdo/aid/632330/jewish/If-Women-WereMen.htm.
Cvetkovitch, Ann. Depression: A Public Feeling. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012.
Diner, Hasia. We Remember with Reverence and Love: American Jews and the Myth of Silence After the
Holocaust. New York: New York University Press, 2009.
Dinnerstein, Leonard. “Review of Hasia Diner’s We Remember with Reverence and Love.” Holocaust &
Genocide Studies 24, no. 2 (April 2020): 314–16.
Dreler, Peter. “Selma’s Missing Rabbi.” The Huffington Post, January 17, 2015.
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/selmas-missing-rabbi_b_6491368.
Dresner, Samuel H. Heschel, Hasidism, and Halakha. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002.
Eckardt, A. R. “Towards an Authentic Christian-Jewish Relationship.” A Journal of Church and State 13,
no. 2 (March 1, 1971): 271–72.
Efune, David. “Fresh Controversy Hits ‘Selma’: Daughter of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heshcel ‘Shocked’ by
Exclusion of Her Father From Film.” The Algemeiner, January 18, 2015.
https://www.algemeiner.com/2015/01/18/fresh-controversy-hits-selma-daughter-of-rabbiabraham-joshua-heschel-shocked-by-exclusion-of-her-father-from-film/.
Eisen, Arnold. Taking Hold of Torah: Jewish Commitment and Community in America. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1997.

234

Eisenstein, Ira. “Of Time and the Sabbath,” 1952.
Eliade, Mircea. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. Translated by Willard R. Trask.
Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987.
Eng, David, and David Kazanjian. Loss: The Politics of Mourning. Berkeley: University of California Press,
2002.
Erlewine, Robert. “Reclaiming the Prophets: Cohen, Heschel, and Crossing the Theocentric/NeoHumanist Divide.” Journal of Jewish Thought & Philosophy 17, no. 2 (2009): 177–206.
Even-Chen, Alexander. “On the Ineffable Name of God and the Prophet Abraham: An Examination of the
Existential-Hasidic Poetry of Abraham Joshua Heschel.” Modern Judaism 31, no. 1 (May 2011):
23–58.
Feldman, Ari. “These Synagogues Aren’t Orthodox. So Why Are Women Not Allowed to Read Torah?”
Forward, January 21, 2019. https://forward.com/news/417773/this-is-the-alamo-a-synagoguefully-embraces-women-in-prayer-decades-after/.
Frydman-Kohl, Baruch. “Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel: Theologian and Crossover Artist.” Canadian
Jewish News, April 5, 2007.
Gatens, Moira, and Genevieve Lloyd. Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present. London:
Routledge, 1999.
Glaser, Jennifer. Borrowed Voices: Writing and Racial Ventriloquism in the Jewish American Imagination.
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2016.
Goldberg, Hillel. Between Berlin and Slobodka: Jewish Transition Figures from Eastern Europe. Hoboken:
Ktav Publishing House, 1989.
“Golden Age of Jewish Culture in Spain.” Wikipedia. Accessed January 16, 2021.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_age_of_Jewish_culture_in_Spain.
Goldman, Karla. “When the Women Came to Shul.” In Judaism Since Gender, edited by Laura Levitt and
Miriam Peskowitz, 57–61. New York: Routledge, 1996.
Goldstein, Eric. The Price of Whiteness. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Grauer, Laurel. “I Was Removed From Dyke March Over Jewish Flag.” Ha’aretz, June 26, 2017.
https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/why-was-i-removed-from-dyke-march-over-jewish-flag1.5488777.
Green, Arthur. “Abraham Joshua Heschel: Recasting Hasidism for Moderns.” Modern Judaism 29, no. 1
(n.d.): 62–79.
———. Ehyeh: A Kabbalah for Tomorrow. Woodstock, Vermont: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2011.
———. Seek My Face: A Jewish Mystical Theology. Woodstock, Vermont: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2011.
Green, Arthur, and Evan Mayse, eds. A New Hasidism: Roots. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
2019.
Greenberg, Betty D., and Althea O. Silverman. The Jewish Home Beautiful. New York: The National
Women’s League of the United Synagogue of America, 1955.
Grossman, Lawrence. “Transformation through Crisis: The American Jewish Committee and the Six-Day
War.” American Jewish History 86, no. 1 (March 1998): 27–54.
Gurthrie Jr., Harvey H. “Review of Abraham Joshua Heschel’s The Prophets.” Anglican Theological
Review 45, no. 3 (July 1963): 312.
Haberman, Bonna Devora. “Israel, A Palace in Space: A Gendered Re-Vision of Territoriality.” Nashim 6,
no. 1 (2003): 165–81.
Hamner, M. Gail. Imaging Religion in Film: The Politics of Nostalgia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2011.
———. “Theorizing Religion and the Public Sphere: Affect, Technology, Valuation.” Journal of the
American Academy of Religion 87, no. 4 (November 2019): 1008–49.

235

———. “What Is Affecognitive?” Affecognitive ~ Religion, Film, Affect, Academia, April 11, 2018.
https://affecognitive.wordpress.com/2018/04/11/what-is-affecognitive/.
Hanau, Shira. “Proudly Observant, Egalitarian, Nondenomenational: Hadar Opens New Kollel.” The
Jewish Week. December 11, 2019. https://jewishweek.timesofisrael.com/proudly-observantegalitarian-and-nondenominational-hadar-opens-new-kollel/.
Held, Shai. Abraham Joshua Heschel: The Call of Transcendence. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2013.
Herberg, Will. Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in Religious Sociology. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1955.
Heschel, Abraham Joshua. God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism. New York: Farrar, Straus &
Giroux, 1955.
———. Heavenly Torah: As Refracted through the Generations. Edited and translated by Gordon Tucker
and Leonard Levin. New York: Continuum Press, 2006.
———. Israel: An Echo of Eternity. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1967.
———. Maimonides: A Biography. Translated by Joachim Neugroschel. New York: Farrar, Straus &
Giroux, 1982.
———. Man Is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1951.
———. Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1997.
———. “No Religion Is an Island.” Union Theological Seminary Quarterly Review 21, no. 2 (January
1966): 117–34.
———. Prophetic Inspiration After the Prophets: Maimonides and Other Medieval Inspiration. Edited by
Morris M. Faierstein. Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, 1996.
———. “Spontaneity Is the Goal.” In Man’s Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism. Santa Fe:
Aurora Press, 1954.
———. The Earth Is the Lord’s: The Inner World of the Jew in East Europe. New York: Farrar, Straus &
Giroux, 1950.
———. The Insecurity of Freedom. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1953.
———. “The Meaning of This Hour.” In Man’s Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism. Santa Fe:
Aurora Press, 1954.
———. The Prophets. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962.
———. The Sabbath: Its Meaning for Modern Man. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1951.
Heschel, Susannah. “Introduction.” In The Sabbath: Its Meaning for Modern Man, by Abraham Joshua
Heschel, 2005 Edition. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1951.
———. “Introduction.” In Israel: An Echo of Eternity, i–xxx. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1967.
———. “Introduction.” In Moral Granduer and Spiritual Audacity, by Abraham Joshua Heschel. New
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1996.
———. “Introduction.” In Man’s Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism, by Abraham Joshua
Heschel. Sante Fe: Aurora Press, 1998.
———. “My Father.” In No Religion Is an Island: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Interreligious Dialogue,
edited by Harold Kasimow and Byron L. Sherwin, 23–42. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books,
1991.
Hudnut-Beumler, James. Looking for God in the Suburbs: The Religion of the American Dream and Its
Critics, 1945-1965. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994.
Hughes, Aaron. The Study of Judaism: Authenticity, Identity, Scholarship. Albany: SUNY University Press,
2013.
Imhoff, Sarah. Masculinity and the Making of American Judaism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2017.

236

Jacobs, Melville. “Review of The Earth Is the Lord’s, by Abraham Joshua Heschel.” The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 270 (July 1950): 197.
James, William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Longmans, Green
& Co., 1912.
Kaplan, Edward K. “Coming to America: Abraham Joshua Heschel, 1940-1941.” Modern Judaism 27, no.
2 (May 2007): 129–45.
———. Holiness in Words: Abraham Joshua Heschel’s Poetics of Piety. Albany: SUNY University Press,
1996.
———. “Jewish Renewal in Pre-Nazi Berlin: Abraham Heschel Interprets.” Cross Currents 53, no. 3 (Fall
2003): 436–44.
———. Spiritual Radical: Abraham Joshua Heschel in America. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
Kaplan, Edward K., and Samuel H. Dresner. Abraham Joshua Heschel: Prophetic Witness. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1998.
Kaplan, Lawrence J. “Time, History, Space, and Place: Abraham Joshua Heschel on the Religious
Significance of the Land of Israel.” Journal of Modern Jewish Studies 17, no. 4 (2018): 496–504.
Katz, Steven T. “Diversity and the Study of Mysticism.” In The Future in the Study of Religion, edited by
Slavica Jakelic and Lori Pearson, 189–210. Boston: Brill, 2000.
———. “Eliezer Berkovits and Modern Jewish Philosophy.” Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Thought 17,
no. 1 (Fall 1977): 92–138.
“Keshet Online: LGBTQ Jewish Pride Signs.” Accessed April 1, 2021.
https://www.keshetonline.org/resources/lgbtq-jewish-pride-signs/.
Khalidi, Rashid. “1948 and After in Palestine: Universal Themes?” Critical Inquiry 40, no. 4 (Summer
2014): 314–31.
———. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997.
Klenicki, Leon, and Geoffrey Wigoder, eds. A Dictionary of the Jewish-Christian Dialogue. New York:
Paulist Press, 1984.
Koltun-Fromm, Ken. Material Culture and Jewish Thought in America. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2010.
———. “Seeing Food in the Jewish Home Beautiful and Kosher by Design.” In Imagining Jewish
Authenticity: Vision and Text in Jewish Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015.
———. “Seeing Things in Abraham Joshua Heschel’s The Sabbath.” In Imagining Jewish Authenticity:
Vision and Text in American Jewish Thought, 49–75. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2015.
Kopelowitz, Ezra. “Three Subcultures of Conservative Judaism and the Issue of Ordaining Women.”
Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women’s Studies and Gender Issues 1, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 136–53.
Kosofsky Sedgwick, Eve. “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid, You
Probably Think This Essay Is About You.” In Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity,
by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.
———. Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.
Kranson, Rachel. Ambivalent Embrace: Jewish Upward Mobility in Postwar America. Durham: University
of North Carolina Press, 2017.
Krasner, Jonathan. “American Jewry at Risk: ‘A Time to Act’ and the Prioritization of Jewish Education.”
Contemporary Jewry 36, no. 1 (April 2016): 85–123.
Kristol, Irving. “Review of The Earth Is the Lord’s, by Abraham Joshua Heschel.” Commentary 10 (January
1950): 490.

237

Lederhendler, Eli. New York Jews and the Decline of Urban Ethnicity, 1950-1970. Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 2001.
Levitt, Laura. American Jewish Loss After the Holocaust. New York: New York University Press, 2007.
Liptzin, Sol. “Review of The Earth Is the Lord’s, by Abraham Joshua Heschel.” Jewish Social Studies 12,
no. 4 (October 1950): 415–16.
Love, Heather. “Truth and Consequences: On Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading.” Criticism 52,
no. 2 (Spring 2010): 235–41.
Magid, Shaul. American Post-Judaism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.
Marmur, Michael. “In Search of Heschel.” Shofar 26, no. 1 (2009): 9–40.
Masortix. “Masortix Seller Profile.” Accessed April 1, 2021.
https://www.redbubble.com/people/MASORTIX/shop.
———. “Tallis. Tefillin. Tampons. Zipper Pouch.” Accessed April 1, 2021.
https://www.redbubble.com/i/pouch/Tallis-Tefillin-Tampons-by-MASORTIX/58134563.440R3.
———. “Tefillin Date Go Bag... Sticker.” Accessed April 1, 2021.
https://www.redbubble.com/i/sticker/Tefillin-date-go-bag-by-MASORTIX/58135459.EJUG5.
———. “There’s Always One in a Minyan Shirt.” Accessed April 1, 2021.
https://www.redbubble.com/i/sweatshirt/There-s-Always-One-In-A-Minyan-byMASORTIX/56807776.9HM5V.XYZ.
———. “Young Heschel Sticker.” Accessed April 1, 2021. https://www.redbubble.com/i/sticker/YoungHeschel-by-MASORTIX/58143009.EJUG5.
Massumi, Brian. Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham: Duke University Press,
2002.
May, Herbert G. “Review of Abraham Joshua Heschel’s The Prophets.” Union Seminary Quarterly Review
18, no. 4 (May 1963): 463–64.
McFadden, Robert D. “Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel Dead.” The New York Times. December 24, 1975.
McKenzie, John L. “Review of Abraham Joshua Heschel’s The Prophets.” Theological Studies 24, no. 3
(September 1963): 470–71.
Merkle, John C. “Abraham Joshua Heschel: Witness to God in Word and Deed.” Studies in ChristianJewish Relations 2, no. 2 (2007): 3–12.
———. The Genesis of Faith: The Depth Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel. New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1985.
Michael, Helen. “Abraham Heschel’s Concept of God.” European Judaism 30, no. 2 (Autumn 1997).
MissMuslim. “In Solidarity with Palestine and the Chicago Dyke March.” MissMuslim, n.d.
https://missmuslim.nyc/solidarity-palestine-chicago-dyke-march/.
Moore, David J. “Heschel on Israel.” Shofar 26, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 112–29.
Morris, Adler, Jacob Agus, and Theodore Friedman. “A Responsum on the Sabbath,” 1950.
https://web.archive.org/web/20120520212136/http://www.usy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/halacha-map.pdf.
Naor, Bezalel. Lights of Prophecy. Union of Orthodox Congregations of North America, 1990.
Novak, David. “The Theopolitics of Abraham Joshua Heschel.” Modern Judaism 29, no. 1 (February
2009): 106–16.
———. “The Theopolitics of Abraham Joshua Heschel.” Modern Judaism 29, no. 1 (February 2009): 106–
16.
Oppenheim, Mark. “Not 'Any Tom, Dick, and Harry": Abraham Heschel and Martin Buber on the
Holocaust.” Studies in Religion 44, no. 3 (July 2015).
“Orach Chaim 2:4.” In Shulchan Aruch HaRav, n.d.

238

Otto, Rudolph. The Idea of the Holy. Translated by John W. Harvey. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1923.
P., S. “Drawings Shown at Gallery Here: Works of Seven Artists Open at the Midtown -- Rosenwald
Sculpture at the Kleeman.” The New York Times. February 7, 1953.
Perlman, Lawrence. Abraham Heschel’s Idea of Revelation. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989.
———. The Eclipse of Humanity: Heschel’s Critique of Heidegger. Boston: De Gruyter, 2016.
Peskowitz, Miriam B. Spinning Fantasies: Rabbis, Gender, and History. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1997.
Pianko, Noam. Jewish Peoplehood: An American Innovation. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
2015.
Pinchuk, Ben Cion. “Jewish Discourse and the Shtetl.” Jewish History 15, no. 2 (2001): 169–79.
Probyn, Elspeth. Blush: Faces of Shame. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
Robertson, E.H. “The People, the Land, and the Book.” The Ecumenical Review 16, no. 1 (October 1963):
123.
Robson, Mark Ian Thomas. “Evil, Privation, Depression, and Dread.” New Blackfriars 94, no. 1053
(September 2013).
Rossiter, Penny. “Bogans: A Sticky Subject.” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 27, no. 1
(2013): 80–92.
Rubin Schwartz, Shuly. The Rabbi’s Wife: The Rebbetzin in American Jewish Life. New York: New York
University Press, 2006.
Sales, Ben. “How the Six-Day War Changed American Jews.” The Jewish Chronicle. June 2, 2017.
Sarna, Jonathan. American Judaism: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
Sassoon, Theodore, Graham Phillips, Charles Kadushin, and Leonard Saxe. “Understanding Young Adult
Attachment to Israel: Period, Lifecycle and Generational Dynamics.” Contemporary Jewry 32, no.
1 (April 2012): 67–84. doi:10.1007/s12397-011-9077-4.
Schaefer, Donovan. Religious Affects: Animality, Evolution, and Power. Durham: Duke University Press,
2015.
Schor, Mira. “The Tale of the Goldsmith’s Floor.” Differences 14, no. 3 (2003): 136–61.
Seidman, Naomi. “Elie Wiesel and the Scandal of Jewish Rage.” Jewish Social Studies 3, no. 1 (October
1996): 1.
Seigworth, Gregory J., and Melissa Gregg. “An Inventory of Shimmers.” In The Affect Theory Reader, 1–
28. Durham: North Carolina Press, 2010.
Sherman, Frank. The Promise of Heschel. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1970.
Sherwin, Byron. “Review of The Earth Is the Lord’s, by Abraham Joshua Heschel.” Shofar 26, no. 1 (Fall
2007): 183.
Sloane, C. O. “Review of The Sabbath: It’s Meaning for the Modern Man.” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly
0008–7912, no. 15 (1953).
Slucki, David. “A Community of Suffering: Jewish Holocaust Survivor Networks in Postwar America.”
Jewish Social Studies 22, no. 2 (Winter 2017).
Spiegel, Irving. “Conservative Jews Vote for Women in Minyan.” The New York Times. September 11,
1973.
Stewart, Kathleen. Ordinary Affects. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.
Sufian, Sandra M. Healing the Land and Nation: Malaria and the Jewish Project in Palestine, 1927-1945.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
Tan, Tobias. “William James and Embodied Religious Belief.” Contemporary Pragmatism 15, no. 3
(August 2018): 366–74.

239

Terrien, Samuel. “Review of Abraham Joshua Heschel’s The Prophets.” Interpretation 17, no. 4 (October
1963): 484–86.
Tompkins Institute. “Nine Affects, Present at Birth, Combine with Life Experience to Form Emotion and
Personality.” What Tomkins Said. Accessed June 23, 2020. https://www.tomkins.org/whattomkins-said/introduction/nine-affects-present-at-birth-combine-to-form-emotion-mood-andpersonality/.
Tompkins, Silvan. Shame and Her Sisters: A Silvan Tompkins Reader. Edited by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
and Adam Frank. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.
Tompkins, Silvan S. Affect Imagery Consciousness: The Complete Edition. Vol. I–III. New York: Springer
Publishing Company, 2008.
Tucker, Gordon. “A.J. Heschel and the Problem of Religious Certainty.” Modern Judaism 29, no. 1 (May
13, 2009): 126–37.
Vorspun, Al. “The Movie Selma: Where Was Heschel?” Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism,
January 23, 2015. https://rac.org/blog/movie-selma-where-heschel-0.
Ward, Kenneth. “The Religious Dimension of American Anti-Communism.” Journal of Church & State 36,
no. 3 (Summer 94): 483–97.
Weidman Schneider, Susan. Jewish and Female: Choices and Changes in Our Lives Today. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1984.
Weissman Joselit, Jenna. The Wonders of America. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994.
Wellen Levine, Stephanie. Mystics, Mavericks, and Merrymakers: An Intimate Journey Among Hasidic
Girls. New York: New York University Press, 2003.
Wetherell, Margaret. “Trends in the Turn to Affect: A Social Psychological Critique.” Body & Society 21,
no. 2 (2014): 139–66.
Whitfield, Stephen J. “Review of Hasia Diner’s We Remember with Reverence and Love.” AJS Review 34,
no. 1 (2010): 147–50. doi:10.1017/S0364009410000152.
Wiegman, Robyn. “The Times We’re In: Queer Feminist Criticism and the Reparative ‘Turn.’” Feminist
Theory 15, no. 1 (March 28, 2014): 4–25.
Williams, Raymond. Culture and Materialism: Selected Essays. London: Verso, 2005.
———. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
Wilson, Colin. “Solidarity with Chicago Dyke March: It’s Not Antisemitic to Oppose Israel.” RS21, July 9,
2017. https://www.rs21.org.uk/2017/07/09/solidarity-with-chicago-dyke-march-its-notantisemitic-to-oppose-israel/.
Wodsiński, Marcin. “Women and Hasidism: A ‘Non-Sectarian’ Perspective.” Jewish History 27, no. 2/4
(December 2013): 399–434.
Woudstra, Marten H. “Review of Abraham Joshua Heschel’s The Prophets.” The Westminster
Theological Journal 26, no. 2 (May 1964): 164–65.
Zertal, Idith. From Catastrophe to Power: The Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1998.
———. Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

240

VITA
Author: Maria Carson
Place of Birth: Winfield, IL
Date of Birth: March 27, 1987
Degrees Awarded:
Syracuse University – Syracuse, NY
M.Phil., 2016

Jewish Theological Seminary of America – New York, NY
M.A., 2012

DePaul University – Chicago, IL
B.A., 2009
B.F.A., 2009

241

